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“I believe the decision of the Court . . . entails harmful consequences for
the country at large. How serious these consequences may prove to be only
time can tell. . . . The social costs of crime are too great to call the new
rules anything but a hazardous experimentation.”
—Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504, 517 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
“When we get a little distant, some things get clearer.”
—THE INDIGO GIRLS, It’s Alright, on SHAMING OF THE SUN (Epic Records
1997).
INTRODUCTION
The fiftieth anniversary of Miranda v. Arizona1 offers a chance to assess how
the decision has played out in the real world and, in particular, to determine
whether it has harmed law enforcement. On the day the Supreme Court handed
down its decision, four dissenters predicted that its price would be reduced
police effectiveness in solving crimes. In dissent, Justice Harlan warned that the
decision would produce social costs, the size of which “only time can tell.”2
Justice White, also dissenting, predicted that “[i]n some unknown number of
cases the Court’s rule will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets
and to the environment which produced him, to repeat his crime whenever it
pleases him.”3
Since then, the Miranda warnings and the associated procedures have
“become part of our national culture.”4 But what effect have they actually had
on law enforcement effectiveness? In this Article, we take advantage of the time
since the Miranda decision—now a little more than fifty years—to see whether
1

384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
Id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
3 Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting).
4 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000); accord Tracey Maclin, The Right
to Silence v. The Fifth Amendment, 2016 U. CHI. L.F. 255, 256 (discussing entrenchment of
the Miranda decision).
2
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it has produced the predicted harmful consequences. In particular, we survey the
available empirical evidence. We collect confession rate data, both from the time
of Miranda and since, to assess whether Miranda caused confession rates to fall.
We also review the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)’s nationwide data
on crime clearance rates to shed light on any changes in the ability of police to
solve crimes. Building on research we first published in 1998,5 we capitalize on
additional data and new statistical techniques to more fully assess whether
Miranda “handcuffed the cops.”
Our focus in this Article is a quantitative one. Many academic commentators
have offered their qualitative assessments regarding Miranda’s effects on law
enforcement based on their understandings of doctrinal developments since
Miranda. These qualitative views have generally been that Miranda has not
harmed law enforcement.6 But this question is, ultimately, a quantitative one that
is best assessed, if possible, quantitatively.
Our Article proceeds in eight parts. In Part I, we describe different approaches
to gauging Miranda’s effect on law enforcement. Ideally, the issue would be
approached by evaluating whether confession rates fell after the decision. The
limited evidence available suggests that they did. But because only limited
confession rate data exist, particularly for recent years, other measures of
Miranda’s effects need to be examined.
In Part II, we explain why crime clearance rate data become the inevitable
second-best measure for evaluating Miranda’s long-term effects. Specifically,
we report the results of regression equations on crime clearance rates from 1950
to 2012, controlling for factors apart from Miranda that might be responsible for
changes in clearance rates. Even controlling for these factors, we find
statistically significant reductions in crime clearance rates after Miranda for
violent and property crimes, as well as for robbery, larceny, and vehicle theft.
We also quantify the number of lost clearances that appear to be due to Miranda.
In Part III, we take advantage of recent advances in statistical modeling to
respond to the critique (advanced by John Donohue,7 among others) that
discovering a “MIRANDA effect” depends on the variables that a researcher
includes or excludes from regression models. Using Bayesian model averaging
(“BMA”), we conclude that our findings are not generally subject to model
specification problems but rather are extremely robust. Indeed, we are able to
replicate many of our most important findings using Donohue’s own
specifications.

5 Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on
Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1059-60 (1998).
6 See, e.g., George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s Spider Web, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1215, 1233
(2017) (“The more I think about it, the more I believe that we have achieved interrogation
nirvana with the current Court’s interpretation of Miranda.”).
7 John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1147, 1157-71 (1998).
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In Part IV, we respond to arguments (raised by Floyd Feeney8) that the postMiranda decline in crime clearance rates is some sort of statistical artifact caused
by record-keeping issues or other similar problems. Here we review not only
national data but also data from some of the nation’s largest cities as well as
from California. Properly understood, the data from all of these sources tend to
confirm our hypothesis that Miranda shackled American law enforcement.
In Part V, we respond to another argument (again raised by Feeney9) that
clearance rates are not responsive to Miranda’s restrictions. We explain that
while clearance rates will inherently understate Miranda’s harmful effects, they
could provide partial measures of these effects. We also explain that lost
clearances due to Miranda are not confined to so-called “secondary” clearances.
We conclude this Part by discussing how police interrogations remain important
to law enforcement even in an era of advancing forensic science.
In Part VI, we review the reasons for believing that our 1966-to-1968
“MIRANDA effect” is attributable to significant restrictions placed on police by
the Miranda decision rather than some other event occurring at exactly that time.
We explain that police reports contemporaneous with Miranda pointed to the
decision as a cause and that other competing potential causes do not appear to
be strong candidates for explaining the pattern of clearance rate reductions we
have found.
In Part VII, we present an alternative approach to regulating police
interrogation that would ameliorate Miranda’s harmful effects on law
enforcement while protecting suspects from unconstitutional coercion. In
particular, we propose that the Miranda warnings-and-waiver procedure be
modified so as to avoid giving suspects the option to block all police questioning.
We also propose that, in exchange for these modified rules, police should be
required to record custodial interrogations. This alternative reduces Miranda’s
harms to law enforcement while better protecting suspects from abusive
questioning.
In Part VIII, we briefly conclude by encouraging the Supreme Court, as well
as commentators and policy makers, to consider alternative ways of regulating
police interrogation that do not have such detrimental effects on police efforts to
apprehend potentially dangerous criminals.
I.

GAUGING MIRANDA’S EFFECT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT

How are we to assess Justice Harlan’s prediction that Miranda would produce
social costs the size of which “only time can tell”?10 Accurately and
quantitatively measuring Miranda’s effect on law enforcement is no simple
matter. We start from the premise that because Miranda imposed new rules
restricting police interrogation, its direct effect would be changes in the results
8 Floyd Feeney, Police Clearances: A Poor Way to Measure the Impact of Miranda on the
Police, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 18-41 (2000).
9 Id. at 42-60.
10 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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of those interrogations—i.e., changes (presumably a reduction) in the number of
confessions that police obtain from suspects. This confession rate decline (if
any) is the initial subject of interest. Any such decline might then have additional
collateral effects, such as possible reductions in the clearance rate (i.e., the rate
at which police solve crimes) because Miranda causes police to gain less
information from criminals about crimes they may have committed, or causes
reductions in convictions because prosecutors lack evidence they need to
persuade juries to convict suspects.
While the approach to measuring Miranda’s effects through confession rate
changes is theoretically straightforward, the empirical information needed for
such an assessment is unfortunately hard to come by. When Miranda was
decided, law enforcement agencies did not regularly track the percentage of
cases in which suspects confessed. In fact, they still do not. Interestingly, the
Miranda decision itself rested on no direct evidence or empirical studies of how
police questioned suspects.11
One would think that in the fifty years since the decision, social scientists and
legal scholars of an empirical bent would have collected data on Miranda’s real
world impact. But little research has been done in this area. Indeed, writing in
1988, Richard Uviller aptly described us as living in an “empirical desert” with
regard to hard data12—a characterization that still is largely accurate.13
This lack of data has left some scholars free to speculate that Miranda’s
harmful effects must have diminished over time. For instance, Steven Duke has
written that while Miranda might permit some suspects to block questioning
entirely, Miranda might also lead other suspects to confess by “sound[ing]
chords of fairness and sympathy at the outset of the interrogation.”14 Duke goes
on to “speculate . . . that after four decades of living with Miranda, the small
number of suspects who are induced to remain silent by the administration of
the warnings is getting even smaller while the number encouraged to talk is at
least remaining stable.”15
Duke’s speculation is, of course, theoretically possible. But what does the
(limited) empirical evidence tell us about Miranda’s effects, both at the time of
the decision and more recently? In this Part, we consider two empirical measures
of Miranda’s possible harmful effects on law enforcement: (1) the before-and11

Barry C. Feld, Behind Closed Doors: What Really Happens When Cops Question Kids,
23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 412 (2013).
12 H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFESSOR’S YEAR ON THE
STREETS WITH THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE 198-99 (1988). Not much data existed before
Miranda either. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 501 (Clark, J., dissenting) (describing the “almost
total lack of empirical knowledge on the practical operation of requirements truly comparable
to those announced by the majority”).
13 See Feld, supra note 11, at 398 (“Despite the importance of interrogation, we know
remarkably little about what actually happens when police question suspects.”).
14 Steven B. Duke, Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the Guilty?, 10 CHAP. L. REV.
551, 559 (2007).
15 Id. at 560.
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after studies of confession rate changes conducted at the time of Miranda; and
(2) a “second generation” of studies on confession rate changes conducted in the
decades following Miranda.
A. The Before-and-After Miranda Confession Rate “Impact” Studies
In the months and years immediately following Miranda, researchers
attempted to collect information on Miranda’s impact on confession rates (and,
to a lesser extent, clearance rates). The studies of most interest for quantifying
Miranda’s costs are the before-and-after “impact” studies—i.e., studies of single
cities in which scholars collected data on confessions before Miranda and after
Miranda to see if anything changed.
One of this Article’s authors, Paul Cassell, collected these studies in a 1996
Northwestern University Law Review article.16 The article presents data from ten
general studies (and an eleventh dealing with homicide crimes only) in which
researchers gathered before-and-after information about confession rates in the
United States.17 Unfortunately, for some of the studies, there were major
problems in methodology that prevented any useful information from being
derived from them. Discarding data from the studies with major problems,
Cassell concluded that the remaining studies showed a confession rate reduction
of 16.1%—i.e., there was a confession rate change, or “delta,” of 16.1
percentage points following Miranda, as shown in Table 1.18

16 Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV.
387, 417 (1996).
17 Id. at 395-418.
18 Id. at 416-18 tbl.1.
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Table 1. Estimates of Changes in the Confession Rate Due to Miranda
City
Pittsburgh
New York County
Philadelphia
“Seaside City”
New Haven-1960-66
New Havencalculated
Washington, D.C.
Kansas City
Kings County
New Orleans
Chicago (homicides)
Los Angeles
Average of Studies
Without Major
Problems

Confession
Rate Before
48.5%
49.0%
45% (est./der.)
68.9%
58-63% (est.)

Confession
Rate After
29.9%
14.5%
20.4% (der.)
66.9%
48.2%

-18.6%
-34.5%
-24.6%
-2.0%
-10-15% (est.)

Change

Major
Problems?
?
Yes

?

?

-16.0%

-

21.5% (der.)
?
45% (est./der.)
40% (est.)
53% (der.)
40.4%

20.0% (der.)
?
29.5% (der.)
28.2%
26.5% (der.)
50.2%

-1.5%
-6% (der.)
-15.5%
-11.8%
-26.5%
+9.8%

Yes
?
?
?
Yes

-

-

-16.1%

-

Est. = estimated
Der. = derived
It is possible to take the 16.1 percentage point delta in confession rates and
derive a measure of lost convictions. Collecting all the relevant data on the
importance of confessions to convictions, Cassell concluded that a confession is
required to convict in about 23.8% of all cases.19 Multiplying these two figures,
the article concluded that Miranda led to loss of a conviction in about 3.8% of
all cases—or a total loss of about 28,000 cases for violent crimes and 79,000
cases for property crimes (extrapolated across 1993 crime data, the most recent
then available).20
These conclusions were not universally accepted. Stephen Schulhofer wrote
a response, questioning which studies should be deemed reliable and how the
lost confessions should be calculated. Recalculating a confession rate drop by
excluding some of the studies used by Cassell and including one excluded by
Cassell (the Los Angeles study), Schulhofer ultimately concluded that
Miranda’s impact on law enforcement was “vanishingly small”—i.e., a
confession rate drop of not 16.1%, but rather between 6.7% and 9.1%.21 Cassell
responded at length to Schulhofer’s criticisms in another article.22
Since then, various scholars have kibitzed on the Cassell-Schulhofer debate
offering their views on who “won.” For example, two scholars sympathetic to
19

Id. at 434 tbl.2.
Id. at 440.
21 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly
Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 538-47 (1996).
22 See generally Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda’s
Defenders, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1084 (1996).
20
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Miranda’s approach (George Thomas and Richard Leo) regarded Schulhofer’s
response as a “decisive refutation”23 of the claim that Miranda harmed law
enforcement. But another scholar, Chris Slobogin, has pointed out that, even
accepting Schulhofer’s recalculation of the confession rate changes at face
value, the figures would still show that Miranda noticeably harmed police efforts
to obtain confessions.24 Moreover, many of the kibitzers confined their attention
to the three original articles written by Cassell, Schulhofer, and then Cassell in
turn. Many of them did not notice another paper by Cassell that shed important
light on the debate.
The quantitatively single most significant difference between Cassell’s and
Schulhofer’s positions on confession rates was whether to include a figure from
the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office reporting that the confession rate in
Los Angeles rose ten percentage points in the three weeks after Miranda—
allegedly from about 40% before the decision to about 50% after.25 Cassell
excluded the Los Angeles figure as unreliable, finding the increase to be an
outlier from all the other studies (which showed clearance rate declines) and
concluding that it was far-fetched to believe that confessions from suspects
dramatically increased within three weeks of the decision.26 Cassell thought the
survey result was attributable not to some sudden rise in the loquaciousness of
criminal suspects, but rather to a problem with the survey instruments.27 Cassell
explained that the Los Angeles prosecutors received an “after” questionnaire that
had been redesigned so that it swept in more statements (including
nonincriminating statements) than did the “before” questionnaire.28 In response
to Cassell, Schulhofer characterized the Los Angeles effort as “[a] careful
study”29 and claimed that Cassell’s disparagement rested only on the “‘summary
sheets’ used by the law clerk who subsequently tabulated these questionnaires,”
not the questionnaires themselves.30 Schulhofer further argued that there was no
indication that the law clerk recorded different things in the before and after
surveys or even that the forms were redesigned.31 Schulhofer ultimately
concluded that the Los Angeles number was “one of the least vulnerable” to
criticism of the figures available for analysis.32
23

George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona:
“Embedded” in Our National Culture?, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203, 240 (2002).
24
Christopher Slobogin, An Empirically Based Comparison of American and European
Regulatory Approaches to Police Investigation, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 423, 448 (2001).
25 See Cassell, supra note 22, at 1097-98.
26 Id. at 1097-101.
27 Id. at 1098 (“The underlying methodology renders the study unusable.”).
28 Id. at 1097-101.
29 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Pointing in the Wrong Direction, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996,
at 21.
30 Schulhofer, supra note 21, at 535.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 538.

694

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:685

To resolve the competing perspectives on the study, Cassell tracked down the
law clerk who tabulated the data—United States Court of Appeals Judge Trott.33
As discussed in a later article, directly contrary to Schulhofer’s assessment of
the situation, Judge Trott reported that his collection of both the before and after
data was “extremely haphazard” and that he paid little, if any, attention to
securing representative samples or consistent survey instruments.34 The forms
were completed and collected under “chaotic” conditions and “ended up
measuring apples and oranges.”35 No controls were maintained over who was
given the forms and who completed them; many prosecutors simply ignored
them.36 Judge Trott stated that he reported these and other problems to his
supervisors at the time, suggesting that the whole process was badly flawed.37
His supervisors replied that, because nothing else was available, the data
collected would have to be used.38 Judge Trott concluded that the Los Angeles
figures “prove nothing” and that researchers should “not draw any conclusions”
about Miranda’s effects from them.39
Later reviewers of the Cassell-Schulhofer debate siding with Schulhofer (such
as Thomas and Leo, writing elsewhere) need to explain why they continue to
cite the Los Angeles study with favor40 and, more broadly, why they believe that
a post-Miranda confession-rate-decline figure is rendered more accurate by

33 Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s “Negligible” Effect on Law Enforcement: Some Skeptical
Observations, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 327, 331 (1997).
34 Id. at 331-32.
35 Id. at 331.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 331-32.
38 Id. at 332.
39 Id.
40 See, e.g., Thomas & Leo, supra note 23, at 237. Curiously, Thomas had previously
written that he “reject[ed] out of hand” using the Los Angeles data in determining Miranda’s
effects on police. George C. Thomas III, Plain Talk About the Miranda Empirical Debate: A
“Steady-State” Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REV. 933, 942 (1996).
Writing in this Symposium, Albert Alschuler opines that “Schulhofer had the better of the
argument on most points [in the debate] but not all.” Albert W. Alschuler, Miranda’s Fourfold
Failure, 97 B.U. L. REV. 849, 882 (2017). Alschuler then specifically discusses only two
points in the debate. Alschuler agrees with Cassell that the Los Angeles study was
“appropriately disregarded.” Id. at 884 n.157. Alschuler goes on to argue, however, contrary
to Cassell’s position (and also contrary to the position of others, see, for example, Stephen J.
Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to “Reconsidering
Miranda,” 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 938, 946-47 (1987)), and consistent with Schulhofer’s position,
that the New York County study should be disregarded. Alschuler, supra, at 884 n.157.
According to Alschuler, the inclusion/exclusion of these two studies “appeared to explain
most of the difference in their conclusions.” Id. But in fact, following Alschuler’s apparent
view of the debate and excluding both the Los Angeles and New York County studies
produces an average post-Miranda confession rate decline of 13%, not much lower than
Cassell’s calculated decline of 16.1%, but well above Schulhofer’s 6.7%.
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including the obviously flawed Los Angeles data. But ultimately, it is hard to do
much more with the before-and-after studies than conclude that they establish a
tentative range on the immediate, post-Miranda confession rate decline. For
example, citing Cassell’s and Schulhofer’s assessments, a 2005 report by the
National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences could do little
more than conclude that the “[s]ummaries of Miranda effect studies suggest that
the warning as it is actually delivered may have resulted in a reduction in
confessions of between 4 and 16 percent.”41
B. The “Second Generation” Miranda Studies
A more serious problem surrounding the before-and-after studies is that they
were conducted around 1966. Miranda’s defenders can argue that the studies all
reported data within a year or two of the decision, and thus do not offer a current
perspective on Miranda’s impact.42 Recent articles by Miranda’s academic
defenders have claimed that cops later “learned to live” with Miranda43—and,
more particularly, that police have learned techniques for working around the
Miranda rules.44 These developing techniques have eliminated, the argument
goes, any harmful effect that Miranda may have initially had.45
What do the later empirical studies actually show about Miranda’s more
recent impact? Here we begin to encounter the “empirical desert” problems
noted earlier.46 There are surprisingly few “second generation” Miranda studies,
41

NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS
Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004).
42 See, e.g., Thomas & Leo, supra note 23, at 245-46 (arguing that even if Miranda had an
immediate impact on law enforcement, that impact diminished over time).
43 See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 45 (1991); Charles Weisselberg & Stephanos Bibas, Debate, The Right
to Remain Silent, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 69, 77-81 (2010).
44 Tonja Jacobi, Miranda 2.0, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 16 (2016) (“Nowadays, the police
are used to Miranda and no longer consider it a major hurdle to their investigative
techniques.”).
45 See, e.g., Duke, supra note 14, at 560 (“[A]fter four decades of living with Miranda, the
small number of suspects who are induced to remain silent by the administration of the
warnings is getting even smaller while the number encouraged to talk is at least remaining
stable.”); Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Love-Hate Relationship with Miranda, 101 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 375, 440 (2011) (noting that “the multiple ways in which the police
have adapted to and accommodated Miranda over the years and the overwhelming rate of
Miranda waivers” have perhaps rendered Miranda “a dead letter”); Richard A. Leo & Welsh
S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators’ Strategies for Dealing with the
Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 433-39 (1999) (concluding that
investigators are “often” able to overcome Miranda’s obstacles to successful interrogation);
Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1592 (2008) (“As a
prophylactic device to protect suspects’ privilege against self-incrimination, I believe that
Miranda is largely dead.”).
46 See Feld, supra note 11, at 398 (discussing the lack of available empirical studies
IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 256-57 (Wesley
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as authors in this Symposium and others have acknowledged.47 But, properly
read, these “second generation” studies provide further support for the view that
Miranda initially harmed law enforcement—and continues to harm law
enforcement. In this Section, we first discuss the post-Miranda studies on police
questioning of adult suspects, and then turn to questioning of juvenile suspects.
1. Questioning of Adults
One (imperfect) way to attempt to assess the continuing validity of the beforeand-after studies would be to compare confession rates before Miranda with
confession rates after. Unfortunately, we have only limited information on
confession rates, but what little we do have suggests confession rates have
remained depressed since Miranda.
The project of comparing confession rates across time must be approached
with some caution. Unlike the before-and-after studies just discussed, a
comparison across time may not compare apples-to-apples in a single
jurisdiction. Instead, the comparison involves taking the confession rates
reported in particular studies in particular cities before Miranda and then
comparing them to later-conducted studies in other cities after Miranda. This
potentially involves an apples-to-oranges comparison if the cities being
compared are not similarly situated. In addition, because the various pre- and
post-Miranda studies have been conducted by different researchers, they may
apply different definitions and methodologies. For example, a “confession” rate
is likely to be much lower than an “incriminating statement” rate—and different
researchers may have applied different definitions to determine these rates.
Different researchers may also have collected their data at different points in the
criminal justice process. A researcher collecting data by watching police
interrogations actually conducted, for example, will necessarily miss cases in
which the police did not question anyone—presumably producing a higher
confession rate than a sample that collects data on suspects who have not been
questioned.
With these caveats in mind, first consider what the pre-Miranda interrogation
rate was. Although broad generalizations are hazardous, before Miranda,
confession rates in this country were probably somewhere around 55% to 65%.48
analyzing what occurs in interrogation rooms).
47 See, e.g., id. at 416-17; Thomas & Leo, supra note 23, at 238-39; see also Christopher
Slobogin, Manipulation of Suspects and Unrecorded Questioning: After Fifty Years of
Miranda Jurisprudence, Still Two (or Maybe Three) Burning Issues, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1157,
1163-64, 1182-87 (2017) (discussing lack of reliable research of various interrogation
techniques).
48 Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 871 (1996); see also CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION OF POLICE INVESTIGATION: LEGAL,
HISTORICAL, EMPIRICAL AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS 6 (Supp. 1995) (concluding that a
64% confession rate is “comparable to pre-Miranda confession rates”). But cf. Thomas, supra
note 40, at 935-36 (deriving a lower estimate of the pre-Miranda confession rate with which
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The earliest academic study in this country reported confession rates of 88.1%
and 58.1% in two cities in California in 1960.49 Similarly, a 1961 survey in
Detroit reported a 60.8% confession rate, which fell slightly to 58% in 1965.50
In New Haven, the confession rate was about 58% to 63% in 1960.51 These
figures deserve special attention in calculating a pre-Miranda confession rate,
because they avoid the problem of “anticipatory” implementation of Miranda in
various jurisdictions. In particular, confession rates after June 1964 might have
been dampened by the Supreme Court’s decision in Escobedo v. Illinois,52 which
led some police to adopt Miranda-style procedures even before the Miranda
decision.53 The available data from the before-and-after studies, discussed
earlier in this Article,54 also show confession rates immediately before Miranda
and can be factored in.
Next let’s consider the available data on confession rates in this country after
Miranda. Although broad generalizations are hazardous here as well, these
studies generally report confession rates lower than the 55% to 65% preMiranda rate. A 1977 study of six cities reported a confession rate of 40.3%.55
A 1979 National Institute of Justice study conducted by Floyd Feeney and two
colleagues in Jacksonville, Florida and San Diego, California reported
confession rates of 32.9% and 19.5% respectively and, adding in statements
admitting being at the scene, overall statement rates of 51.3% and 35.1%
respectively.56
The two most recent studies of adult confession rates in this country were
done in the 1990s. In 1993, Leo examined police interrogations in Berkeley,
California. Leo found an in-custody questioning success rate by detectives of
64%.57 Leo’s “success” percentage, when adjusted so as to be comparable to
to compare studies).
49 Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Police Practices and the Law—From Arrest to Release or
Charge, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 11, 43-44 (1962).
50 Theodore Souris, Stop and Frisk or Arrest and Search—The Use and Misuse of
Euphemisms, 57 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 251, 264 (1966).
51 Cassell, supra note 16, at 406 (discussing Michael Wald et al., Interrogations in New
Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1573, 1644 (1967)).
52 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964).
53 Cassell, supra note 16, at 403 (noting that the confession rate fell in Philadelphia after
Escobedo, and fell again after a pre-Miranda decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit); see also Cassell, supra note 22, at 1101-04 (discussing Escobedo’s effect on
confession rates).
54 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
55 Gary D. LaFree, Adversarial and Nonadversarial Justice: A Comparison of Guilty Pleas
and Trials, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 289, 298 tbl.2 (1985).
56 FLOYD FEENEY, FORREST DILL & ADRIANNE WEIR, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ARRESTS WITHOUT
CONVICTION: HOW OFTEN THEY OCCUR AND WHY 142-43 (1983) (reporting confession and
admission rates).
57 Richard Angelo Leo, Police Interrogation in America: A Study of Violence, Civility and
Social Change 270 (Aug. 1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at
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earlier studies, by accounting for suspects not questioned and the greater efficacy
of questioning by detectives of suspects in custody, translates into an overall
confession rate of about 39%.58
Remarkably, the most current study of adult confession rates dates back more
than two decades to 1994, when one of the present authors (Cassell, joined by
his colleague, Bret Hayman) collected data from Salt Lake County, Utah.59
Cassell and Hayman reported an overall incriminating statement rate of only
33.3%—comprised of 21.5% confessions and 11.9% incriminating statements—
as shown in Figure 1.60

Since the Leo and Cassell/Hayman studies of the mid-1990s, it appears that
essentially no empirical work has been done in this country to determine overall
confession rates of adults.61
Berkeley) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Leo, Police Interrogation in America]. Leo later
published his dissertation, in part, in two articles. See generally Richard A. Leo, Inside the
Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996) [hereinafter Leo, Inside the
Interrogation Room]; Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L &
CRIMINOLOGY 621 (1996) [hereinafter Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited].
58 See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 48, at 926-30 (discussing Leo, Police Interrogation
in America, supra note 57, at 255-68). For criticism of the downward adjustment of Leo’s
figures, see Thomas, supra note 40, at 953-54.
59 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 48, at 850.
60 Id. at 869.
61 We have located one study that reported “confession” rates. The study examined child
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Taken together, the limited data suggest that confession rates from the years
after Miranda are lower than confession rates from the years before Miranda,
implying that Miranda has in fact impeded law enforcement.62 For example, the
Leo success figure (adjusted) and the Cassell/Hayman incriminating statement
figure are both below 40%—which appears to be lower than most of the preMiranda figures. But as with the before-and-after studies, the second-generation
data can be criticized because they rest on studies from individual cities that may
not be generalizable across the country.63 And the data are also growing stale,
because no new data have been collected in the last twenty years.
2. Questioning of Juveniles
One last source of confession rate data remains to be considered. Several
recent studies have been conducted regarding police questioning of juvenile
offenders. While these studies tend to show high confession rates, they cannot
be directly compared to studies of adults because of juveniles’ high waiver and
confession rates.
A 2005 study by Jodi Viljoen found that juvenile delinquents (including preadolescent juveniles) retrospectively reported a confession rate of approximately
55.3%.64

sex abuse cases from 1997 to 2000 and reported “confession” rates of between 19% and 37%,
although it did not provide much information about the source of those figures. MargaretEllen Pipe et al., Factors Associated with Nondisclosure of Suspected Abuse During Forensic
Interviews, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: DISCLOSURE, DELAY, AND DENIAL 77, 92 (MargaretEllen Pipe et al. eds., 2007).
Some qualitative research has been conducted, which shows that police officers use various
techniques to minimize the importance of Miranda waivers to suspects. See, e.g., DAVID
SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 102 (1991). These studies can be read to
show that Miranda remains of concern to police because it illustrates how hard police work
to prevent suspects from “lawyering up.” But for purposes of quantitatively determining an
interrogation success rate, these studies are of little use.
62 See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 48, at 871-76. Writing in this Symposium, Alschuler
argues that it is impossible to ensure exact comparability between the Salt Lake County data
and earlier studies. Alschuler, supra note 40, at 884. While this point is surely true, it is
possible to try and reach some general comparisons, and Cassell and Hayman have “shown
their math” so that anyone who disagrees with their calculations can simply make appropriate
adjustments. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 48, at 926-30. Alschuler also suggests that it
is unclear how Miranda could have caused a reduction in confessions given the relatively
limited number of suspects who invoked their rights in the Salt Lake County study. Alschuler,
supra note 40, at 884. But, in fact, there are several possible mechanisms, including the
possibility that Miranda forced police to move questioning to relatively less productive,
noncustodial settings. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 48, at 881-85.
63 See Thomas, supra note 40, at 954-56 (raising this possibility).
64 Jodi L. Viljoen, Jessica Klaver & Ronald Roesch, Legal Decisions of Preadolescent and
Adolescent Defendants: Predictors of Confessions, Pleas, Communication with Attorneys,
and Appeals, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 253, 261 (2005).
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Barry Feld has conducted the most detailed juvenile studies. In 2006, Feld
collected video recordings contained in prosecutors’ files of police questioning
of sixty-three sixteen- and seventeen-year-old suspects.65 He found that “80% of
the juveniles waived their Miranda rights.”66 He further found that the juveniles
confessed and admitted all the elements of the offense in less than one-fifth of
the cases (17%), but “provided some statements of evidentiary value in about
half (53%) of the cases.”67
In 2013, Feld extended his research by publishing his analysis of recordings
from 307 files in which police questioned juveniles.68 In this sample, 92.8% of
the juveniles waived Miranda.69 He further found that a majority (58.6%) of the
juveniles confessed.70 In addition, about one-third (29.8%) provided statements
of some evidentiary value to police.71
Finally, the most recent quantitative study of police interrogation in this
country appears to be one conducted by Hayley Cleary based on videotapes of a
sample of fifty-eight youths from across the country, including both custodial
and noncustodial questioning.72 The juveniles interviewed were on average
fifteen and a half years old.73 Of this sample of juveniles, 37% fully confessed
to the allegations, 31% made incriminating admissions—a success rate of
68%—while 24% denied the charges, and 7% went unresolved.74
This research on juveniles generally shows high confession rates, but the
confession rate figures cannot be directly compared to the adult studies
discussed above. Unlike the studies noted above, these studies involved suspects
who had already been charged with crimes or who had already been interrogated,
among other features likely to inflate confession rates.75 But the most
65

Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Policy and
Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 250, 288-95 (2006).
66 Id. at 255-56.
67 Id. at 286.
68 Feld, supra note 11, at 399. See generally BARRY C. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND
CONFESSIONS: INSIDE THE INTERROGATION ROOM (2013); Barry C. Feld, Questioning Gender:
Police Interrogation of Delinquent Girls, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1059 (2014) [hereinafter
Feld, Questioning Gender]; Barry C. Feld, Real Interrogation: What Actually Happens When
Cops Question Kids, 47 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1 (2013).
69 Feld, supra note 11, at 429.
70 Id. at 440.
71 Id. at 442.
72 Hayley M. D. Cleary, Police Interviewing and Interrogation of Juvenile Suspects: A
Descriptive Examination of Actual Cases, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 271, 273-76 (2014).
73 Id. at 275.
74 Id. at 280.
75 See Cleary, supra note 72, at 279-81 (noting that all recordings involved suspects who
had waived Miranda and that because the study was based on recordings mailed to
researchers, caution is warranted in generalizing from the study’s findings because it is not
apparent how the agencies selected the recordings); Feld, supra note 11, at 420 (noting that
the 307 juvenile cases studied reflect sample selection bias because they all involved charged
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fundamental reason these juvenile studies cannot be compared to studies of adult
suspects is that they involve, by construction, juveniles. It appears that juveniles
waive rights more readily than do adults.76 In addition, juveniles are more likely
to confess than adults.77 The extent of these distortions is not known, and
therefore it is not possible to compare these juvenile studies to the adult studies
described above.
C. The Need to Move Beyond Confession Rates
In this Section, we collected every scrap of hard data we could find in this
country78 about confession rates both before and after Miranda—the one direct

cases, more serious delinquents, cases more likely to go to trial, and perhaps more juveniles
who waived Miranda); Feld, supra note 65, at 287 n.207 (noting that Cassell and Hayman
attributed a higher confession rate to certain studies due to exclusion of suspects not
questioned, exclusion of noncustodial questioning, and inclusion of only questioning
conducted by detectives); Viljoen, Klaver & Roesch, supra note 64, at 255 (studying alreadydetained suspects).
76 Feld, supra note 11, at 429 (“Juveniles waive Miranda at higher rates than do adults—
around 90%.”); A. Bruce Ferguson & Alan Charles Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39, 53 (1970) (reporting that over 90% of juveniles interrogated waived
their rights, perhaps due to lack of understanding); J. Thomas Grisso & Carolyn Pomicter,
Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Procedures, Safeguards, and Rights
Waiver, 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 321, 339 (1977) (finding that juveniles invoked their rights
in about 9% to 11% of cases compared with 40% for adults); Thomas Grisso & Melissa Ring,
Parents’ Attitudes Toward Juveniles’ Rights in Interrogation, 6 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 211,
214 (1979) (noting the Grisso and Pomicter study in which 90% of juveniles complied with
police requests). See generally THOMAS GRISSO, INSTRUMENTS FOR ASSESSING
UNDERSTANDING & APPRECIATION OF MIRANDA RIGHTS (1998).
77 See Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17
Cases, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2000, at 26, 28-33 (identifying various reasons for why juveniles
might be particularly responsive to questioning); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to
Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1160-62 (1980)
(discussing that juveniles are less likely to understand the adverse consequences of
confessing); cf. J. Pearse et al., Police Interviewing and Psychological Vulnerabilities:
Predicting the Likelihood of a Confession, 8 J. COMMUNITY & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 910 (1998) (finding English suspects under the age of twenty-five more likely to confess than
English suspects over the age of twenty-five). The available evidence also suggests that police
do not question juveniles with less aggressive techniques than adults. See Hayley M. D. Cleary
& Todd C. Warner, Police Training in Interviewing and Interrogation Methods: A
Comparison of Techniques Used with Adult and Juvenile Suspects, 40 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
270, 276 (2016) (finding that data suggest that officers use a variety of techniques, including
those “considered to be more aggressive or manipulative,” in similar ways when questioning
both adults and juveniles).
78 Another paper is underway which will attempt to discuss foreign confession rate data.
See generally Paul G. Cassell, Further Evidence That Miranda Is Handcuffing the Cops: A
Comparison of American and Selected Foreign Confession and Clearance Rates (Feb. 23,
2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
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measure of Miranda’s effect on law enforcement. We have offered our reasons
for believing that both the “impact” studies and the later “second generation”
studies support the conclusion that Miranda harmed law enforcement. But we
have also noted that these conclusions are subject to criticism for various
reasons. Responding to such criticisms is difficult because it is quite true that
existing data on confession rates are limited (having been collected in only a
handful of cities) and are now beginning to show some age.
Given that the existing empirical research on confession rates has not resolved
the question of whether Miranda has hampered law enforcement over the long
haul, the question arises as to whether any alternative approach can be pursued.
Ideally we would want a measure (1) that is consistently collected, as opposed
to a patched-together comparison, (2) that reflects the entire country rather than
just a few individual cities, and (3) that extends into current years rather than
several decades past. Whether such a measure can be found is the subject of the
next Section.
II.

CLEARANCE RATES AS AN INDIRECT MEASURE OF MIRANDA’S EFFECT ON
CONFESSION RATES

A. How Clearance Rates Could Affect Confession Rates
Since regularly collected, long-term data on confession rates are unavailable,
we must search for a second-best alternative. The strongest candidate for such a
statistic is the crime “clearance” rate, i.e., the rate at which police “clear” or
solve crimes. Since at least 1950, the FBI has collected clearance rate figures
from around the country and reported them annually in its Uniform Crime
Reports (“UCR”).79 Because of this extended range of data, clearance rates
might permit a long-term perspective on Miranda’s effects.
The clearance rate appears to be a reasonable (if understated) surrogate
measure for the confession rate.80 Sometimes police officers, lacking evidence
to clear a case, will bring a suspect in, deliver Miranda warnings, interrogate,
and—if no confession results—release him, leaving the police officers with
insufficient evidence to clear the case.81 If Miranda prevented the confession,
79

See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 2015 [hereinafter UCR-[year]]. Crime clearance rates for 1950 to 1974 are helpfully
collected in JAMES ALAN FOX, FORECASTING CRIME DATA: AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 8386 tbl.A-1 (1978).
80 See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 30 (2008)
(“[C]onfessions allow detectives to ‘clear’ crimes (i.e., close the file and classify the case as
solved by arrest) . . . .”); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 328 (1991) (“[O]ne of the ways in which police are often evaluated
is through the ‘clearance’ rate . . . . One of the major ways this occurs is through
confessions.”). For an explanation of how clearance rates understate the effect on confessions,
see infra notes 364-525 and accompanying text.
81 Obtaining statistics on the frequency of such interrogations is difficult. See Cassell &
Fowles, supra note 5, at 1063 n.38 (collecting the available data).
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by discouraging the suspect from talking or otherwise, the crime may never be
cleared. As the leading police interrogation manual explains, “[m]any criminal
cases, even when investigated by the best qualified police departments, are
capable of solution only by means of an admission or confession from the guilty
individual or upon the basis of information obtained from the questioning of
other criminal suspects.”82 Field research on police interrogations found that
“virtually every detective . . . insisted that more crimes are solved by police
interviews and interrogations than by any other investigative method.”83 And
Leo’s book on police interrogations reports “that police solve more crimes with
interrogation-induced confessions than they do with virtually any other type of
evidence.”84
Interrogation of a suspect for one crime may also lead to a confession of a
more serious crime. For example, a drug dealer might be interrogated about a
narcotics offense and end up confessing to a homicide.85 Confessions are also
sometimes necessary to solve multiple crimes committed by the same
perpetrator. For example, even if police can arrest and convict a robber for one
robbery, without a confession, they may not be able to clear four other robberies
the robber also committed.86
In the first several decades following Miranda, clearance rates were generally
viewed as a statistic that would reveal Miranda’s effects—particularly by
Miranda’s defenders.87 For example, Stephen Schulhofer’s influential 1987
article praising Miranda claimed that while some of the before-and-after studies
suggested declining confession rates after Miranda, “within a year or
two . . . [clearance rates] were thought to be returning to pre-Miranda levels.”88
82

FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS, at xii (5th ed.
2013).
83 Leo, Police Interrogation in America, supra note 57, at 376.
84 LEO, supra note 80, at 187.
85 See Graham C. Ousey & Matthew R. Lee, To Know the Unknown: The Decline in
Homicide Clearance Rates, 1980-2000, 35 CRIM. JUST. REV. 141, 153 (2010).
86 See Wald et al., supra note 51, at 1595 (giving examples of such clearances). The issue
of multiple clearances from a single arrest is discussed at greater length below. See infra notes
454-501 and accompanying text.
87 See, e.g., Richard H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., Miranda in Pittsburgh—A
Statistical Study, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 20 (1967) (discussing clearance rates as a measure of
Miranda’s effects); James W. Witt, Non-Coercive Interrogation and the Administration of
Criminal Justice: The Impact of Miranda on Police Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 320, 330-31 (1973) (same); cf. Yale Kamisar, On the Tactics of PoliceProsecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 436, 466-67 (1964) (discussing
claims by critics that the Supreme Court’s decision in Mallory v. United States reduced
clearance rates by restricting D.C. police questioning).
88 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 456 (1987)
[hereinafter Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda] (linking the supposedly rebounding
clearance rates to the notion that Miranda “posed no barrier to effective law enforcement”);
see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Fifth Amendment at Justice: A Reply, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
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Many other Miranda supporters argued that post-Miranda clearance rates
demonstrated that Miranda had only benign effects.89 Accordingly, we head
down the path of investigating clearance rates as a measure of Miranda’s effects
because Miranda’s defenders suggested it.90
While a possible consensus exists that clearance rates at least partially gauge
Miranda’s impact, one note of caution should be sounded. As we discuss at
greater length below,91 police can record a crime as “cleared” when they have
identified the perpetrator and placed him under arrest, even where the evidence
is insufficient to convict, or even to indict. Therefore, clearance rates are a quite
conservative measure of Miranda’s harmful effects on the conviction of
criminals.
In theory, one could begin to measure the understatement of Miranda’s harms
by measuring the rate at which cleared cases are later charged. If confession rates
fell after Miranda, prosecutors might charge fewer suspects because the lack of
a confession made the prosecution more difficult.92 This theoretical possibility
is, in practice, a moot point because of the lack of charging data. The FBI’s data
on charging decisions are woefully inadequate for statistical analysis, swinging
wildly from year to year during the 1960s.93 The FBI stopped reporting charging
figures in the 1970s.94

950, 954 & n.17 (1987) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Fifth Amendment] (arguing that apparently
steady clearance rates, coupled with other evidence, refute the notion that Miranda has
harmed law enforcement).
89 See SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SOC’Y, AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN CRISIS 63-64 n.53 (1988) (collecting evidence, including clearance rates, that
Miranda has not harmed law enforcement); Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to
Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1, 18 n.93, 19 n.99 (1986) (citing clearance and
confession rates to argue Miranda did not harm law enforcement); cf. Leo, The Impact of
Miranda Revisited, supra note 57, at 645 (suggesting that Miranda has not significantly
affected crime clearance rates, although “in some instances,” clearance rates may have
dropped).
90 Curiously, Alschuler, writing in this Symposium, criticizes our decision to rely on
clearance rates as a measure of Miranda’s effects. Alschuler, supra note 40, at 885. But that
criticism should be directed at others, such as Schulhofer, who proposed the idea in the first
instance.
91 See infra notes 366-69 and accompanying text.
92 See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 48, at 908-09 tbl.15 (finding a statistically significant
difference in prosecutorial charging decisions between suspects who were successfully
interrogated and those who were not).
93 Compare UCR-1965, supra note 79, at 103 tbl.12 (noting that 50,980 persons were
charged with violent crimes, derived by summing four violent crime categories), and UCR1966, supra note 79, at 104 tbl.16 (noting that 44,641 persons were charged with violent
crimes, derived by summing four violent crime categories), with UCR-1967, supra note 79,
at 109 tbl.16 (noting that 41,515 persons were charged with violent crimes, derived by
summing four violent crime categories).
94 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1065.
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One other theoretical possibility for measuring Miranda’s impact would be to
investigate conviction rates. Convictions have the advantage of resting on
presumably more reliable court adjudications of actual guilt or innocence.95
However, conviction rates would probably miss many of Miranda’s effects.96
Conviction rates typically rest on percentages of prosecutions that end in
conviction, and thus miss cases in which the evidence is too slim to warrant a
prosecution. More significant, conviction rate data in this country are
notoriously bad.97 The basic problem is that police agencies, the source for FBI
data, are poorly situated to report on ultimate court outcomes. Perhaps for this
reason, the FBI stopped reporting conviction rate figures in 1978.98 The Bureau
of Justice Statistics has since picked up the task and currently reports some
conviction rate data for the nation’s seventy-five largest counties.99 But because
that series does not extend back to the time of Miranda, it is of no use for present
purposes. Through a process of elimination, then, the choice for a long-term
evaluation of Miranda boils down to the understated measure of clearance rates.
B. What Clearance Rates Tell Us About Miranda’s Effects
In this Section, we analyze what the available FBI clearance rate data tell us
about Miranda’s effects on law enforcement. We begin by looking at national
crime clearance rate trends, which show clear downward movement in the
several years immediately following Miranda. We then turn to the issue of
whether those trends can be explained by other things going on during the late
1960s, such as rising crime rates. The standard tool for sorting through such
issues is multiple regression analysis. We develop a model of crime clearance
rates that includes potential confounding variables, and then report the results of
our regression analysis on clearance rates. Our equations suggest that the sharp
downward trends in clearance rates immediately after Miranda cannot be
explained by the other factors conventionally understood to affect crime
clearances.

95 See Monica A. Walker, Do We Need a Clear-Up Rate?, 2 POLICING & SOC’Y 293, 304
(1992) (suggesting that in England and Wales, conviction data are better than clearance data
because they rest on known offenders as opposed to suspects).
96 See Cassell, supra note 16, at 396-98 (discussing why conviction rates cannot show how
Miranda hinders the investigative process).
97 See Isaac Ehrlich & George D. Brower, On the Issue of Causality in the Economic Model
of Crime and Law Enforcement: Some Theoretical Considerations and Experimental
Evidence, 77 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 99, 104 (1987) (finding conviction rate data
“highly questionable”).
98 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1066 & n.53.
99 See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 243777, STATE COURT PROCESSING
STATISTICS: FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 1
(2013).
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1. The National Clearance Rate Trend
Did clearance rates fall after Miranda? Before 1998, the conventional
academic wisdom was that Miranda had no noticeable effect on crime clearance
rates.100 That wisdom was perhaps most prominently embodied in Stephen
Schulhofer’s 1987 article, “Reconsidering Miranda,” which argued that
clearance rates “were thought to be returning to pre-Miranda levels” shortly
after the decision and that “[s]tudy after study confirmed this trend.”101 Although
Schulhofer was forced to later repudiate his position,102 his 1987 article was
cited repeatedly as proof that Miranda had not hampered law enforcement. For
example, Yale Kamisar, perhaps Miranda’s leading academic supporter and a
keynote speaker in this Symposium, wrote that Schulhofer’s article “effectively
refutes [the] contention” that Miranda has harmed law enforcement.103 Other
scholars likewise relied on Schulhofer’s assessment of clearance rate data to
rebut claims that Miranda had handcuffed the cops.104
While scholars such as Schulhofer were happily citing clearance rate theory
to defend Miranda, they had not collected any actual data. For example,
Schulhofer’s footnotes referenced only two studies with clearance rate data.105
Neither of these studies provided support for the thesis that clearance rates have
returned to pre-Miranda levels.106 Indeed, the few other statistical analyses of
post-Miranda clearance rates that existed suggest that clearance rates fell. In
New York City, in February 1967, the Deputy Commissioner of the New York
100 See Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, supra note 57, at 645-46 (concluding that
the proposition that Miranda “has exercised only a negligible effect on the ability of police to
elicit confessions [and] solve crimes . . . ha[s] become the conventional wisdom among
scholars”).
101 Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 88, at 456.
102 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 278, 27880 (1996) (arguing that while clearance rates did, in fact, decline after Miranda, the decline
was due to other factors apart from Miranda).
103 Yale Kamisar, Remembering the “Old World” of Criminal Procedure: A Reply to
Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 537, 586-87 n.164 (1990).
104 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1066 n.57.
105 Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 88, at 456 n.52 (“Elsewhere declining
confession rates were noted at first, but within a year or two, both clearance and conviction
rates were thought to be returning to pre-Miranda levels. Study after study confirmed this
trend.”); see also Schulhofer, Fifth Amendment, supra note 88, at 954 n.17 (“Apparently, this
is seldom the case because, as my article stressed, falling confession rates have not
significantly reduced clearance and conviction rates.”).
106 One of the studies found exactly the opposite of Schulhofer’s claim. See NEAL A.
MILNER, THE COURT AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT: THE IMPACT OF MIRANDA 217 (1971)
(finding substantial decreases in clearance rates in early 1967 in three of four Wisconsin
cities). The other study, the Pittsburgh study, offered mixed results, noting at one point that
“there has been a decline in the clearance rate from the first half of 1966. One of several
possible explanations for this is the imposition of the Miranda requirements on the Pittsburgh
police.” Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 87, at 24.
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Police Department (“NYPD”) reported that clearance rates dropped about 10%
in 1966.107 He attributed the drop, “in part, to recent Supreme Court decisions
that had limited the admissibility of confessions in court.”108 In “Seaside City,”
California, which is defined as “an eight-square-mile enclave in the Los Angeles
metropolitan area,” crime clearance rates dropped about 3% in the three years
immediately after Miranda.109
Remarkably, as of the mid-1990s, no one had carefully examined the FBI’s
national data on crime clearance rates to see whether they had been affected by
Miranda.110 We set out to change that with several articles we published around
1998.111 Contrary to the implications of Miranda’s defenders, the national data
from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports showed that, in fact, crime clearance
rates fell sharply all over the country immediately after Miranda and have
remained at these lower levels ever since. In 1965, the year preceding Miranda,
the UCR noted that the national clearance rate for the “grand total” crimes112
was “virtually unchanged from 1964.”113 In June of the following year, the
Supreme Court handed down its Miranda opinion. At the end of 1966, the UCR
(which usually describes police performance in decidedly upbeat terms)
acknowledged a substantial drop in clearances.114 Indeed, the UCR observed that
the drop in clearance rates from 1965 to 1966 was equal to the entire drop in
clearance rates from 1961 to 1965.115 The 1966 drop in clearances was
“universally reported by all population groups and by all geographic
divisions.”116 In the following year, 1967, the UCR continued to report

107 See Bernard Weinraub, Crime Reports Up 72% Here in 1966; Actual Rise Is 6.5%,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1967, at A1. New York City data on clearance rates at the time of
Miranda is discussed at greater length at infra notes 252-90 and accompanying text.
108 Weinraub, supra note 107, at A1.
109 Witt, supra note 87, at 322, 330-31; see also Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1067
& n.62 (collecting other information on reports of post-Miranda clearance rate changes).
110 Research on many aspects of clearance rates is generally lacking. See Marc Riedel,
Homicide Arrest Clearances: A Review of the Literature, 2 SOC. COMPASS 1145, 1147-48
(2008).
111 See, e.g., Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1057-60.
112 The FBI’s national clearance rate accounted for “grand total” crimes. Cassell & Fowles,
supra note 5, at 1133. This included the UCR’s seven “index crimes” (i.e., murder, rape,
robbery, assault, burglary, larceny $50 and over, and auto theft) as well as negligent
manslaughter and larceny under $50. Id.
113 UCR-1965, supra note 79, at 18 (citing a 24.6% clearance rate for “grand total” crimes
and a 26.3% clearance rate for index crimes).
114 See UCR-1966, supra note 79, at 27 (“Whereas police, nationally, cleared 26.3 percent
of [Crime Index] offenses in 1965, in 1966 this dropped to 24.3 percent. The decrease was
noted in every Crime Index offense with robbery solutions having the sharpest decline, down
14 percent.”).
115 Id.
116 Id.
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widespread bad news.117 Again a clearance rate drop was “universally reported
by all population groups and by all geographic divisions.”118 In 1968, the UCR
acknowledged another fall in clearance rates.119 In 1969, the UCR reported that
most clearance rates declined slightly,120 and in 1970, the UCR reported that
clearance rates were unchanged.121 Clearance rates have remained roughly the
same since 1970.
A long-term perspective on clearance rates comes from plotting the FBI’s
annual figures. Figure 2 depicts the national crime clearance rate from 1950 to
2012 for violent crimes (i.e., nonnegligent homicides, forcible rapes, aggravated
assaults, and robberies).

117 See UCR-1967, supra note 79, at 30 (“Whereas police nationally cleared 24.3 percent
of these offenses in 1966, this dropped to 22.4 percent in 1967. The decrease was noted in
every Crime Index offense with auto theft solutions having the sharpest decline . . . .”).
118 Id.
119 See UCR-1968, supra note 79, at 30 (“Whereas police nationally cleared 22.4 percent
of these offenses in 1967, this dropped to 20.9 percent in 1968. The decrease was noted in
every Crime Index offense.”).
120 See UCR-1969, supra note 79, at 28 (“Whereas police nationally cleared 20.9 percent
of these offenses in 1968, this dropped to 20.1 percent in 1969. This decrease was noted in
every Crime Index offense except murder and forcible rape.”).
121 See UCR-1970, supra note 79, at 30 (“Law enforcement agencies in the nation cleared
20 percent of Index Crimes during 1970. It is to be noted this is the same percentage of
clearances as experienced during 1969.”).
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As can be seen, violent crime clearance rates were fairly stable from 1950 to
1965, generally hovering above 60%. They even increased slightly from 1962
to 1965. Then, in the three years following Miranda, the rates fell dramatically—
to 55% in 1966, to 51% in 1967, and to 47% in 1968.122 Violent crime clearance
rates have hovered around 45% ever since. Because Miranda probably took
effect over several years—while both police practices and suspect volubility
adjusted to the new rules123—simple visual observation of the long-term trends
suggests that Miranda substantially harmed police efforts to solve violent
crimes. Moreover, contrary to the notion that clearance rates returned to preMiranda levels,124 violent crime clearance rates in fact have been permanently
depressed since the decision.

122

To be clear, 1965 is the last pre-Miranda data point, as indicated by the vertical line
marked between “Before Miranda” and “After Miranda.” Because the FBI figures are
reported annually, the 1966 number is the first to reflect Miranda’s effects.
123 See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
124 See Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 88, at 456.
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A similar pattern appears in property crime clearance rates, as shown in
Figure 3.

As with violent crimes, the property crime data suggest that clearance rates fell
sharply immediately after Miranda and have remained at lower rates ever since.
2. Using Regression to Sort Through Competing Causes
A more thorough analysis of the hypothesis that Miranda caused the declines
in crime clearance rates must contend with other competing causes. If another
factor—call it the “X factor”—caused clearance rates to fall in the years 1966 to
1968, then Miranda would be absolved of responsibility.125
The standard technique for sorting through such competing possibilities is
multiple regression analysis. In 1998, we published an initial multiple regression
analysis of the clearance rate data available at the time.126 In this Article, we
extend our earlier multiple regression equations for crime clearance rates,
relying on the additional data that have appeared since then as well as on
additional statistical tools that have become available to address issues related
to both parameter and model uncertainty.

125 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda Is Unjustified—And Harmful, 20 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 347, 364-72 (1997); Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 280-85.
126 See generally Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5.
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The statistical technique we use is an interrupted time series design.
Specifically, we analyze whether, controlling for other relevant factors, there
was a detectable change in clearance rates at the time of Miranda. Before diving
into the complexities of multiple regression equations, however, one important
point must be emphasized. Although sophisticated econometric techniques are
available for analyzing the data, simple visual observation has its place as
well.127 The graphs in the previous Section demonstrate that there was a sharp,
post-Miranda drop in clearance rates, and that overall picture nicely fits the
handcuffing-the-cops theory advanced by Miranda’s critics. We wonder
whether the many defenders of Miranda who concluded that the decision had no
adverse effects on the basis of a posited stable post-Miranda clearance rate128
will now, consistent with their methodological approach, rethink their position
and agree that Miranda was indeed harmful to police efforts.
We turn to time series analysis of national data out of necessity, because the
Miranda decision precludes the use of other common statistical techniques. The
preferred methodology for assessing a social policy is experiment design, in
which two jurisdictions (at a minimum) are compared, one that is subject to the
new policy with another “control” jurisdiction that is not.129 Unfortunately, such
research is not possible with Miranda. On June 13, 1966, the Supreme Court
required all jurisdictions across the country to follow the prescribed
interrogation procedures.130 Since then, police agencies have generally followed
the Miranda requirements with little deviation.131 Comparison of a control group
127

See Gary A. Mauser & Richard A. Holmes, An Evaluation of the 1977 Canadian
Firearms Legislation, 16 EVALUATION REV. 603, 604 (1992) (“Although unsophisticated, a
visual inspection has the advantage of being able to assess trends across time, so that possible
links . . . may be identified.”); Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL
L. REV. 721, 759 n.183 (2017) (noting that a visual “analysis of raw trends [in criminal justice
data] can be useful”). See generally COREY L. LANUM, VISUALIZING GRAPH DATA (2017).
Various scholars have illustrated this technique. See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1071
n.80; see also Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1365, 1365-69 (2008) (praising the simple before-and-after assessments
made in Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
REV. 665 (1970)).
128 See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
129 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 127, at 740 (“‘The preferred methodology for assessing
a social policy’ is an analysis which involves ‘a true experiment in which one jurisdiction at
random is subjected to the new policy, while another ‘control’ jurisdiction is not.’” (quoting
Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1072)); see also Stephanie R. deLusė & Sanford L. Braver,
A Rigorous Quasi-Experimental Design to Evaluate the Causal Effect of a Mandatory
Divorce Education Program, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 66, 69 (2015) (comparing a group of couples
enrolled in an education program with another comparable “control” group of couples not
enrolled in the education program); Daniel E. Ho & Donald B. Rubin, Credible Causal
Inference for Empirical Legal Studies, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 17, 20 (2011) (collecting
illustrations of this approach).
130 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 488-89 (1966).
131 See Paul G. Cassell, The Costs of the Miranda Mandate: A Lesson in the Dangers of
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with a subject group is thus not possible. Indeed, it seems fair to number among
Miranda’s costs the fact that the “constitutionalization” of police integration law
has prevented controlled experimentation in this area.132
We also used time series analysis because another similar and commonly used
statistical technique, cross-sectional or panel analysis, is unavailable to us.133 In
this “quasi-experimental” technique, the impact of legal rules is analyzed stateby-state, where data from states following one legal regime are compared with
data from states that do not follow that regime.134 For example, one of us
(Richard Fowles) recently conducted a detailed analysis of the changes in
(among other things) motorcycle helmet laws in various states to determine
whether these legal changes reduced motorcycle fatalities,135 and has previously
conducted analyses of varying state speed limits and drunk driving laws on
vehicle fatalities.136 When investigating Miranda’s effects, however, despite
what Schulhofer has previously suggested,137 it would make no sense to apply a
state-by-state methodology. No “control” jurisdictions unaffected by Miranda
exist. As Stephen Rushin and Griffin Edwards have explained: “[W]hen the U.S.
Supreme Court handed down transformational regulations of American law
Inflexible, “Prophylactic” Supreme Court Inventions, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 311 (1996)
(noting the reluctance of police agencies to explore alternatives to Miranda).
132 See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 48, at 922 (concluding that Miranda prevented
research on important interrogation questions).
133 See generally MARC NERLOVE, ESSAYS IN PANEL DATA ECONOMETRICS 1-70 (2002)
(discussing the history of panel data econometrics).
134 See, e.g., Abhay Aneja, John J. Donohue III & Alexandria Zhang, The Impact of Rightto-Carry Laws and the NRC Report: Lessons for the Empirical Evaluation of Law and Policy,
13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 565, 566 (2011) (discussing JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS
CRIME (2d ed. 2000)); Raymond A. Atkins & Paul H. Rubin, Effects of Criminal Procedure
on Crime Rates: Mapping Out the Consequences of the Exclusionary Rule, 46 J.L. & ECON.
157, 167-68 (2003) (describing the parameters of a cross-sectional analysis regarding the
effects of Mapp v. Ohio on crime rates); Nadia Greenhalgh-Stanley & Shawn Rohlin, How
Does Bankruptcy Law Impact the Elderly’s Business and Housing Decisions?, 56 J.L. &
ECON. 417, 425 (2013) (“In order to identify and isolate the causal effect of bankruptcy law,
we use both a cross-sectional and a panel approach.”).
135 See generally Richard Fowles & Peter D. Loeb, Sturdy Inference: A Bayesian Analysis
of U.S. Motorcycle Helmet Laws, 55 J. TRANSP. RES. F. 41 (2016) (finding that the existence
of universal motorcycle helmet laws reduced fatalities from motorcycle crashes).
136 Gail Blattenberger, Richard Fowles & Peter D. Loeb, Determinants of Motor Vehicle
Crash Fatalities Using Bayesian Model Selection Methods, 43 RES. TRANSP. ECON. 112, 11516 (2013); see also Gail Blattenberger, Richard Fowles, Peter D. Loeb & Wm. A. Clarke,
Understanding the Cell Phone Effect on Vehicle Fatalities: A Bayesian View, 44 APPLIED
ECON. 1823, 1823-24 (2012) (analyzing the effects of certain factors on motor vehicle fatality
rates using panel data and classical regression analysis).
137 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1072 (noting Schulhofer’s suggestion of a stateby-state “cross-sectional” analysis approach to research Miranda, but also noting that one of
Schulhofer’s citations for the proposition that this is an “almost invariable” practice is, in fact,
a national time series analysis similar to ours).
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enforcement like Miranda . . . , their decisions bound all state and local law
enforcement agencies equally. This made it impossible for researchers to
compare a police agency burdened by Miranda . . . with a similarly situated
police department unburdened by these decisions over the same time period,”138
at least in this country.139 Moreover, as a practical matter, obtaining appropriate
cross-sectional data for the variables in our equations appears to be impossible,
and such data, as it exists, might be contaminated by other problems.140
In any event, interrupted time series analysis is quite appropriate for assessing
the effect of a legal reform.141 This statistical technique is commonly used to
138

Rushin & Edwards, supra note 127, at 726 n.5. In theory, such research might be
possible if some jurisdictions followed Miranda rules before the decision and some did not.
Then it would be possible to compare changes in these differing groups. See, e.g., Atkins &
Rubin, supra note 134, at 158 (arguing that because some states already had an exclusionary
rule when the Supreme Court imposed one in Mapp v. Ohio, a control group exists for
statistical analysis); Abraham N. Tennenbaum, The Influence of the Garner Decision on
Police Use of Deadly Force, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 241, 247-48, 255-56 (1994)
(supplementing national interrupted time series data with state comparison data); see also
Scott DeVito & Andrew W. Jurs, “Doubling-Down” for Defendants: The Pernicious Effects
of Tort Reform, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 543, 583-84 (2014) (using fixed effects analysis in time
series analysis of tort reform); Benjamin Steiner & Emily Wright, Assessing the Relative
Effects of State Direct File Waiver Laws on Violent Juvenile Crime: Deterrence or
Irrelevance?, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1451, 1460-64 (2006) (using a quasiexperimental multiple interrupted time series design by finding similar states to use as controls
in time series analysis); cf. Matthew Desmond, Andrew V. Papachristos & David S. Kirk,
Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting in the Black Community, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 857,
862 (2016) (using interrupted time series analysis on police 911 calls with various control
comparisons via nonequivalent and nonaffected dependent variables); Andrew Jurs & Scott
DeVito, The Stricter Standard: An Empirical Assessment of Daubert’s Effect on Civil
Defendants, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 675, 677-88 (2013) (comparing state adoption of rules on
expert witness testimony after federal adoption of Daubert compared to state adoption of rules
before federal adoption of Daubert). However, such possibilities are unavailable to us here.
Before Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), no state had adopted anything approaching
the full set of Miranda rules. Even during the 1964 to 1966 period, only a few states moved
in the direction of Miranda, and they did not impose all of the Miranda rules. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 519-20 n.17, 521 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (collecting cases and
concluding that no “State [has] chosen to go nearly so far on its own”); see also Cassell, supra
note 16, at 493-96 (discussing efforts to warn suspects after Escobedo and concluding that the
largest drop in confession rates came from Miranda’s novel imposition of waiver
requirements).
139 It might be possible to compare American confession rates with overseas confession
rates. See supra note 78.
140 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1073 & nn.90-91.
141 D.J. Pyle & D.F. Deadman, Assessing the Impact of Legal Reform by Intervention
Analysis, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 193, 213 (1993) (“Legal reform should be an area in which
intervention analysis is widely used.”); see also Anthony Biglan, Dennis Ary & Alexander C.
Wagenaar, The Value of Interrupted Time-Series Experiments for Community Intervention
Research, 1 PREVENTION SCI. 31, 31 (2000) (“Time-series designs enable the development of
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assess the effects of legal changes.142 Standard statistical texts suggest that this
technique is well suited for such issues, provided that care is used in analyzing
the data and other factors not included in the regressions are considered.143
3. A Model of Crime Clearance Rates
The first step in developing any time series model is to identify relevant
variables for inclusion in the model. In our 1998 article, we set out both our
variables and our justifications for using them at some length.144 We refer those
interested in details to our earlier article. In this Article, we will just very briefly
summarize our general approach.
For our dependent variable, we are obviously interested in clearance rates for
the reasons just discussed. To get a broad picture, we use national clearance rate
data from the FBI. We discuss possible problems in the FBI data at greater length
below.145 As a first effort, we use composite, national clearance rate data because
they may have the effect of minimizing “noise” that would result from smaller
aggregations. The FBI also reports clearance rate data in various subgroupings
of cities varying by population size. We discuss those groupings below as
well.146
knowledge about the effects of community interventions and policies in circumstances in
which randomized controlled trials are too expensive, premature, or simply impractical.”).
142 See, e.g., Jessica Dennis et al., Helmet Legislation and Admissions to Hospital for
Cycling Related Head Injuries in Canadian Provinces and Territories: Interrupted Time
Series Analysis, BMJ, May 2013, at 2 (studying helmet laws and hospital admissions); David
K. Humphreys, Antonio Gasparrini & Douglas J. Wiebe, Evaluating the Impact of Florida’s
“Stand Your Ground” Self-Defense Law on Homicide and Suicide by Firearm: An Interrupted
Time Series Study, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 44, 45 (2017) (“We used the years that have
elapsed since the enactment of the Florida law as a natural experiment to assess its impact on
rates of homicide and homicide by firearm.”); Ted Joyce, A Simple Test of Abortion and
Crime, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 112, 112-13 (2009) (assessing effects of the Supreme Court’s
Roe v. Wade decision on crime rates); H. Laurence Ross, Richard McCleary & Gary LaFree,
Can Mandatory Jail Laws Deter Drunk Driving? The Arizona Case, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 156, 161 (1990) (“We analyzed the data by applying an interrupted time series
quasi-experimental research design in order to verify whether alcohol-related fatalities had
decreased significantly at the time of the law’s inception.”); Bob Edward Vásquez, Sean
Maddan & Jeffery T. Walker, The Influence of Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Laws in the United States: A Time-Series Analysis, 54 CRIME & DELINQ. 175, 182-86 (2008)
(assessing effects of Megan’s Law on rape); Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law:
The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4. J. LEGAL STUD. 133, 171-94 (1975) (using time series
analysis to study the impact of the Gun Control Act).
143 See, e.g., WILLIAM R. SHADISH, THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL,
EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE
103-34 (2002).
144 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1074-82. The issue of whether we have properly
“specified” the equation is discussed at greater length in Part III, infra.
145 See infra notes 274-310 and accompanying text.
146 See infra notes 310-25 and accompanying text.
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Our regression equations also contain various independent or explanatory
variables for clearance rates. Identifying those factors, however, remains
somewhat of a challenge because the literature on clearance rates is surprisingly
thin, particularly regarding assessing clearance rates over time.147 The available
research suggests that much remains to be done to explain clearance rates.148
The available research does, however, offer a few possible control variables.
The factor most commonly cited as affecting the clearance rate is the crime
rate. The standard argument is that as police officers have more crimes to solve,
they will be able to solve a smaller percentage of them149—variously called the
“overload” theory,150 the “overtaxing” theory,151 or the “caseload strain”
theory.152 Although the theory has strong theoretical and intuitive appeal, the
empirical support is not completely uniform.153 Moreover, crime rates rose
147

See Edward R. Maguire et al., Why Homicide Clearance Rates Decrease: Evidence
from the Caribbean, 20 J. POLICING & SOC’Y 373, 379-80 (2010) (noting that a 2010 study
was the first English-language survey examining clearance rates in developing nations);
Ousey & Lee, supra note 85, at 142 (“[T]he homicide clearance literature is incompletely
developed . . . .”); David Schroeder, DNA and Homicide Clearance: What’s Really Going
On?, 7 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 279, 279 (2007) (noting the “dearth of research” on
homicide clearances).
148 See, e.g., John P. Jarvis & Wendy C. Regoeczi, Homicides Clearances: An Analysis of
Arrest Versus Exceptional Outcomes, 13 HOMICIDE STUD. 174, 174 (2009) (noting that
homicide clearance rates have escaped significant scholarly attention); Kenneth J. Litwin, A
Multilevel Multivariate Analysis of Factors Affecting Homicide Clearances, 41 J. RES. CRIME
& DELINQ. 327, 328-37 (2004) (noting competing theories on crime clearance rates and that
“literature on factors affecting homicide clearances is limited and yields somewhat
inconsistent results”); Elizabeth Ehrhardt Mustaine et al., Can Social Disorganization or Case
Characteristics Explain Sexual Assault Case Clearances?, 7 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 255, 25556 (2012) (“Understanding factors related to the clearing of criminal cases by law
enforcement is an important, but understudied, issue in criminal justice.”).
149 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1076-77 (discussing the relationship between crime
and clearance rates); see also Maguire et al., supra note 147, at 388-90.
150 Michael Geerken & Walter R. Gove, Deterrence, Overload, and Incapacitation: An
Empirical Evaluation, 56 SOC. FORCES 424, 429-31 (1977).
151 Daniel Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, in
DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON
CRIME RATES 95, 119 (Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen & Daniel Nagin eds., 1978).
152 Kenneth J. Litwin & Yili Xu, The Dynamic Nature of Homicide Clearances: A
Multilevel Model Comparison of Three Time Periods, 11 HOMICIDE STUD. 94, 101 (2007).
153 Compare JAN M. CHAIKEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, R-1777-DOJ, THE CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION PROCESS VOLUME II: SURVEY OF MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY POLICE
DEPARTMENTS 41 (1975) (supporting theory), and Hyunseok Jang, Larry T. Hoover & Brian
A. Lawton, Effect of Broken Windows Enforcement on Clearance Rates, 36 J. CRIM. JUST.
529, 536 (2008) (same), and Maguire et al., supra note 147, at 388-90 (same), and Gorazd
Meško, Darko Maver & Ines Klinkon, Urban Crime and Criminal Investigation in Slovenia,
in URBANIZATION, POLICING, AND SECURITY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 301, 317 (Gary Cordner,
AnnMarie Cordner & Dilip K. Das eds., 2010) (reporting data supporting theory from
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significantly throughout the 1960s and later, and then began declining
significantly in the early 1990s, a pattern that does not correspond to the sharp
1966-to-1968 decline in clearance rates. To control for the number of crimes,
we collected FBI data on the estimated number of FBI “violent” crimes
committed across the country each year from 1950 through 2012.154 This
variable, converted to a crime rate by dividing the number of “violent” crimes
by the resident population of the country, is identified as VIOLENT CRIME
RATE.155
Apart from the crime rate, the factors most often cited as influencing
clearance rates are law enforcement personnel and expenditures on law
enforcement.156 With more personnel and resources available, the argument
goes, more crimes should be cleared, although (once again) despite the intuitive
appeal of the hypothesis, the studies are mixed.157 To control for any influences

Slovenia), and Ko-Hsin Hsu, Homicide Clearance Determinants: An Analysis of the Police
Departments of the 100 Largest U.S. Cities 58 (2007) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University
of Maryland, College Park) (on file with authors) (“In the end, having more sworn officers
significantly changed (increased) the homicide clearance rates of low-clearance
departments.”), with William M. Doerner & William G. Doerner, Police Accreditation and
Clearance Rates, 35 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 6, 18 (2012) (concluding
that rising crime rates put greater pressure on police to solve crimes), and Litwin & Xu, supra
note 152, at 108 (finding slim support for the theory), and Ousey & Lee, supra note 85, at 150
(finding little evidence for overload theory), and Paul-Philippe Paré, Richard B. Felson &
Marc Ouimet, Community Variation in Crime Clearance: A Multilevel Analysis with
Comments on Assessing Police Performance, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 243, 252
(2007) (describing a Canadian study that found workload only affected clearance of
misdemeanors, not clearance of violent or property crimes), and Janice L. Puckett & Richard
J. Lundman, Factors Affecting Homicide Clearances: Multivariate Analysis of a More
Complete Conceptual Framework, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 183 (2003) (finding that
detective workload had no effect on homicide clearance), and Aki Roberts, The Influences of
Incident and Contextual Characteristics on Crime Clearance of Nonlethal Violence: A
Multilevel Event History Analysis, 36 J. CRIM. JUST. 61, 68-69 (2008) (finding no significant
effects of police resources on clearance rates). For more information, see Cassell & Fowles,
supra note 5, at 1077 n.113 (collecting earlier research on this issue).
154 In the FBI crime reports, “violent” crimes are murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated
assault.
155
In our earlier paper, we used the total crime rate as the measure of workload on the
system. See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1077. In this Article, in an effort to minimize
differences between our approach and John Donohue’s approach, we use the violent crime
rate. See Donohue, supra note 7, at 1153-55, 1164-65 (justifying violent crime rate as the
appropriate workload measure).
156 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1077-78.
157 Id. at 1077-78 & n.117; see also Charles Wellford & James Cronin, Clearing Up
Homicide Clearance Rates, 243 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 2, 6 (2000) (finding that assigning
multiple detectives to investigate is among those factors linked to high homicide clearance
rates); Inimai M. Chettiar, More Police, Managed More Effectively, Really Can Reduce
(Feb.
11,
2015),
Crime,
ATLANTIC
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these factors may have, we collected data on the number of law enforcement
employees per capita (“POLICE PERSONNEL”) and the dollars spent on police
protection per capita by state and local governments, adjusted for inflation by
the consumer price index (“POLICE DOLLARS (REAL)”).158
Because our focus is on policing, we did not include any variables for later
stages in the criminal justice process, such as sentencing. How changes in
imprisonment rates affect crime rates is a subject of debate.159 Because we are
focusing on the “front end” of the criminal justice process—police investigative
activities—controlling for events at the back end did not strike us as particularly
important.
Criminal justice variables are not the only ones that might affect clearance
rates. The criminal justice literature identifies other variables, including
demographic variables, as having some bearing on clearance rates or, more
generally, on crime rates.160 While concerns have been raised in criminal justice

http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/02/more-police-managed-moreeffectively-really-can-reducecrime/385390/ [https://perma.cc/UH3B-ZW2C].
158 Schulhofer has previously suggested that clearance rates would respond not simply to
changes in law enforcement manpower and expenditures, but also to interactions between
these variables and the overall number of crimes—what he calls the “capacity” of the system.
Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 291. To test his theory, in our previous article, we added to the
equations PERSONNEL CAPACITY, which was defined as the rate of police employees per
capita divided by the crime rate for index crimes, and DOLLAR CAPACITY (REAL), which
was defined as the number of inflation-adjusted dollars spent on police protection per capita
divided by the crime rate for index crimes. Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1078. However,
these artificial variables had little influence on our earlier equations, so we did not include
them again here. Id. at 1083 tbl.I.
159 Compare BARRY LATZER, THE RISE AND FALL OF VIOLENT CRIME IN AMERICA 249
(2016) (citing a “revivified criminal justice system” as an important cause of downward crime
trends in the 1990s), and BERT USEEM & ANNE MORRISON PIEHL, PRISON STATE: THE
CHALLENGE OF MASS INCARCERATION 51-80 (2008) (offering evidence for the proposition
“more prison, less crime”), with OLIVER ROEDER, LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & JULIA BOWLING,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME DECLINE? 3-4 (2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/what-caused-crime-decline
[https://perma.cc/4SRA-NGAA].
160 In our earlier article, we explained that we did not include any racial variables in our
equations because, among other reasons, long-term racial changes are unlikely to explain
short-term clearance rate fluctuations and the empirical support for an association with
clearance rates is thin. Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1078 n.121 (citing Peggy S.
Sullivan, Determinants of Crime and Clearance Rates for Seven Index Crimes 163-64 (Dec.
1985) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Vanderbilt University) (on file with authors)). Since
then, a few studies have suggested race might have a connection to clearance rates, although
this conclusion is disputed. See, e.g., Lynn A. Addington, Using National Incident-Based
Reporting System Murder Data to Evaluate Clearance Predictors, 10 HOMICIDE STUD. 140,
148 (2006) (finding murders of white victims more likely to be cleared than murders involving
nonwhite victims); Catherine Lee, The Value of Life in Death: Multiple Regression and Event
History Analyses of Homicide Clearance in Los Angeles County, 33 J. CRIM. JUST. 527, 530
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research about “overmodeling” demographic variables,161 we believe some
limited variables could be appropriately included. Perhaps the most salient of
these factors is the number of persons in the crime-prone juvenile years. Most
crimes are committed by persons who are in adolescence or early adulthood.162
Increases in the number of young persons, particularly in connection with the
post-World War II “baby boom,” have been linked with changes in crime
rates.163 The age band commonly identified with this effect is fifteen to twentyfour,164 which also corresponds to readily available census data. In addition,
there is some mixed evidence of age-related effects on clearance rates.165 Since
(2005) (finding homicide cases involving nonwhite victims less likely to be cleared); Yili Xu,
Characteristics of Homicide Events and the Decline in Homicide Clearance: A Longitudinal
Approach to the Dynamic Relationship, Chicago 1966-1995, 33 CRIM. JUST. REV. 453, 46566 (2008) (finding that Latino victims and, in some models, African American victims
associated with lower likelihood of clearance); cf. Litwin, supra note 148, at 339 (finding
homicides with African American victims not less likely to be cleared, but homicides with
Latino victims less likely to be cleared). But see Ousey & Lee, supra note 85, at 149 (finding
no effect on homicide clearance rates from racial composition of the population). Because we
continue to believe long-term racial demography is likely to have low predictive power in our
equations, we did not include any racial variables here.
More broadly, criminologists have been debating whether “discretionary” factors (such as
the social position of victims) or “nondiscretionary” factors (such as police workloads)
explain crime clearance rates. See Brian Lockwood, What Clears Burglary Offenses?
Estimating the Influences of Multiple Perspectives of Burglary Clearance in Philadelphia, 37
POLICING 746, 748 (2014) (collecting citations to the literature). Because the empirical support
for such theories is “decidedly mixed,” and because such general attitudinal variables are
unlikely to explain a sudden shift from 1966 to 1968, we did not include any such variables
here. See id. at 748-49.
161 Compare LOTT, supra note 134, at 146-48, 187 (defending use to avoid omitted variable
problem), with Aneja, Donohue & Zhang, supra note 134, at 593 (criticizing use of thirty-six
demographic controls in “right-to-carry” firearms research).
162 The seminal article on this point remains Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Age
and the Explanation of Crime, 89 AM. J. SOC. 552 (1983).
163 See, e.g., LATZER, supra note 159, at 243-52; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT
AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 56-63 (2007). But cf. Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime
Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON.
PERSP. 163, 171-72 (2004) (arguing that an aging population might account for decline in
property crime rates in the 1990s but that it was not an important factor for decline in violent
crime rates).
164 Yale Kamisar, How to Use, Abuse—And Fight Back with—Crime Statistics, 25 OKLA.
L. REV. 239, 246 (1972) (identifying the fifteen to twenty-four age band as having the most
influence on crime rates); see also PATSY KLAUS & CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 190104, AGE PATTERNS IN VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION, 1976-2000, at 1 (2002)
(discussing the rate of nonfatal violent victimization by age groups).
165 See Lee, supra note 160, at 530 (finding homicide cases involving old victims less
likely to be solved); Litwin, supra note 148, at 341 (finding cases with child victims more
likely to be cleared than cases with older victims); Litwin & Xu, supra note 152, at 104 (“The
victim’s age has a significant negative relationship with homicide clearances . . . .”).
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it is conceivable that changes in the proportion of the population in the juvenile
age band might be associated with changes in clearance rates, we included a
variable to take into account this factor (“JUVENILES”).
Changes in various socioeconomic variables are also plausible candidates for
affecting clearance rates. For example, criminal justice literature identifies
variances in the unemployment rate as a possible explanation for crime rate
fluctuations.166 Similarly, changes in income levels and labor force participation
might be associated with crime rates167 and clearance rates,168 particularly since
such factors might be viewed as a measure of the opportunity cost of committing
a crime. While the evidence regarding effects on clearance rates of such
variables is mixed,169 we included variables for the labor force participation
(“LABOR
FORCE
PARTICIPATION”),
unemployment
rate
(“UNEMPLOYMENT”), and disposable per capita real income (“PER CAPITA
INCOME (REAL)”).170
As a measure of changing social circumstances that might be related to crime,
we also added a variable that measured live births to unmarried mothers171 and
converted it to a per capita rate by dividing by resident population (“BIRTHS
TO UNMARRIED WOMEN”).
166

See, e.g., ROEDER, EISEN & BOWLING, supra note 159, at 48-53 (“Consistent with the
larger body of research, this report finds that the decrease in unemployment in the 1990s was
responsible for about 0 to 5 percent of that decade’s crime drop.”). For additional literature
on this issue, see Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1079 n.127.
167 See ROEDER, EISEN & BOWLING, supra note 159, at 49-51 (“In line with the past body
of research, this report finds that increases in per capita income were responsible for 5 to 10
percent of the decreases in crime in both the 1990s and the 2000s.”); Richard Fowles & Mary
Merva, Wage Inequality and Criminal Activity: An Extreme Bounds Analysis for the United
States, 1975-1990, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 163, 179-80 (1996) (finding robust linkages between
wage inequality and murder and assault rates).
168 See Ousey & Lee, supra note 85, at 151 (finding contrary-to-expectation positive
association between economic deprivation and homicide clearance rates); Xu, supra note 160,
at 468 (finding a significant negative effect of median household income on clearance rates
in one model).
169 See Mustaine et al., supra note 148, at 258-62, 272-73; Roberts, supra note 153, at 67
(finding unemployment rate had a statistically significant negative effect on robbery and
aggravated assault clearance rates, but not rape clearance rates).
170 It has very recently been suggested that there is a clear link between interest rates and
crimes. See James Austin & Gregory D. Squires, The ‘Startling’ Link Between Low Interest
REPORT
(Dec.
6,
2016),
Rates
and
Low
Crime,
CRIME
http://thecrimereport.org/2016/12/06/the-startling-link-between-low-interest-rates-and-lowcrime/ [https://perma.cc/H6XB-9UMF] (“When interest rates go up, crime goes up. When
interest rates go down, crime goes down.”). Because this possible linkage came to our
attention so late in the process of our research, we were not able to explore it further.
171 Cf. Ousey & Lee, supra note 85, at 151 (finding no statistically significant relationship
between homicide clearances and measure of family breakdown); Sullivan, supra note 160,
at 165 (finding a relationship between murder clearances and the percentage of families with
single mothers).
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It has also been suggested that increasing urbanization during the 1960s was
an explanation for rising crime rates.172 Conceivably, urbanization could have
some bearing on clearance rates as well.173 For instance, clearance rates for index
crimes are generally higher in smaller cities.174 A few studies of clearance rates,
however, have found slim predictive power in urbanization.175 To control for the
possible effects of urbanization, we added a variable for the percent of the
resident population residing in urban areas (“URBANIZATION”).
Schulhofer has also suggested that a control variable should be included for
the distribution of crimes committed in large and small cities.176 Because smaller
cities have higher clearance rates, Schulhofer reasons that a shift in the
distribution of crimes could bias our results.177 To test this hypothesis, we
controlled for the percentage of violent crimes committed in small cities, as
reported in the UCR (“CRIME IN SMALL CITIES”).
As a final control, we added a standard time trend variable, identified as
“TREND OVER TIME.” Although some cautions have been raised about such
a variable,178 we thought it might be useful to control for long-term, time-related
trends apart from Miranda.
We believe we included the most important variables that might have
influenced crime clearance rates over the years 1950 to 2012, along with the
Miranda variable.179 To capture the effects of the Miranda decision, we included

172 See Kamisar, supra note 164, at 247. See generally LATZER, supra note 159, at 50-56
(discussing African American urbanization and crime rates); URBANIZATION, POLICING, AND
SECURITY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 153, at 4; Ajaz Ahmad Malik, Urbanization and
Crime: A Relational Analysis, 21 J. HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 68, 69-70 (2016) (reviewing literature
on the connection between crime and city size).
173 See Schulhofer, supra note 125, at 366-68 (noting that “[c]learance rates are
consistently lower in the larger cities” and suggesting that as a greater percentage of the
population exists in large cities, and therefore a greater percentage of crimes are committed
in large cities, the national clearance rate will be affected).
174 See UCR-2010, supra note 79, at 317 tbl.25 (reporting that violent crime clearance rates
were 39.9% for cities with populations larger than 250,000, 47.6% for cities with populations
of 50,000 to 99,999, and 56.5% for cities with populations smaller than 10,000).
175 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1080 n.133 (collecting studies).
176 See Schulhofer, supra note 125, at 366-67 (suggesting this control for violent crimes).
177 Id. at 367.
178 See, e.g., Charles R. Nelson & Heejoon Kang, Pitfalls in the Use of Time as an
Explanatory Variable in Regression, 2 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 73, 80 (1984).
179 We were intrigued by the possibility that increased cell phone usage might have had
some effect on clearance rates. See generally Jonathan Klick, John MacDonald & Thomas
Stratmann, Mobile Phones and Crime Deterrence: An Underappreciated Link, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 243 (Alon Harel & Keith N. Hylton eds.,
2012). However, we could find no developed body of literature on clearance rates and cell
phones. Even if we could, cell phones appeared on the scene well after Miranda. Accordingly,
we did not include a variable for cell phone usage.
It has also been suggested that increases in abortion after Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
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led to changes in crime rates by reducing the number of “unwanted” kids, thus later reducing
the number of unsupervised and crime-prone juveniles. See John J. Donohue III & Steven D.
Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 116 Q.J. ECONOMICS 379, 380 (2001). See
generally STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST
EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 137-43 (2005). This theory, however, as
originally propounded by Donohue and Levitt included a (later-acknowledged) mistake, John
J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, Measurement Error, Legalized Abortion, and the Decline
in Crime: A Response to Foote and Goetz, 123 Q.J. ECON. 425, 425 (2008), and has been
heavily attacked for various reasons, see LATZER, supra note 159, at 254 (noting the abortion
hypothesis “is unable to explain why, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, crime rose
substantially among youth born during the legalization decade”); Philip J. Cook & John H.
Laub, After the Epidemic: Recent Trends in Youth Violence in the United States, 29 CRIME &
JUST. 1, 23 (2002) (noting that the timing of the theory is wrong because crime rates among
juveniles did not decrease until about 1994); Christopher L. Foote & Christopher F. Goetz,
The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 123 Q.J. ECON. 407, 409 (2008) (concluding that
if the measurement mistake is corrected, the relationship between abortion and crime is much
weaker); Ted Joyce, Did Legalized Abortion Lower Crime?, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 1, 2
(2004) (“Thus, even in models with state and year fixed effects, the relationship between
abortion and crime may be biased by differences in within-state growth in cocaine markets
over time, a classic problem of omitted variables.”); Joyce, supra note 142, at 112 (noting that
because of the broad implications of the conclusion that legalized abortion lowered crime
rates, more research must be done); John R. Lott Jr. & John Whitley, Abortion and Crime:
Unwanted Children and Out-of-Wedlock Births, 45 ECON. INQUIRY 304, 305-06 (2007)
(noting that although the abortion hypothesis is plausible, the fact that the legalization of
abortion increased the number of out-of-wedlock births forecloses that hypothesis). Because
the theory is so debated, and because we already control for changes in the crime rate that
presumably capture any abortion effects, we did not try to separately model changes in
abortion law here. But cf. Donohue, supra note 7, at 1161 (jettisoning noneconomic variables
in clearance rate regressions to simplify equations).
Likewise, it has been argued that reductions in lead absorption due to the introduction of
unleaded gasoline reduced crime rates. See LATZER, supra note 159, at 255 (“[T]he
government’s blood tests showed that between 1988 and 1991, lead levels fell dramatically
for the age 6-19 cohort as well as for African Americans, two groups highly involved in the
violent crime of those years. As crime was soaring, not declining, in 1988 through 1991, the
effects were the very opposite of what [the theory suggested].”); Rick Nevin, How Lead
Exposure Relates to Temporal Changes in IQ, Violent Crime, and Unwed Pregnancy, 83
ENVTL. RES. 1, 2 (2000); Rick Nevin, Understanding International Crime Trends: The Legacy
of Preschool Lead Exposure, 104 ENVTL. RES. 315, 315 (2007); Jessica Wolpaw Reyes,
Environmental Policy as Social Policy? The Impact of Childhood Lead Exposure on Crime,
7 B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 1 (2007). This theory, too, is heavily debated. See, e.g.,
Scott Firestone, Does Lead Exposure Cause Violent Crime? The Science Is Still out,
THE
CRUX
(Jan.
8,
2013),
DISCOVER:
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2013/01/08/does-lead-exposure-cause-violentcrime-the-science-is-still-out/#.WEwtgVwqx8 [https://perma.cc/Y76E-478W]. Here again,
because of the ongoing debate and because we had already modeled crime rates in our
equations, we did not attempt to model lead exposure effects.
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a “dummy” variable in the equations (“MIRANDA”), which was assigned the
value of 0 before Miranda and 1 after.180 Because we were working with yearly
data and because Miranda was handed down on June 13, 1966 (roughly halfway
through 1966), deciding what to do with the 1966 value of the MIRANDA
variable was an issue. As a first approximation of Miranda’s effects, in our
earlier paper, we first assigned MIRANDA the value of 0 for years before 1965,
0.5 for 1966, and 1 for 1967 and the following years. Later analysis in that paper,
as well as in a follow-on analysis from John Donohue, suggested that a threeyear “phase in” for MIRANDA might be appropriate—i.e., that it was appropriate
to assign MIRANDA a value of 0 before 1966, 0.333 in 1966, 0.666 in 1967 (the
first full year in which the Miranda decision was in effect), and 1 in 1967 and
later years.181 The reason for the delayed phase in for MIRANDA was that
Miranda’s effect did not take hold throughout the country instantaneously.
Instead, it is commonly accepted that it took police a year or so to train officers
in the new Miranda procedures.182 We discussed this issue at length in our earlier
paper and simply follow the three-year phase in here.183
We think these variables contain the most important influences on crime
clearance rates over the last five decades. Although the equations could include
other variables, a parsimonious construction has certain statistical advantages.184
We discuss below whether “omitted” variables could have influenced our
conclusions.185

180

Of course, whether the MIRANDA variable captures changes in clearance rates due to
the Miranda decision or some other factor at the time is open for discussion. We provide our
reasons for attributing the changes to Miranda at infra Part VI.
181 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1095.
182 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 369 (5th ed. 2009) (“[I]n the months
immediately following that decision it was determined that the police did not regularly or
completely give the warnings before interrogation. This was largely attributable to delays in
police training about the new requirements, and later studies found that police were regularly
advising suspects of their rights before attempting to question them.”).
183 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1092-95 (justifying the three-year phase in);
Donohue, supra note 7, at 1166-67 (finding that the three-year phase in provided the best
results).
184 WILFREDO PALMA, TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 152-53 (2016) (discussing advantages of
parsimony in model design); cf. JUDEA PEARL, CAUSALITY: MODELS, REASONING, AND
INFERENCE 45-48 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing Occam’s razor in designing models).
185 See infra Part VI.
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Using standard ordinary least squares (“OLS”) regression techniques, it is
possible to develop an equation to explain national crime clearance rates as
follows:
CLEARANCE RATEI
(for violent, property,
and individual crimes)

= β0i + β1(MIRANDA)i
+ β2(VIOLENT CRIME RATE)i
+ β3(POLICE PERSONNEL)i
+ β4(POLICE DOLLARS (REAL))i
+ β5(PERSONNEL CAPACITY)i
+ β6(DOLLAR CAPACITY
(REAL))i
+ β7(JUVENILES)i
+ β8(LABOR FORCE
PARTICIPATION)i
+ β9(UNEMPLOYMENT)i
+ β10(PER CAPITA INCOME
(REAL))i
+ β11(BIRTHS TO UNMARRIED
WOMEN)i
+ β12(URBANIZATION)i
+ β13(CRIME IN SMALL CITIES)i
+ β14(TREND OVER TIME)i
+ εi

where i runs from 1950 to 2012 and the independent variables are as described
above. This is a “reduced form” equation, which assumes that there are no
“simultaneity” problems (that is, that the dependent clearance rate variables do
not affect any of the independent variables), an assumption we discuss below.186
4. Regression Equation Results
In this Section, we report results stemming from this model. In Table 2, we
report results for equations run on data from 1950 to 2012187 for the dependent
variables for the FBI’s two composite clearance rate categories: violent crimes
and property crimes. As can be seen, controlling for the potentially confounding
influences, we find that our MIRANDA variable has statistically significant188
negative effects on crime clearance rates for both categories.
186

Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1082; see infra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
Because our data stop at 2012, they do not include effects from possibly worsening
police-citizen relations in the wake of the Ferguson shooting, such as the developing Black
Lives Matter movement and related issues. See generally HEATHER MAC DONALD, THE WAR
ON COPS: HOW THE NEW ATTACK ON LAW AND ORDER MAKES EVERYONE LESS SAFE (2016).
188 All statistical significance tests reported in this Article are two-tailed, although an
argument could be made for a one-tailed test. We are aware of the controversy surrounding
187
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Table 2. Violent and Property Crime Clearance Rate Regressions
(1950 to 2012) (three-year Miranda phase in)
OLS Regressions on Clearance Rates for Cities (t statistics in parenthesis)
Variable

Violent Crimes

Property Crimes

-9.446
(-4.991)***

-2.221
(-2.614)*

VIOLENT CRIME RATE

-0.109
(-2.017)*

-0.011
(-0.432)

POLICE PERSONNEL

6.329
(-1.827)†

1.451
(0.933)

POLICE DOLLARS (REAL)

-0.098
(-1.126)

0.003
(0.079)

-1.384
(-4.264)***

-0.495
(-3.395)**

0.298
(1.081)

-0.275
(-2.221)*

UNEMPLOYMENT

0.703
(2.842)**

0.330
(2.973)**

PER CAPITA INCOME (REAL)

0.00274
(2.272)*

0.001
(0.975)

BIRTHS TO UNMARRIED WOMEN

-0.347
(-0.864)

-0.054
(-0.827)

URBANIZATION

-0.347
(-0.864)

-0.366
(-2.025)*

CRIME IN SMALL CITIES

0.0177
(0.179)

-0.050
(-1.125)

TREND OVER TIME

-0.256
(-1.037)

-0.033
(-0.301)

INTERCEPT

564.8
(1.231)

131.9
(0.640)

ADJUSTED R2

0.9752

0.9511

MIRANDA

JUVENILES
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION

*** significant at .001 level ** significant at .01 level * significant at .05 level
† significant at .10 level

reporting p-values and have tried to follow the recommendations of the American Statistical
Association in our approach and report of findings. See generally Ronald L. Wasserstein &
Nicole A. Lazar, Editorial, The ASA’s Statement on p-Values: Context, Process, and Purpose,
70 AM. STATISTICIAN 129 (2016). All p-values reported in this Section should be considered
in light of the Bayesian model averaging we report in the next Section.
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In this table and others, we use gray shading to denote statistically significant
effects of the MIRANDA variable, with darker gray indicating significance at the
conventional 95% or higher confidence level and light gray indicating
significance at the 90% confidence level.
The magnitude of the MIRANDA effect is -9.446 for violent crimes (meaning
MIRANDA depressed violent crime clearance rates by 9.446 percentage points)
and -2.221 for property crimes (meaning MIRANDA depressed violent crime
clearance rates by 9.446 percentage points). While our focus in this Article is on
the MIRANDA variable, we found a few other interesting results. For example,
as expected, an increase in the violent crime rate produced a statistically
significant reduction in clearance rates (although the same thing did not occur
for property crimes). Similarly, as expected, we found that an increase in police
personnel led to an increase in violent crime clearance rates, although this result
was statistically significant only at the 90% confidence level (and did not occur
for property crimes). The proportion of the population consisting of juveniles in
the crime-prone years (fifteen- to twenty-four-year-olds) also had a statistically
significant negative effect for both crime categories. This finding can be viewed
as consistent with suggestions in the clearance rate literature that gang-related
crimes are more difficult to clear than other crimes189 because an increase in
juveniles might produce (for example) an increase in gang membership.
Table 2 reports statistics for aggregated categories composed of individual
crimes. However, such aggregations may obscure trends among these individual
crimes.190 Accordingly, we ran our regression equations for each of the seven
individual component crimes for which data from 1950 to 2012 are available.191

189

See, e.g., Litwin, supra note 148, at 339, 340 tbl.1 (showing a statistically significant
decrease in homicide clearing rates when the homicide was gang-related).
190 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1083.
191 Clearance rate data for arson is currently reported in the UCR, but because that data
does not extend back to 1966, we do not report any arson results here.
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Figure 4 depicts clearance rates for all violent crimes except robbery—i.e.,
for murder, rape, and assault—from 1950 to 2012.
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As can be seen, all three crimes exhibit downward trends in their clearance
rates during the 1960s, although they do not appear to exhibit the pronounced
break at 1966 seen in the violent crime and property crime categories. Robbery
is charted separately because its clearance rate is much lower than the others. As
can be seen in Figure 5, robbery clearance rates exhibit a pronounced downward
trend from 1966 to 1968, suggesting a harmful impact from Miranda.

Regression results track what these visual observations suggest. As shown in
Table 3, we find a statistically significant MIRANDA effect for robbery but not
for other individual violent crimes.
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Table 3. Total and Individual Violent Crimes Regressions
(1950 to 2012) (three-year Miranda phase in)
OLS Regressions on Clearance Rates for Cities (t statistics in parenthesis)
Variable

Violent
Crimes

Murder

Rape

Robbery

Aggravated
Assault

-9.446
(-4.991)***

-1.005
(-0.453)

-3.501
(-1.497)

-5.683
(-3.069)**

-2.762
(-1.459)

VIOLENT CRIME
RATE

-0.109
(-2.017)*

-0.264
(-4.161)***

0.011
(0.162)

-0.133
(-2.510)*

-0.126
(-2.336)*

POLICE
PERSONNEL

6.329
(-1.827)†

3.158
(0.778)

4.298
(1.004)

5.634
(1.662)

5.838
(1.685)†

POLICE
DOLLARS (REAL)

-0.098
(-1.126)

0.008
(0.076)

-0.018
(0.167)

0.035
(0.405)

-0.062
(-0.713)

-1.384
(-4.264)***

0.868
(2.281)*

-2.153
(-5.364)***

-1.002
(-3.153)**

-0.855
(-2.631)*

0.298
(1.081)

-0.455
(-1.405)

0.205
(0.600)

-0.087
(-0.322)

0.039
(0.141)

UNEMPLOYMENT

0.703
(2.842)**

0.143
(0.493)

0.174
(0.568)

0.758
(3.131)**

0.734
(2.965)**

PER CAPITA
INCOME (REAL)

0.00274
(2.272)*

-0.003
(1.918)†

0.001
(0.476)

0.001
(1.226)

0.001
(0.795)

BIRTHS TO
UNMARRIED
WOMEN

-0.347
(-0.864)*

0.204
(1.197)

-0.238
(-1.322)

0.016
(0.114)

-0.130
(-0.895)

URBANIZATION

-0.347
(-0.864)

-0.752
(-1.595)

-1.298
(-2.612)*

0.128
(0.326)

0.417
(1.036)

CRIME IN SMALL
CITIES

0.0177
(0.179)

-0.428
(-3.689)***

-0.072
(0.591)

0.027
(0.282)

-0.056
(-0.568)

TREND OVER
TIME

-0.256
(-1.037)

0.202
(0.697)

-0.301
(-0.985)

-0.629
(-2.600)*

-0.505
(-2.043)*

INTERCEPT

564.8
(1.231)

-208.6
(-0.388)

762.6
(1.345)

1258.0
(2.803)**

1033.0
(2.252)*

ADJUSTED R2

0.9752

0.9856

0.9846

0.9648

0.9797

MIRANDA

JUVENILES
LABOR FORCE
PARTICIPATION

*** significant at .001 level ** significant at .01 level * significant at .05 level
† significant at .10 level
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The size of the statistically significant negative effect on robbery clearance
rates from MIRANDA is (-5.683). For the other three crimes, the signs associated
with MIRANDA were all negative, but none of the results were statistically
significant at conventional levels.
We turn next to the three property crimes (burglary, larceny, and vehicle
theft). In Figure 6, we graph clearance rates over time from 1950 to 2012 for
burglary and larceny.
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As can be seen, there are downward trend lines during the 1960s, which
appear to be somewhat pronounced around the time of Miranda, particularly for
larceny. Larceny also trends upward beginning around 2008, something we
discuss below.192 Similar results are depicted in Figure 7, which shows clearance
rates for vehicle thefts.

Here again, we see a downward trend in the 1960s, with a particularly
pronounced drop in the three years (1966 to 1968) following the announcement
of Miranda.

192

See infra notes 243-48 and accompanying text.
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Table 4 reports our clearance rate findings for the three individual property
crimes.
Table 4. Total and Individual Property Crimes Regressions
(1950 to 2012) (three-year Miranda phase in)
OLS Regressions on Clearance Rates for Cities (t statistics in parenthesis)
Variable

Property
Crimes

Burglary

Larceny

Vehicle Theft

MIRANDA

-2.221
(-2.614)*
-0.011
(0.432)

-1.494
(-1.415)
-0.063
(-2.092)*

-2.071
(-2.052)*
0.012
(0.405)

-5.516
(-5.151)***
0.000
(0.001)

1.451
(0.933)
0.003
(0.079)

2.801
(1.449)
0.016
(0.323)

0.788
(0.427)
-0.025
-0.546

-1.648
(-0.841)
-0.015
(-0.298)

-0.495
(-3.395)**
-0.275
(-2.221)*

-1.161
(-6.404)***
-0.141
(-0.915)*

-0.128
(-0.739)
-0.279
(-1.894)

-0.799
(-4.347)***
0.446
(2.854)**

0.330
(2.973)**
0.001
(0.975)

0.588
(4.260)***
0.001
(1.385)

0.314
(2.376)*
0.000
(0.774)

0.178
(1.268)
0.001
(2.040)*

BIRTHS TO
UNMARRIED
WOMEN

-0.054
(-0.827)

0.081
(0.997)

-0.088
(-1.140)

-0.097
(-1.181)

URBANIZATION

-0.366
(-2.025)*
-0.050
(-1.125)

0.982
(4.376)***
0.074
(1.343)

-0.961
(-4.482)***
-0.072
(-1.359)

0.681
(2.993)**
-0.062
(-1.104)

-0.033
(-0.301)
131.9
(0.640)
0.9511

-0.875
(-6.339)***
1681.0
(6.565)***
0.9892

0.320
(2.430)*
-524.5
(-2.143)*
0.6763

-0.505
(-3.608)***
949.3
(3.656)***
0.9865

VIOLENT CRIME
RATE
POLICE PERSONNEL
POLICE DOLLARS
(REAL)
JUVENILES
LABOR FORCE
PARTICIPATION
UNEMPLOYMENT
PER CAPITA
INCOME (REAL)

CRIME IN SMALL
CITIES
TREND OVER TIME
INTERCEPT
ADJUSTED R2

*** significant at .001 level ** significant at .01 level * significant at .05 level
† significant at .10 level
Tracking visual observation of the trend lines, we found statistically
significant negative effects for MIRANDA for larceny and vehicle theft

732

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:685

clearances. For burglary clearances, the sign associated with MIRANDA was
negative as expected but not quite statistically significant at conventional levels.
In sum, our regression equations find that, even after controlling for important
and potentially confounding variables, our MIRANDA variable was associated
with statistically significant drops in crime clearance rates for both aggregate
categories (violent and property crimes) and for the individual crimes of robbery,
larceny, and vehicle theft. Interestingly, we have a consistent negative sign
across all crime categories. These findings support the position that Miranda did
indeed interfere with law enforcement’s ability to clear crimes.
C. Quantification of Miranda’s Cost
Our regression equations also allow us to quantify the number of lost
clearances that appear to be attributable to MIRANDA. Table 5 shows these
results.
Table 5. Size of the Effect of the MIRANDA Variable
Crime
Violent
Murder
Rape
Robbery
Aggravated
Assault
Property
Burglary
Larceny
Vehicle Theft

2012
Clearance
Rate
46.8
62.5
40.1
28.1

MIRANDA
Effect
-9.446
0.000
0.000
-5.683

Percentage
Increase Without
Miranda
20.1%
N/A
N/A
20.2%

2012 Additional
Cleared Crimes
Without Miranda
213,000
N/A
N/A
61,500

55.8

0.000

N/A

N/A

19.0
12.7
22.0
11.9

-2.221
0.000
-2.071
-5.516

11.6%
N/A
9.4%
46.3%

929,000
N/A
513,000
304,000

The numbers cited in Table 5 for additional cleared crimes were derived by
multiplying the percentage increase in clearance rate that occurs without
MIRANDA against total offenses known for all agencies.193
D. Explaining the Pattern
Our equations suggest a “MIRANDA effect” on clearance rates for violent and
property crimes, as well as for robbery, larceny, and vehicle theft, but not for

193 The clearance rate data we used is for cities only. We have made the assumption that
the MIRANDA effect found in cities also applies to other agencies. The net effect of this
assumption is to increase the “additional cleared crimes” category by about 25%. See UCR2012, supra note 79, at 394 tbl.25 (showing that all agencies cleared 1,060,028 violent crime
offenses, while city agencies cleared 834,273 violent crime offenses).
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homicide, rape, assault, or burglary.194 What could explain this pattern?195 We
discuss some tentative possibilities in this Section.
Turning first to the aggregate categories of violent and property crimes, one
reason why we may have found our MIRANDA effect there is precisely because
these are aggregate categories. Individual crime clearance categories may be
subject to long-term changes for various reasons that are hard to investigate.196
The larger aggregate categories might tend to eliminate some of the “noise”197
in smaller categories, thereby proving more informative on broader trends.198 It
is important to understand, however, that these aggregate categories will be
largely driven by one or two component crimes. Violent crimes, for example,
consist of about 60% aggravated assaults and 30% robberies.199 Property crimes
are about two-thirds larcenies.200 Thus, the noise-reducing capacities of the
aggregate categories are restricted.
Turning to individual crimes, one thing of interest is that clearances for what
might be loosely denominated as crimes of passion or aggression (i.e., murder,
rape, and assault) were apparently unaffected by Miranda, while clearances for
what are more often crimes of deliberation (i.e., robbery, larceny, and vehicle
theft) were affected. These categories, of course, are gross oversimplifications,
as there are obviously coolly calculated murders and impulsive car thefts. But if
these generalizations are correct more often than not, they might correspond with
the empirical evidence suggesting that Miranda more substantially interferes
with police efforts to interrogate repeat offenders and professional criminals.201
One potential problem with this theory is the crime of burglary. In our 1998
article, we ventured essentially this same theory—which worked more cleanly
then because burglary was one of the crimes for which we found a MIRANDA
effect.202 Burglary does seem to be a crime often committed by professional
194

We give our reasons for attributing these results to Miranda’s restrictions on police
interrogation rather than some other cause. See infra Part VI.
195 Because our focus is on Miranda’s effects, we will not discuss other effects we found
(or failed to find) in specific equations—e.g., the effects of police and economic variables on
clearance rates.
196 See, e.g., infra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing changes in murder
clearance rates due to changing patterns of murder).
197 See infra notes 296-99, 328-63 and accompanying text (discussing noise in California
data).
198 Feeney has suggested that the aggregate categories are “not very informative”
compared to the individual categories, but he does not address the “noise” issue we are
concerned about. Feeney, supra note 8, at 108.
199 See, e.g., UCR-2010, supra note 79, at 317 tbl.25.
200 See, e.g., id.
201 Cassell, supra note 16, at 464-66 (citing studies that show that repeat offenders may be
less likely to confess than those without criminal records).
202 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1089 (“Our equations suggest a ‘Miranda effect’
on clearance rates for . . . burglary . . . . But if the generalizations are more often than not
correct, they might correspond with the empirical evidence suggesting that Miranda more
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criminals,203 and the fact that burglary does not appear in our basic equation
would be a strike against the theory. But we were able to produce a MIRANDA
effect here in some of our other regression equations, as discussed below.204 And
perhaps there are facts about burglaries that make them less likely to have been
affected by Miranda.205
Another possible partial explanation for our patterns is that police may be able
to shift resources to maintain high clearance rates for the most serious and least
common crimes (e.g., murder and rape) at the expense of lower clearance rates
for some less serious and more common crimes (e.g., larceny and vehicle theft).
Police agencies are frequently judged by their effectiveness in solving the most
notorious crimes, especially murders.206 As a result, maximum “detective
power” is allocated to solve homicides.207 If Miranda affected clearances
generally, one would expect police to respond. To the extent resources affect
clearance rates,208 police should be able to maintain high clearance rates for the
most serious crimes by allocating more resources to solve them, but at the cost
of lower clearance rates in crime categories less visible to the public.209
Support for this theory comes from the only available before-and-after
Miranda study analyzing individual crimes. Researchers in Pittsburgh found
that, after Miranda, the confession rate in homicide cases fell 27.3 percentage
points, robbery cases 25.7 points, auto larceny cases 21.2 points, burglary and
receiving goods cases 13.7 points, and forcible sex offense cases 0.5 points.210
But while this study found no post-Miranda change in homicide clearances rates,
it found a significant robbery clearance rate drop.211 Interestingly, in the eighteen
months before Miranda, Pittsburgh police cleared 94.3% (fifty of fifty-three) of
substantially affects police success in dealing with repeat offenders and professional
criminals.” (footnote omitted)).
203 See LARRY J. SIEGEL, CRIMINOLOGY 343 (5th ed. 1995); Claire Nee, Understanding
Expertise in Burglars: From Pre-Conscious Scanning to Action and Beyond, 20 AGGRESSION
& VIOLENT BEHAV. 53, 53-55 (2015).
204 See infra Tables 6 & 8 (noting a MIRANDA effect for burglary for Cassell/Fowles
specification with 1950 to 2007 data, which BMA indicates is robust). But see supra Table 4
(noting a MIRANDA effect for burglary for Donohue specification with 1950 to 2012 data);
infra Table 7 (showing that BMA indicates such an effect is not robust).
205 See infra notes 445-50 and accompanying text.
206 See Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 179
(2008) (noting that police officers are under “extraordinary pressure to secure convictions for
heinous crimes”).
207 See id. at 178.
208 See supra note 158 (collecting conflicting evidence on this issue); cf. supra Table 2
(finding sporadic effect of police resources on clearances).
209 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1090.
210 These figures are derived by subtracting the post-Miranda rates from the pre-Miranda
rates listed in Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 87, at 11 tbl.1.
211 Id. at 21 tbl.9 (finding overall clearance rates in Pittsburgh higher after Miranda than
before).
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all homicides; in the thirteen months after, they also cleared 94.4% (thirty-four
of thirty-six) of all homicides—even though homicide confessions fell
sharply.212 While it would have been feasible for the Pittsburgh police to devote
the necessary resources to solve thirty-four homicides with fewer confessions, it
would have been virtually impossible to deal with the large decline in the
number of robbery confessions. Before Miranda, the Pittsburgh police cleared
45.1% (970 of 2152) of all robberies; after Miranda, they cleared only 30.8%
(556 of 1805).213 If similar trends occurred around the United States, police
departments may have shifted resources to keep homicide clearance rates high
at the expense of the clearance rates for some other less serious offenses, such
as robbery. However, this reading of the Pittsburgh study does not explain why
post-Miranda clearances rose slightly for burglary and vehicle thefts in that
city214 (although the post-Miranda increase in burglary is consistent with our
finding of no MIRANDA effect for burglary).
Another reason why we found no MIRANDA effect for homicide may be that
we did not account for changing homicide patterns. Homicide, more than any
other violent crime, exhibits a long-term decline in clearance rates since 1950.
It is quite likely that at least some part of this drop is attributable to the increase
in the proportion of felony-type murders and the corresponding decline in
murders within the family or as a result of “romantic triangles and lovers’
quarrels.”215 Presumably the family and romantic homicides are easier to solve,
whereas the felony-type murders, often committed by strangers, are less so.216
We have not accounted for these changes because of the difficulty in obtaining
data for the relevant time period.217 It is possible that these changes have
obscured any MIRANDA effect in the homicide regressions.
If changes in the patterns of homicides could have obscured a Mirandainduced drop in clearance rates, could changes in the patterns of other crimes
have caused a drop in clearance rates for those crimes that coincided with
Miranda? It seems improbable that crime patterns would have changed suddenly
enough to explain the kind of sharp 1966-to-1968 drop that we observed in the
robbery category, for example. In any event, there were two crimes for which
patterns were relatively stable during the late 1960s: robbery and larceny.218

212

Id.
Id.
214 See id.
215 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1091 (quoting UCR-1993, supra note 79, at 285).
216 See Litwin & Yu, supra note 152, at 96.
217 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1091 n.163 (“FBI data before 1965 on offendervictim relationships in homicide cases do not appear to be regularly published in a consistent
format.”).
218 Lawrence E. Cohen & Marcus Felson, Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A
Routine Activity Approach, 44 AM. SOC. REV. 588, 600 tbl.5 (1979). The authors report
offense trends for only four crimes: robbery, burglary, larceny, and murder. Id. Although their
analysis is based on data apparently collected as part of the UCR program, the data do not
213
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Since we found a MIRANDA effect on both of these crimes, our MIRANDA
effect does not appear to be an artifact of changing crime patterns.
Still another explanation for our pattern of findings rests on the issue of socalled “secondary clearances.” While we defer full discussion of such clearances
until later,219 police may clear certain kinds of crimes through interrogations
more frequently than other kinds of crimes. For example, police may press an
arrested robber to confess to other similar robberies he has committed. Such
repeated crimes (and the possibility of multiple clearances) may not exist as
frequently for crimes like assault, which may typically consist of a single,
unrepeated act. A study of the NYPD around the time of Miranda compiled
ratios of clearances to arrests across crime categories.220 The ratio of clearances
to arrests greatly exceeds 1.0 for some crimes—specifically burglary, grand
larceny, grand larceny vehicle, and robbery.221 For grand larceny vehicle, for
example, the ratio was 2.416, meaning that, for each vehicle larceny arrest,
police cleared about two-and-a-half such crimes. No doubt a substantial number
of these additional clearances came from confessions. On the other hand, for
other crimes—specifically homicide, rape, and assault—the ratio was quite close
to 1.0. Presumably murderers and rapists rarely confess to more than one crime.
This suggests that confessions may play a more important role for crimes such
as vehicle theft, larceny, and robbery, and that clearance for these crimes are,
therefore, more susceptible to changes in confession procedures. Again, the one
crime that does not fit the expected pattern is burglary. Burglary had the highest
ratio (3.778), but we did not find a MIRANDA effect for burglary. Perhaps more
research on these issues will shed further light on burglary clearances.
III. MODEL SPECIFICATION ISSUES: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF JOHN DONOHUE’S
SPECIFICATIONS
We have just described the results produced with our “specification” of
regression equations—that is, the results produced with our chosen variables.
While we have explained why we chose these variables,222 this specification
issue is an important one worth considering further. Improper specification of
equations can lead to inaccurate results. Indeed, a concern is that, through
improper specification, a researcher can produce a predesired or otherwise
spurious result.223
appear to be published in the annual crime reports and it is unclear whether the data are readily
available. Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1091 n.164.
219 See infra notes 370-71, 452-99 and accompanying text.
220 PETER W. GREENWOOD, N.Y.C. RAND INST., AN ANALYSIS OF THE APPREHENSION
ACTIVITIES OF THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 24 tbl.3 (1970).
221 See id. The following ratios of clearance rate to arrest rate can be derived from
Greenwood’s data: 1.045 for homicide; 1.063 for rape; 1.660 for robbery; 1.073 for assault;
3.778 for burglary; 2.564 for grand larceny; and 2.416 for grand larceny vehicle. See id.
222 See supra notes 144-85 and accompanying text.
223 A classic paper on this issue is Edward E. Leamer, Let’s Take the Con out of
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This Section explores the specification issue. We are aided in this exploration
by the fact that, after we circulated our 1998 paper for publication, John
Donohue wrote a thoughtful response, carefully discussing (among other things)
specification issues and reporting the results produced with his different
specifications.224 At the time, we wrote a brief reply to Donohue, explaining how
we believed that his specifications required some unusual assumptions, which
explained why his equations produced somewhat fewer statistically significant
MIRANDA effects than we reported.225 Now with the benefit of nearly two
decades since that exchange, we revisit the specification issue. Time has given
us two advantages: (1) an additional stream of FBI clearance rate data from the
last two decades; and (2) advances in computing power and related econometric
methods that allow specification issues to be more aggressively addressed. Both
of these developments provide some additional support for our conclusion that
Miranda has harmed law enforcement.
A. The Donohue Model with Data Extended Through 2012
Our clearance rate model here is essentially the same model that we used in
our 1998 Stanford Law Review article.226 The model we use here produces
results that parallel our 1998 results in many respects. Specifically, comparing
our current equations (which use a three-year MIRANDA phase in) with our 1998
results (which use a three-year phase in), we now find a MIRANDA effect for
five of nine FBI categories compared to six of the same nine categories in 1998.
The one difference between our current equations and the 1998 equations is the
individual crime category of burglary, for which MIRANDA exhibited a
statistically significant negative coefficient in 1998, but not in our current
model.227
In 1998, Donohue wrote a response that was generally supportive of some of
our most significant conclusions. Donohue began by acknowledging that
focusing on clearance rates (rather than confession rates) would probably
significantly understate quantification of Miranda’s harmful effects.228 He also
noted that we “beg[a]n at somewhat of a disadvantage since” we were forced to
“base [our] study on an interrupted time series analysis stemming from a single
federally imposed mandate, rather than on the more desirable type of panel data
analysis, which examines the experience of different states over time.”229

Econometrics, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 31, 36-39 (1983).
224 See generally Donohue, supra note 7.
225 See generally Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Falling Clearance Rates After
Miranda: Coincidence or Consequence?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1181 (1998).
226 The one difference is that we substituted violent crimes for index crimes as the measure
of police workload, for reasons discussed in supra note 155.
227 Compare Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1096 tbl.IV, with supra Table 4.
228 See Donohue, supra note 7, at 1156.
229 Id. at 1157.
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We provided our data to Donohue so that he could run regression equations
with his own, alternative specifications. As with our equations then (and now),
Donohue’s equations produced negative MIRANDA effects230 across all
aggregate and individual crime categories.231 Donohue’s equations, however,
found fewer statistically significant effects than our equations. While our
equations found statistically significant negative MIRANDA effects at the
conventional 95% confidence level for six of the nine categories,232 Donohue
found such negative effects for only two: violent crimes and larceny.233 Donohue
also found such negative effects at the 90% confidence level for property crimes
and vehicle thefts.234
The difference between our equations and Donohue’s equations came down
to specification. Donohue’s equations included, in addition to an identically
constructed MIRANDA variable, variables for the violent crime rate, police
officers (per capita), police officers/number of violent crimes, police
expenditures (per capita), police expenditures/number of violent crimes, crime
in small cities, time, and time squared.235 In addition to jettisoning noncriminal
justice variables, Donohue made three assumptions different from ours: (1) that
violent crimes, rather than index crimes, should be the independent variable
measuring police workload; (2) that inclusion of a time-squared variable (in
addition to a time variable) was appropriate; and (3) that the appropriate measure
of police capacity was a measure of officers rather than total employees.236
Eliminating any of these three assumptions produced much stronger MIRANDA
effects.237
Given that time has marched on for nearly two decades since our competing
papers were published, we wondered whether, with the benefit of extra data, the
Donohue specifications would reveal anything more about the Miranda effect.
Sometimes with additional time—and additional data—patterns more clearly
reveal themselves. Accordingly, we simply took Donohue’s original
specifications and re-ran his equations using the additional data extending from
1950 to 2012 that we assembled here—an additional seventeen years of data—
230

Donohue chose to relabel the dummy variable “Post-1966,” arguing that this was a
more “neutral” term. Id. at 1163 n.74. We believe that labeling dummy variables by the effect
they are designed to capture is a standard approach, although we acknowledge that further
evidence is required beyond regression equations to explain why it is proper to attribute the
effect indicated by the dummy variable to Miranda. We discuss this “causality” question at
greater length later in this Article. See infra Part VI.
231 Donohue, supra note 7, at 1176 tbl.IV, 1177 tbl.V.
232 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1086 tbl.II, 1088 tbl.III.
233 Donohue, supra note 7, at 1176 tbl.IV, 1177 tbl.V.
234 Id. at 1177 tbl.V. Donohue’s coefficients for MIRANDA are also slightly different than
ours, as he used the natural log of the clearance rates rather than the clearance rates
themselves. See id. at 1160.
235 Id. at 1173 tbl.I.
236 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 225, at 1185-87.
237 Id. at 1186-87, 1190 tbl.I.
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instead of the 1950-to-1995 data that we had assembled for our first article. For
reasons that we will explain shortly, we also ran Donohue’s equations (and our
equations) starting in 1950 but stopping after 2007—the onset of the Great
Recession. Table 6 reports the results of these various equations.
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Table 6. Aggregate and Individual Crimes:
Coefficients of the MIRANDA Variable—Alternative Specifications by
Cassell/Fowles and Donohue
(three-year Miranda phase in)
OLS Regressions on Clearance Rates for Cities (t statistics in parenthesis)
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As shown in Table 6, the Donohue specification now largely replicates our
(current) findings, and completely replicates our findings if the data set is limited
to 2007 (rather than 2012). Indeed, on this extended data set, Donohue’s
specifications produce statistically significant results at the conventional 95%
confidence level for even more categories (six of the nine) than do ours.
This convergence of the results from our equations with those from
Donohue’s equations is an important finding. Donohue set out to explore our
regression equations and, independently of our efforts, specified his own
alternative model. He then used this model to suggest that, while we had
provided “some evidence” that Miranda harmed law enforcement, our evidence
was not yet conclusive.238 The fact that even Donohue’s own equations now
reproduce our findings is an important step in the direction of proof on which
policy recommendations can be made.239
A further step in that direction comes from considering the results of
Donohue’s equations (and ours) if we run the equations on data stopping at 2007.
Specifying the length of the data series on which to run a time series regression
is an important issue, since results can sometimes be affected by length of the
data set chosen.240 In our 1998 article, we showed that our MIRANDA effect was
not sensitive to the time periods we selected for running the regressions. We got
almost identical results in our equations not only with a full data set available to
us (1950 to 1995), but also with a data set that excluded potentially problematic
data from the 1950s (i.e., a data set from 1960 to 1995) and also a data set
shortened by fifteen years (i.e., a data set from 1950 to 1980).241 The only
difference we found was that, for the individual crime of burglary, the 1950 to
1980 data set produced results significant only at the 90% confidence level.242
Interestingly, burglary is also the only individual crime that drops out of
statistical significance in our current equations.
We are now in a position to extend that conclusion, by showing that our results
hold, despite an additional seventeen years of data. But by extending the time
period covered by the data comes the possibility that new and important events
will creep into the equations. In extending the data from 1995 to 2012, we were
concerned about a possibly impactful event: the Great Recession. According to
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Research (the arbiter of such things), the United
States economy entered a recession in December 2007 that extended for eighteen

238

Donohue, supra note 7, at 1171.
See Aneja, Donohue & Zhang, supra note 134, at 614 (“Researchers and policy makers
should keep an open mind about controversial policy topics in light of new and better
empirical evidence or methodologies.”).
240 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1098-99. For an illustration of this problem, see
Aneja, Donohue & Zhang, supra note 134, at 601-06 (running “right-to-carry” law regressions
over different time periods).
241 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1100 tbl.VI.
242 Id.
239
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months, ending in June 2009.243 The Great Recession was, “by most measures[,
the] worst economic recession since the Great Depression” of the early 1930s.244
The widespread harms included unprecedented job losses and a significant rise
in the unemployment rate.245 It also had worldwide effects, spreading to create
“the worst recession the world has witnessed for over six decades.”246
Because of its significant economic effects, we wondered whether the Great
Recession would have had unpredictable (and uncontrolled) effects on our
regression equations. While the available evidence suggests that the Great
Recession did not significantly influence overall crime rates in the aggregate,247
some crime patterns changed that could have influenced clearance rates,
particularly with regard to property crimes.248 Additionally, the Great Recession
could have affected other variables in our and Donohue’s equations. Both sets
of equations include variables that could have been affected by economic
changes, such as (for Donohue’s equations) dollars spent on law enforcement (a
variable which is, in turn, inflation adjusted) and (for our equations) labor force
participation, unemployment rate, and per capita income. Given the potentially
significant effects, we decided to run our equations (and Donohue’s equations)
stopping at 2007—the start of the Great Recession.
As shown in Table 6 above, both sets of equations run on the data from 1950
to 2007 produce more statistically significant MIRANDA effects. In our
equations, we found statistically significant MIRANDA effects for violent and
property crime clearances, as well as for robbery, assault (at the 90% confidence

243 US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES.,
http://www.nber.org/cycles.html [https://perma.cc/7J4X-7SK9] (last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
244 Chart Book: The Legacy of the Great Recession, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES,
http://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/chart-book-the-legacy-of-the-greatrecession?fa=view&id=3252 [https://perma.cc/DY2Z-CECF] (last updated Feb. 10, 2017).
245 Id.
246 SHER VERICK & IYANATUL ISLAM, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF LABOR, THE GREAT
RECESSION OF 2008-2009: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND POLICY RESPONSES 3 (2010),
http://ftp.iza.org/dp4934.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7KC-4AMS].
247 See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, STANFORD CTR. ON POVERTY & INEQUALITY, CRIME AND THE
GREAT
RECESSION
1,
http://users.soc.umn.edu/~uggen/crime_recession.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TQQ9-JFBT] (last visited Jan. 29, 2017); James Q. Wilson, Crime and the
Great Recession, CITY J., Summer 2011, at 90, 90.
248 For example, from 2006 to 2010, there was a 21% increase in shoplifting crimes, UCR2010, supra note 79, at 90 tbl.7, which generally have extremely high clearance rates, see
infra notes 440-41 and accompanying text. Also, motor vehicle thefts fell precipitously, by
38% from 2006 to 2010. UCR-2010, supra note 79, at 90 tbl.7. Perhaps related to this decline,
larceny of motor vehicle accessories (included in the larceny category) fell by 14% from 2006
to 2010. See id. In contrast to other crimes’ clearance rates, larceny clearance rates show a
sharp upward trend beginning around 2006. See supra Figure 6. We are not certain why this
occurred, although the possibility of improved security technologies has been suggested as a
general explanatory factor. See Michael Tonry, Why Crime Rates Are Falling Throughout the
Western World, 43 CRIME & JUST. 1, 5 (2014).
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level), burglary, larceny, and vehicle theft clearances. Using the Donohue
specification, we found MIRANDA effects for violent and property crime
clearances, as well as for rape, robbery, assault, larceny, and vehicle theft, all
statistically significant at 95% confidence or (for violent, rape, robbery,
property, larceny, and vehicle theft) at the 99% confidence level or greater.
These results, too, give us greater confidence in the robustness of our conclusion
that Miranda reduced clearance rates.
B. Bayesian Model Averaging and the Cassell/Fowles and Donohue
Specifications
The specification issue that we are concerned with can also be addressed in a
more rigorous fashion. Historically, uncertainty about which model
specification was “correct” was a subject on which classical econometric
methods offered little guidance. But recently, interest in Bayesian approaches
has grown to address this problem.249
A researcher attempting to quantitatively explore a phenomenon (such as, in
this case, crime clearance rates) will likely encounter uncertainty about which
variables to include in statistical models. Typically, a researcher must develop a
theoretical model that contains some explanatory variables, but the precise set
of explanatory variables to include is uncertain.250 More worrisome, a researcher
could try a series of alternative specifications until discovering one that
“works”—i.e., one that produces a statistically significant result251 (or, if trying
to debunk a particular theory, one that does not produce a statistically significant
result).
Conventionally reported statistical significance measures (such as the tstatistics we and Donohue have both reported) are of little use in assessing such
concerns. These statistics show statistical significance within a particular model.
But they do not help answer the question of whether the model itself is correct.
Issues of model uncertainty related to the choice of which variables to include
249 See generally ANDREW GELMAN ET AL., BAYESIAN DATA ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2014);
PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 213, 216-31 (6th ed. 2008); Fowles & Loeb,
supra note 135, at 52. For an interesting historical account of early uses of Bayesian methods,
see Duo Qin, Bayesian Econometrics: The First Twenty Years, 12 ECONOMETRIC THEORY
500, 503-13 (1996).
250 See Jacob M. Montgomery & Brendan Nyhan, Bayesian Model Averaging: Theoretical
Developments and Practical Applications, 18 POL. ANALYSIS 245, 246-54 (2010).
251 Alan Gerber & Neil Malhotra, Do Statistical Reporting Standards Affect What Is
Published? Publication Bias in Two Leading Political Science Journals, 3 Q.J. POL. SCI. 313,
314 (2008) (“[R]esearchers may engage in data mining to find model specifications and subsamples that achieve significance thresholds.”); see also Daniele Fanelli, Negative Results
Are Disappearing from Most Disciplines and Countries, 90 SCIENTOMETRICS 891, 892-93
(2012); cf. Joseph P. Simmons, Leif D. Nelson & Uri Simonsohn, False-Positive Psychology:
Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as
Significant, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1359, 1359-62 (2011) (discussing problems when researchers
report only equations that “worked”).
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in a regression are paramount to problems of simultaneity and multicollinearity.
In particular, problems emerge when the associated explanatory variables are
correlated within a regression model.
As a consequence of problems such as these, reported econometric results are
sometimes fragile to even slight changes in model specification.252 Writing in
this Symposium, Alschuler nicely flagged this concern when he wrote, with
regard to law-related regression analyses, that most “seem to collapse as soon as
one breathes on them. In particular, I have never seen any work by an
econometrician that convinced me of anything.”253
Bayesian model averaging (“BMA”) attempts to address concerns like
Alschuler’s by trying to assess robustness of regression results with regard to
alternative specifications.254 We refer our (largely legal) audience to other
technical literature (including articles previously cowritten by Fowles255) for
specific descriptions of how the procedure works.256 But, in brief, BMA looks
at all conceivable model specifications and then weights them by their posterior
probabilities.257 For example, if there are n number of variables that might be
included in a regression equation, then BMA consider all 2n conceivable discrete
models and determines whether the variable in question remains significant
across those various specifications.258 It appears to be generally accepted that
“BMA can help applied researchers to ensure that their estimates of the effects
of key independent variables are robust to a wide range of possible model
specifications.”259 It is also generally agreed that BMA can be a useful corrective
for the (apparently widespread) problem of researchers selectively reporting
only models that “work.”260 In the last few years, BMA has become commonly
used in econometric literature.261
252

Montgomery & Nyhan, supra note 250, at 246. For an illustration of this problem, see
the spirited empirical debate over whether “right-to-carry” firearms laws reduce crime. Aneja,
Donohue & Zhang, supra note 134, at 614-15. See generally LOTT, supra note 134.
253 Alschuler, supra note 40, at 889 n.186.
254 See David Weisbach, Introduction: Legal Decision Making Under Deep Uncertainty,
44 J. LEGAL STUD. S319, S332 (2015).
255 See Gail Blattenberger, Richard Fowles & Peter D. Loeb, Variable Selection in
Bayesian Models: Using Parameter Estimation and Non Parameter Estimation Methods, in
34 ADVANCES IN ECONOMETRICS: BAYESIAN MODEL COMPARISON 249, 261-65 (Ivan Jeliazkov
& Dale J. Poirier eds., 2014); Blattenberger, Fowles & Loeb, supra note 136, at 119;
Blattenberg, Fowles, Loeb & Clarke, supra note 136, at 1829.
256 See, e.g., Montgomery & Nyhan, supra note 250, at 247-49.
257 Blattenberger, Fowles & Loeb, supra note 255, at 261.
258 Id.
259 Montgomery & Nyhan, supra note 250, at 246.
260 See Leslie K. John, George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Measuring the Prevalence
of Questionable Research Practices with Incentives for Truth Telling, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 524,
525 (2012).
261 Tiago M. Fragoso & Francisco Louzada Neto, Bayesian Model Averaging: A
Systematic Review and Conceptual Classification, 16 tbl.2 (Sept. 29, 2015),
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Recent advances in computing power have promoted adoption of BMA by
making BMA calculations feasible.262 In the context of our clearance rate
equations here, given that our model has thirteen independent (explanatory)
variables, the total number of alternative model specifications is 8192 (2 to the
13th power). Similarly, given that Donohue’s model has ten independent
variables,263 the total number of alternative models is 1024 (2 to the 10th power).
Without adequate computer processing speed, it would not previously have been
possible to assess all these alternatives.264 But now, more powerful computers
and readily available software packages allow researchers to use BMA to assess
all these different possibilities.265
We used the standard BMA package in R, which is readily available and well
documented.266 We used the standard odds ratio of 1:20 for model inclusion. Our
results for the Cassell/Fowles model, using our full data set (1950 to 2012), are
reported in Table 7.

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1509.08864v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2AZ-GVFG].
262 KENNEDY, supra note 249, at 217 (“In recent years these practical difficulties have been
greatly alleviated by the development of appropriate computer software . . . .”). Before BMA
became practical, it was possible to conduct Extreme Bounds Analysis (“EBA”) to make
similar fragility determinations. See Blattenberger, Fowles & Loeb, supra note 255, at 25556 (“[EBA] is a methodology of global sensitivity analysis that computes the maximum and
minimum values for Bayesian posterior means in the context of linear regression models.”).
EBA calculated the maximum and minimum coefficients that could be obtained using
maximum likelihood estimation over all possible linear combinations of explanatory
variables. Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1104. In our 1998 paper, we reported EBA
statistics showing that our results were not fragile. Id. at 1105. For further discussion of the
differences between earlier EBA analysis and current BMA analysis, see Blattenberg, Fowles
& Loeb, supra note 255, at 255-58, 261-65.
263 Donohue, supra note 7, at 1173 tbl.1.
264 See KENNEDY, supra note 249, at 213.
265 Id.
266 Blattenberger, Fowles & Loeb, supra note 255, at 262, 277 n.14, 278 (citing Adrian
Raftery et al., BMA: Bayesian Model Averaging, CRAN.R-PROJECT (Nov. 6, 2015),
https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/BMA/index.html [https://perma.cc/ECZ3-3T8W]);
see also ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND
MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS 10-11 (2007) (advocating for the use of R software
when conducting Bayesian analysis).
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Table 7. Bayesian Model Average of MIRANDA Variable Inclusion in
Cassell/Fowles Specifications—1950-2012
(three-year Miranda phase in)
Regressions on Clearance Rates for Cities
Cassell/Fowles Specification (Odds Ratio of 1:20 for Models Inclusion)
MIRANDA
in Percent
of
Equations
100.0%

MIRANDA in
Percent of top 5
Equations

Bayes
Average
Coefficient

Number of
Models

100%

-10.110

99

Murder 1950-2012

10.2%

0%

0.093

14

Rape 1950-2012

13.6%

20%

-0.281

17

Robbery 1950-2012

100.0%

100%

-7.092

27

Aggravated Assault 19502012
Property Crimes 19502012
Burglary 1950-2012

44.6%

40%

-1.481

54

78.8%

100%

-1.180

28

42.9%

60%

-0.809

25

Larceny 1950-2012

60.9%

80%

-1.069

30

Vehicle Theft 1950-2012

100.0%

100%

-5.122

21

Clearance Rate Data

Violent Crimes 1950-2012

Shaded areas denote crimes for which MIRANDA variable is found in at least
four of the top five equations.
Since some of our readers may not be familiar with the standard statistical
reporting for BMA results, we will describe the first row of the table in some
detail. This row reports BMA results for violent crime clearance rates using the
data set 1950 to 2012. The BMA procedure considered all 8192 possible
specifications of our equations—i.e., all different combinations of the thirteen
explanatory variables we had identified. The procedure then selected equations
that had odds of greater than 5% of being the correct model. BMA sorts through
these 8192 models and retains those that are supported by the evidence and
discards models whose support is low. From a Bayesian perspective, it is
perfectly sensible to calculate a given model’s posterior probability, P(D|Mi),
where Mi represents the ith model and D represents the observed data. When two
models are compared, a selection decision comes down to either dropping one
of the models from consideration or keeping both of them. The mechanism to
assist in making this decision is the ratio of the posterior probabilities. If the
odds ratio is relatively close to 1.0, the two candidate models are kept; otherwise,
one model is retained and the other eliminated. With our choice of 1:20, the odds
window retains a large number of plausible models, but significantly fewer than
all possible 1.0s. As noted above, posterior model probabilities are also used as
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the weights applied to the estimated coefficients for the retained models when
computing Bayesian average.
In this case, the BMA procedure identified ninety-nine out of 8192 models as
being most likely correct. Of these 99 identified models, the MIRANDA variable
was included in 99 of the 99 identified models (100%). Typically, posterior
model probabilities drop quickly, so BMA also identified the top five models
and, in these, MIRANDA was included in all five (100%). The average
coefficient generated from these equations is -10.110, meaning that the BMAselected models had an average negative coefficient associated with MIRANDA
of -10.111. The remaining rows in Table 7 report the same data for each of the
other eight crime categories of clearance rates we are investigating. Strong
results are shown for robbery, property crimes, larceny, and vehicle theft—
particularly for robbery and vehicle theft (100% inclusion).
As discussed in the preceding Section, we were concerned about the Great
Recession’s effect on our models. BMA can reveal which equations are selected
if we confine our data to 1950 to 2007, as shown in Table 8.
Table 8. Aggregate and Individual Crimes:
Bayesian Model Average of MIRANDA Variable Inclusion—1950-2007
(three-year Miranda phase in)
Regressions on Clearance Rates for Cities
Cassell/Fowles Specification (Odds Ratio of 1:20 for Models Inclusion)
(data for 1950-2007)
Clearance Rate Data

Violent Crimes 1950-2007
Murder 1950-2007
Rape 1950-2007
Robbery 1950-2007
Aggravated Assault 19502007
Property Crimes 1950-2007
Burglary 1950-2007
Larceny 1950-2007
Vehicle Theft 1950-2007

MIRANDA
in Percent
of
Equations
100.0%
11.8%
13.0%
100.0%

MIRANDA in
Percent of Top
Five Equations

Bayes
Average
Coefficient

Number of
Models

100%
20%
0%
100%

-8.482
0.207
-0.303
-5.773

44
38
44
19

76.5%

80%

-2.631

44

100.0%
73.2%
99.1%
100.0%

100%
80%
100%
100%

-2.778
-1.727
-2.504
-5.621

22
19
37
25

As this table shows, we have even stronger MIRANDA findings if we confine
our data to data unaffected by the Great Recession. Not only do clearance rates
for violent crimes, robbery, and vehicle theft show up in 100% of the equations,
but property crimes (100%) and larceny (99.1%) show up almost invariably as
well. Given the possibility that recessionary influences may have had some
bearing on property crime clearance rates, this result is interesting.
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Of course, BMA permits us to examine not just the robustness of our
equations but also of Donohue’s equations. Table 9 reports the BMA results for
the Donohue equations, using the full data set (1950-2012).
Table 9. Bayesian Model Average of MIRANDA Variable Inclusion in
Donohue Specifications—1950-2012
(three-year Miranda phase in)
Regressions on Clearance Rates for Cities
Donohue Specification (Odds Ratio of 1:20 for Models Inclusion)
(data for 1950-2012)
MIRANDA
in Percent
of
Equations

MIRANDA in
Percent of Top
Five Equations

Bayes
Average
Coefficient

Number of
Models

Violent Crimes 1950-2012

100.0%

100%

-9.090

46

Murder 1950-2012

10.3%

0%

-0.100

22

Rape 1950-2012

75.9%

80%

-4.485

19

Robbery 1950-2012

95.8%

100%

-4.476

50

37.7%

40%

-1.049

40

41.0%

20%

-0.691

21

Burglary 1950-2012

20.6%

20%

-0.210

9

Larceny 1950-2012

9.0%

20%

0.022

9

100.0%

100%

-6.161

15

Clearance Rate Data

Aggravated Assault 19502012
Property Crimes 19502012

Vehicle Theft 1950-2012

As can be seen, Donohue’s equations also produce robust MIRANDA findings,
particularly for violent crimes (100% inclusion), vehicle theft (100% inclusion),
and robbery (95.8% inclusion). BMA can also be used to assess the results of
Donohue’s equations using the data set up to the Great Recession. Table 10
reports these results.
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Table 10. Bayesian Model Average of MIRANDA Variable Inclusion in
Donohue Specifications—1950-2007
(three-year Miranda phase in)
Regressions on Clearance Rates for Cities
Donohue Specification (Odds Ratio of 1:20 for Models Inclusion)
(data for 1950-2007)
Clearance Rate Data

Violent Crimes 1950-2007
Murder 1950-2007
Rape 1950-2007
Robbery 1950-2007
Aggravated Assault 19502007
Property Crimes 1950-2007
Burglary 1950-2007
Larceny 1950-2007
Vehicle Theft 1950-2007

MIRANDA
in Percent
of
Equations
100.0%
33.5%
100.0%
100.0%

MIRANDA in
Percent of Top
Five Equations

Bayes
Average
Coefficient

Number of
Models

100%
40%
100%
100%

-9.603
-0.605
-9.625
-6.267

11
24
8
38

42.7%

40%

-1.464

23

100.0%
18.8%
85.8%
100.0%

100%
20%
100%
100%

-2.366
-0.180
-1.555
-6.509

18
10
29
39

As can be seen, BMA shows that Donohue’s equations, when confined to
prerecession data, produce robust MIRANDA effects for many different crimes,
including violent crimes (100% inclusion), rape (100% inclusion), robbery
(100% inclusion), property crimes (100% inclusion), vehicle theft (100%
inclusion), and larceny (85.8% inclusion).
In light of these findings, we think it is fair to say that our MIRANDA effects
will not “seem to collapse as soon as one breathes on them,” in the colorful
language of Alschuler.267 To the contrary, the great bulk of our findings (and
even many similar findings by Donohue) are insensitive to model specification,
as shown by the BMA procedure which assessed, quite literally, thousands of
possible alternative specifications.
C. Simultaneity Issues
This may also be the appropriate point for a brief discussion of simultaneity
issues. As we discussed with Donohue in our 1998 exchange, our equations are
reduced-form models—that is, we have specified only a single causal
equation.268 This requires the assumption that crime clearance rates were
explained by various variables, but not vice versa. However, crime clearance
rates could influence the explanatory variables. In particular, a drop in the
clearance rate might cause crime rates to rise, because the lower the chance of

267
268

Alschuler, supra note 40, at 889 n.186.
Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1101-03; Donohue, supra note 7, at 1168.
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apprehension, the greater the expected rewards to crime. Such a possibility is
known as “simultaneity.”269 Our (and Donohue’s) crime clearance rates model,
resting as it does on the reduced-form model, does not capture these possible
interactions. There is considerable literature suggesting that failure to consider
simultaneity can lead to problems in predicting crime rates and the deterrent
effects of police.270 However, the issue posed here is a slightly different one:
whether failure to control for possible simultaneity affects our conclusions about
the MIRANDA variable.
Particularly in light of the BMA results, we believe our conclusions are
unlikely to have been substantially affected for several reasons. First, it is
possible that there is no simultaneity—that is, clearance rates might not directly
affect crime rates. While we do not necessarily subscribe to this counterintuitive
theory, it is interesting that the literature on police effects on crime is
conflicting.271 Second, even if simultaneity is an issue, results consistent with
those reported here might still be found. Simultaneity can bias results not only
upward, but also downward. It can also leave them unchanged. We do not think
that simultaneity would explain away the kinds of dramatic shifts in crime
clearance rates that we are studying here.
Most importantly, our BMA analysis demonstrates that our results are
insensitive to the variables that we include or exclude in the equations. This
strongly suggests that simultaneity does not explain our findings, in that we do
not detect MIRANDA fragility across a vast number of model specifications.
Furthermore, the stability of MIRANDA is remarkable given the high degree of
correlation within the data. In the presence of multicollinearity, it is not
uncommon to observe sign switching for focus variables when other variables
are added or dropped. Across the vast number of models that BMA estimates,
MIRANDA remains robust.
We readily acknowledge that, in theory, simultaneous equations for our crime
clearance rate model would be the most desirable way to proceed. In practice,
however, the specification of such models is often highly dependent on
269

Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1102.
Id. at 1102 & n.209 (collecting illustrations of this problem).
271 See Marian J. Borg & Karen F. Parker, Mobilizing Law in Urban Areas: The Social
Structure of Homicide Clearance Rates, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 435, 436 (2001) (“[S]tudies
have examined the link between clearance or arrest rates and crime rates. Results regarding
this relationship are mixed. Although some studies demonstrate a crime-prevention effect of
arrests on crime rates, others fail to find consistent evidence that higher clearance rates result
in significantly lower crime rates.” (citations omitted)). Compare John E. Eck & Edwards R.
Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent Crime? An Assessment of the Evidence,
in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 207, 217 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000)
(carefully reviewing nine studies, with twenty-seven dependent variables, of the size of police
forces and violent crime and finding no “consistent evidence that increases in police strength
produce decreases in violent crime”), with Levitt, supra note 163, at 176-79 (attributing the
crime drop in the 1990s, in part, to increases in the number of police and a rising prison
population).
270
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underlying assumptions, particularly for individual crimes (e.g., robbery) in
which we are particularly interested.272 Given the great debate over how to
model relationships between law enforcement efforts and crime,273 however, we
have decided to avoid this quagmire for present purposes. Instead, we simply
leave things where they are: robust findings of many MIRANDA effects across
both our and Donohue’s reduced form specifications of regression equations.
IV. DATA COLLECTION ISSUES: A RESPONSE TO FLOYD FEENEY
Following the publication of our initial Stanford Law Review article (and our
follow-on exchange with Donohue), Feeney published a detailed response.274
Feeney conceded that our approach of reviewing clearance rate data was likely
to significantly understate any harmful effects due to Miranda.275 Feeney,
however, also advanced three major challenges to the data underlying our
premise—the data demonstrating that FBI clearance rates fell sharply after
Miranda. First, Feeney argued that the clearance rate data we relied on, collected
from cities, declined due to artificial (record-keeping) reasons and thus any
decline should not be attributed to Miranda.276 Second, Feeney argued that the
“premier” data on crime clearance rates in the 1960s come from California and
that such data show no post-Miranda decline.277 Third, and somewhat in tension
with his first two claims, Feeney argued that Miranda’s adverse effect on
clearance rates was due to reductions in police ability to obtain secondary
clearances.278
We appreciate the time and attention Feeney devoted in crafting a 114-page
response to our original article. We disagree, however, with many of his
observations. In this Part and the following Part, we use new data we have
collected to show that his three data-based critiques are unpersuasive.279

272 See ZIMRING, supra note 163, at 55 (“Models to predict crime generally are not strong;
models to predict specific types of crime are even more premature and fragile.”).
Shortly after writing our 1998 paper, we attempted to develop simultaneous equations, and
the models we tried showed the same strong MIRANDA effect as our reduced form equations.
See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1103 n.215. But because we thought those models
remained highly sensitive to underlying assumptions, we decided not to pursue the effort
further.
273 See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin, Robert M. Solow & Cynthia Lum, Deterrence, Criminal
Opportunities, and Police, 53 CRIMINOLOGY 74, 74 (2015); Greg Pogarsky & Thomas A.
Loughran, The Policy-to-Perceptions Link in Deterrence: Time to Retire the Clearance Rate,
15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 777, 778 (2016); Steven Raphael, Optimal Policing, Crime,
and Clearance Rates, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 791, 797-98 (2016).
274 See generally Feeney, supra note 8.
275 See id. at 5.
276 Id. at 4.
277 Id. at 4-5.
278 Id. at 5-6.
279 Feeney also criticized our conclusion that Miranda caused the drop in clearance rates.
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A. Data Collection Problems in the Nation’s Cities
1. Clearance Rate Declines in the Nation’s Fourteen Largest Cities
Feeney’s lead argument is that changes in police record keeping in large cities
caused clearance rates to fall after 1965 for reasons unrelated to Miranda.280
Feeney points to, for example, the sharp fall in robbery clearance rates in New
York City.281 Feeney attributes this decline to record-keeping changes, rather
than any actual impairment of the NYPD’s ability to clear crimes.282 Feeney then
goes on to argue that these record-keeping changes influenced our
calculations.283
Before diving into the details of this argument, we want to set a cautionary
note. We are obviously aware that data from individual cities is subject to
fluctuation and manipulation. We acknowledged this point in our first article.284
But while such deviations might present a serious problem for analyses of police
effectiveness in particular jurisdictions, our focus here is on a Supreme Court
decision binding on police forces around the country. Accordingly, we use the
aggregate national clearance rate, comprised of clearance reports from
thousands of agencies.285 Even if a particular city reported rates in a questionable
fashion, our results would be unaffected if any such manipulations did not
change significantly in the several years surrounding Miranda or if any changes
in the manipulations were relatively small in comparison to the total number of
reports nationally— both reasonable assumptions.286 We also report results for
the aggregated categories of clearance rates for “violent crimes” and “property
crimes,” for which interjurisdictional variations in categorizing crimes should

We review this criticism at infra notes 529-709 and accompanying text. Feeney also examined
clearance rate data from foreign countries. A review of this claim is in progress. See generally
Cassell, supra note 78.
280 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 18-41.
281 Id. at 31.
282 Id.
283 Id. at 32-33.
284 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1075-76 (discussing how national aggregation
of data mitigates problems with local data collection).
285 Cf. Yehuda Grunfeld & Zvi Griliches, Is Aggregation Necessarily Bad?, 42 REV. ECON.
& STAT. 1, 10 (1960) (“[A]ggregation is not necessarily bad if one is interested in the
aggregates.”).
286 See FOX, supra note 79, at 7 (concluding that the problem of data manipulation is “not
overly troublesome” for time series analysis that “does not involve cross-sectional data, but
rather a time series from the same population”); Charles R. Tittle & Alan R. Rowe, Certainty
of Arrest and Crime Rates: A Further Test of the Deterrence Hypothesis, 52 SOC. FORCES 455,
456 (1974) (stating that although manipulations are possible, “there are good reasons to doubt
that they greatly contaminate the data” and that they “seem to be distributed throughout the
various police departments so that the validity of a study which examines internal variations
in the entire body of data . . . would be unaffected” (citations omitted)).
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be minimized.287 Also, FBI data collection criteria for “cleared” crimes appear
to have remained the same throughout the relevant period.288 So any recordkeeping changes would have to have occurred in individual cities for reasons
unique to those cities, and with effects presumably confined to those particular
cities, not influencing the much larger national aggregates we consider.
Turning specifically to New York City, Feeney attributes the change in record
keeping to the election of reform mayor John Lindsay.289 When Lindsay took
office at the beginning of 1966, he apparently ordered “honest” reporting of all
crimes committed.290 According to Feeney, these changes in reporting practices
caused a substantial increase in the number of reported robberies in 1966, with
the consequence that the clearance rate declined in New York City—from 42.9%
to 17.7%.291 Feeney does not appear to have considered the possibility that just
as New York City decided to report more crimes, it also reported more
clearances for the same crimes. Nor does Feeney discuss the possibility that
confession rate declines in New York City were in fact particularly steep, as
suggested by the only post-Miranda confession rate study in New York City.292
287 See Gene Swimmer, The Relationship of Police and Crime: Some Methodological and
Empirical Results, 12 CRIMINOLOGY 293, 304 (1974) (claiming that the impact on the data by
variability of reporting techniques is minimized by grouping the types of offenses into larger
“property” and “violence” categories); see also FOX, supra note 79, at 127 n.8 (“Although the
data on the individual Index offenses are available, such disaggregate analyses would be so
specific that they would not lend themselves to making general statements about the
interrelation of the variables of interest.”).
288 The 1962 UCR Handbook defines a “cleared” crime and provides examples. See U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK:
HOW TO PREPARE UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 48-49 (1962) (defining “offenses cleared by
arrest” and “exceptional clearances”). The 1965 and 1966 handbooks contain virtually
identical definitions. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK 50 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 UCR HANDBOOK] (“An
offense is ‘cleared by arrest’ or solved for crime reporting purposes, when at least one person
is (1) arrested, (2) charged with the commission of the offense, and (3) turned over to the court
for prosecution . . . .”). Later versions appear to be substantively indistinguishable. See, e.g.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING
HANDBOOK 41-42 (1984) (defining “cleared by an arrest” and “exceptional clearances”). It
appears that the definition of a “cleared” crime was slightly broadened sometime before the
1960s by allowing police to count as cleared crimes cases in which the offender was “turned
over to the court for prosecution” rather than actually requiring the prosecution to take place.
See Lawrence W. Sherman, Defining Arrest: Practical Consequences of Agency Differences
(Part I), 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 376, 380 (1980).
289 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 30.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 31, 32 tbl.5.
292 See Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings on S. 300,
S. 552, S. 580, S. 674, S. 675, S. 678, S. 798, S. 824, S. 916, S. 917, S. 992, S. 1007, S. 1094,
S. 1194, S. 1333, and S. 2050 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law & Procedures of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 1120 (1967) [hereinafter Controlling Crime Hearings]
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Instead of exploring these issues, Feeney builds on his theory about New York
City to suggest that such record-keeping changes explain the drop in clearance
rates that we are investigating. But Mayor Lindsay’s reforms produced changes
in all crime categories (with the sole exception of murder—presumably a crime
that is hard to fail to report).293 As discussed earlier, our equations find a
MIRANDA effect for the categories of robbery, larceny, and vehicle theft, but
not murder, rape, assault, and (in most models) burglary. This suggests that the
record-keeping phenomenon is not the same phenomenon we are analyzing.
To bolster his conclusions, immediately after reporting his table of New York
City data, Feeney reported another table with robbery clearance rate data from
the nation’s fourteen largest cities (including New York City), as of 1965.294
Quickly eyeballing the numbers, Feeney seems to believe that the data from
these fourteen cities raise a question about whether there was any decline in
clearance rates after Miranda at all. Looking at the data from these fourteen
cities, Feeney suggests that they show, in his opinion, “an almost random
shifting” or a “mixed trend.”295
While Feeney commendably provides a table listing the published and
unpublished data for the fourteen cities he relies upon, he does not explain
precisely how he determines whether or not this data exhibits any pattern.
Moreover, focusing on any individual city presents its own problems. Focusing
on smaller individual data sets tends to obscure larger trends—the proverbial
missing-the-forest-for-the-trees problem. The smaller the unit from which data
is collected, the more likely it is that some random event may influence that data,
introducing randomness or “noise” into the data set.296 To provide an obvious

(noting the reduction in confession rates from approximately 49% of nonhomicide felony
defendants to 15% following Miranda); Weinraub, supra note 107, at A1 (reporting that a
police spokesperson attributed the decline in clearance rates from 1965 to 1966 in New York
City in part to Supreme Court decisions restricting the ability to get multiple confessions).
But cf. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, TAPING POLICE INTERROGATIONS IN THE 20TH PRECINCT,
N.Y.P.D. 79-80 (1967) (questioning whether Miranda could have caused the reported changes
in New York City’s clearance rate); Nagin, supra note 151, at 114-15 (suggesting that more
accurate record-keeping policies might explain the decline in the New York City clearance
rate).
293 Compare UCR-1965, supra note 79, at 65 tbl.3 (reporting New York City index
crimes), with UCR-1966, supra note 79, at 170-85 tbl.55 (same).
294 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 35-36, 37 tbl.6. Feeney claims that these fourteen cities
“account for over 50% of the robberies in the nation in 1966, 1967, and 1968.” Id. at 36. But
the citation he cites to does not support his point. See id. at 36 n.92 (citing PHILIP J. COOK,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ROBBERY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT TRENDS
AND PATTERNS 11-12 (1983) (noting that in 1981, the nation’s fifty-seven cities reported 61%
of all robberies)). The UCR for 1966 does not either because summing the total robberies for
the nation’s twenty-four largest cities in that year does not provide a number of robberies
equaling 50% of the nation’s total. See UCR-1966, supra note 79, at 92 tbl.6.
295 Feeney, supra note 8, at 35-36.
296 See GEORGE E. P. BOX, J. STUART HUNTER & WILLIAM G. HUNTER, STATISTICS FOR
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example, to discover the effects of Miranda on police, we would not want to
exclusively look at crime clearance rates from one individual police precinct.
Police officers might come and go from the precinct, a new gang might move
into the precinct, and so forth, making it hard to generalize from what happened
in that small area to the entire country. Of course, similar problems can exist
with respect to data from particular cities, as Feeney’s own arguments explain.
A new mayor or police chief might introduce a different record-keeping system
for the police force.297 Or in a particular year, a city might face a budget crunch
or the spread of a particularly dangerous addictive drug. Each of these factors in
any particular city could have changed clearance rates during the 1966-to-1968
period—thereby introducing noise into the data and obscuring any larger trends
that may or may not have existed across the country.
With regard to noise in data, a standard statistical response is averaging. So
long as the noise is random with respect to the phenomenon of interest,
averaging should help remove the effects of noise on the data being studied.298
Applied to the issues discussed in this Article, while data from any one city
might gyrate for unpredictable reasons, the collective data from fourteen cities
are less likely to do so. And data from, 140 or 1400 cities, for example, are even
less likely to do so. If we are interested in a big picture assessment of a national
phenomenon like Miranda, that picture will come into sharper focus as we step
back and aggregate larger data sets, as Feeney himself appears to agree.299
EXPERIMENTERS: DESIGN, INNOVATION, AND DISCOVERY 558-59, 568-76 (2d ed. 2005). See
generally HOLGER KANTZ & THOMAS SCHREIBER, NONLINEAR TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 174-96
(2003). The issue of the appropriate level of aggregation is obviously not confined to the
Miranda context, but is a broader issue in criminal justice research. See, e.g., Aneja, Donohue
& Zhang, supra note 134, at 596-97 (analyzing both county-level and state-level data because
of problems with individual counties); John R. Hipp, Block, Tract, and Levels of Aggregation:
Neighborhood Structure and Crime and Disorder as a Case in Point, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 659,
660 (2007). Related to these problems is what has been called “The Law of Small Numbers,”
the belief that small samples mirror the population from which they are drawn. See David A.
Hyman, Why Did Law Professors Misunderestimate the Lawsuits Against PPACA?, 2014 U.
ILL. L. REV. 805, 830.
297 See, e.g., David Seidman & Michael Couzens, Getting the Crime Rate Down: Political
Pressure and Crime Reporting, 8 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457, 480 (1974) (discussing
“[m]anipulation of crime statistics” in Baltimore, Maryland).
298 See, e.g., Hilary Sigman, Environmental Liability and Redevelopment of Old Industrial
Land, 53 J.L. & ECON. 289, 303 (2010). We are aware of more complex and thorough
approaches for addressing issues of noise in time series data. See, e.g., Grega Repovš, Dealing
with Noise in EEG Recording and Data Analysis, 15 INFORMATICA MEDICA SLOVENICA 18,
19 (2010) (discussing methods for dealing with noise in medical research); Michail Vlachos,
Dimitrios Gunopulos & Gautam Das, Indexing Time-Series Under Conditions of Noise, in 57
DATA MINING IN TIME SERIES DATABASES 67, 68 (Mark Last, Abraham Kandel & Horst Bunke
eds., 2004). However, the limited number of data points in the series we are working with
precludes using such methods.
299 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 33-34 (discussing ways to create a data set larger than
individual cities and moving in the direction of “national” data).
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We took this aggregating approach with Feeney’s own fourteen-city data set,
averaging the reported clearance rates for the fourteen cities.300 The results are
depicted in Figure 8 below, which shows the robbery clearance rates for each of
the fourteen cities, as well as the average of the fourteen cities and the FBI’s
national average. As anticipated, data from the fourteen individual cities involve
a lot of “noise,” reflected by the fluctuating trend lines plotting year-to-year data
from the various cities. But when averaged together, the data from the fourteen
cities show a clear downward trend over 1966 to 1968.

But rather than just give our own subjective opinion as to whether the average
looks like a sharp downward trend (as we believe) or “random shifting”301
showing only a “mixed trend” (as Feeney believes), we decided to take a more
rigorous approach to the question. A standard statistical technique for reviewing
a data set for possible changes over time is to ask whether the data contains a
structural break.302 Reviewing data for a structural break is a pure time series
300

We used an unweighted average—i.e., simply the numerical average of each of the
fourteen cities. This approach is appropriate because our concern was to determine not the
magnitude of any drop in clearance rates in these cities, but rather whether a drop occurred in
these cities. We also generated four missing observations for Chicago (1960 to 1963), by
assuming that clearance rates in those years were the same as those in 1964, and one missing
observation for Dallas (1969), by averaging the clearance rates for the preceding and
following year.
301 Feeney, supra note 8, at 35.
302 See, e.g., Patricia H. Born & J. Bradley Karl, The Effect of Tort Reform on Medical
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question about a single data series. No choices need to be made about model
specification or the inclusion/exclusion of additional variables. Moreover,
standard statistical software is available to perform such examinations. Using
the standard structural change function (strucchange303) in R, we reviewed the
fourteen-city average from 1960 to 1970.304 Remarkably, where Feeney saw
only “random shifting,” we found a statistically significant structural break
following 1965 (with a confidence interval of one year on either side)—
consistent with our hypothesis that Miranda caused a break in clearance rates
over the 1966-to-1968 timeframe.
Feeney might respond, however, by arguing that the big drop in clearances in
New York City from 1965 to 1966 lies behind our finding of a structural break
in the data. Feeney suggests as much when he notes that New York City’s
numbers influence our other clearance rate discussions.305 But, here again, it is
possible to test this hypothesis by simply excluding New York City from the
fourteen-city average. Simple visual observation suggests that dropping New
York City from the data set does not make much of a difference, as shown in
Figure 9.

Malpractice Insurance Market Trends, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 718, 747 (2016)
(performing structural break analysis on an insurance market).
303 See Achim Zeileis et al., Strucchange: An R Package for Testing for Structural Change
in Linear Regression Models, 7 J. STAT. SOFTWARE 1, 15 (2002).
304 One of the choices we had to make was what minimum number of observations was
required for a structural break. We assumed three observations.
305 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 32-33.
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But we can do more than simple visual observation by again using the
strucchange function. Reviewing the thirteen-city average (the large cities
without New York City), we once again detect a structural break in the data, this
time at 1966 (with confidence intervals of one year on either side)—a timeframe
that fits our 1966-to-1968 hypothesis.306
Feeney might respond, however, that even among just the thirteen cities, more
record-keeping problems still existed. In particular, Feeney identified three cities
(in addition to New York City) where he believes record-keeping changes
coincidentally occurred, potentially affecting clearance rates at the same time as
Miranda: Detroit, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C.307 So, once again, we can
test this possibility by dropping all of the cities with identified record-keeping
changes from the original fourteen-city data set, leaving behind ten cities. When
examined visually, this data set also shows a downward trend at the time of
Miranda, as shown in Figure 10.

306

We also detected a second break in the data at 1963.
See Feeney, supra note 8, at 35 (“The four cities with record keeping shifts (New York,
Detroit, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C.) show sharp downward figures . . . . [H]owever,
this is due to the record keeping shifts rather than to any real sharp decline in clearance
rates.”).
307
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Using the strucchange algorithm, we are again able to identify a downward
structural break in the data in 1967, a time consistent with our theory,308 although
this break does not show a confidence band associated with it. We hypothesize
that if we had more observations, to the left and right (that is, earlier and later),
we would be able to shrink the confidence band. But significant pieces of the
fourteen-city data are unpublished or not otherwise generally available. Thus, it
would require an extraordinary amount of time to collect data for this extended
data set.
In sum, relying only on Feeney’s hand-plucked robbery clearance rate data
from the nation’s fourteen largest cities, we are able to disprove his claim that it
shows no evidence of declining clearance rates at the time of Miranda. Instead,
when the data are averaged together to eliminate noise—with or without
individual cities with record-keeping changes—they reveal a structural decline
in crime clearance rates in the immediate post-Miranda period (i.e., 1966 to
1968).
308

One of the ten cities that Feeney believes does not have record-keeping problems is Los
Angeles Accordingly, Los Angeles is included in the ten cities depicted in Figure 10. See id.
at 38. As we show shortly, however, the Los Angeles clearance rate data are subject to wild
fluctuations at the time of Miranda—fluctuations that tend to obscure the post-Miranda
decline in the remaining nine cities. See infra notes 343-65 and accompanying text. Because
dropping Los Angeles from the average would only further steepen the immediate postMiranda clearance rate decline in the average depicted in Figure 10, we did not undertake a
separate analysis of the data without Los Angeles.

760

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:685

2. Clearance Rate Declines in the Nation’s Cities Organized by Population
Feeney’s claim that record-keeping changes in New York City and a few other
large cities explain the crime clearance rate declines can be explored in another
way. After pointing to problems with the New York City data, Feeney notes that
“in theory” it would be possible to remove New York City (and other
problematic large cities) from the calculation, producing a “cleaner data set.”309
Feeney believes that the logistics of such data collections make the project quite
difficult.310 But actually, collecting cleaner data sets is relatively
straightforward. Indeed, the FBI has already constructed data sets where recordkeeping issues are unlikely to be a serious problem.
The FBI annually reports not only data for all cities (the data set we generally
rely upon311) but also numerous other subgroupings (e.g., Group I—cities with
populations of more than 250,000; Group II—cities with populations between
100,000 and 250,000; Group III—cities with populations between 50,000 and
100,000).312 Of course, looking to the grouping of smaller cities would eliminate
the effect of record-keeping changes in large cities like New York City. Some
of these groupings aggregate as many as several hundred cities whose reporting
practices would not have all changed simultaneously in 1966 when the Miranda
decision was handed down.
Moreover, while the exact number of cities reporting data within each group
may fluctuate slightly each year, the fluctuations are insignificant in aggregated
data. We plot the number of cities reporting crime data to the FBI in Figure 11.313
As can be seen, there are no sudden spikes or changes in the data.

309

See Feeney, supra note 8, at 33.
See id. at 33-34.
311 See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
312 See, e.g., UCR-1968, supra note 79, at 110-11 tbl.22.
313 In Figure 11, a missing 1957 data point was obtained by averaging the data from 1956
and 1958.
310
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We agree with James Alan Fox (one of the country’s leading crime observers)
that, “[a]lthough the group of cities included in the FBI tabulations does change
annually, the extent of error resulting from these fluctuations is minimal relative
to the aggregate data.”314 Also, analysis of the national data does not show any
major fluctuations, specifically in the 1965-to-1969 timeframe of particular
interest here.315 In short, so long as there are a large number of cities in the
national group reporting data,316 we would not expect record-keeping problems
to dictate results (conversely, if there were a very small number of cities in any
particular grouping, we would worry about “noise” in the data which might
create anomalous results).
Focusing on clearance rates for robbery (the same category that Feeney
focuses on), we collected the FBI robbery crime clearance rate data from the
eleven different population groupings for which the FBI reported data from 1950
to 2012.317 We then ran our standard multiple regression equations on each of
the eleven groupings, with the same explanatory variables used earlier.318
314

FOX, supra note 79, at 127 n.11.
See MICHAEL D. MALTZ, ANALYSIS OF MISSINGNESS IN UCR CRIME DATA 13-14 (2006).
316 The situation might be different if one were researching state-level data or, particularly,
county-level data. See id. at 14-15; Michael D. Maltz & Joseph Targonski, A Note on the Use
of County-Level UCR Data, 18 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 297, 316-17 (2002).
317 For some groupings, the FBI did not begin reporting data until several years after 1950.
We note those more limited data sets in our chart below.
318 In doing so, we were running regression equations that contained a dependent variable
(clearance rates) for cities grouped by particular size and that contained independent variables
resting on national data. Of course, we would have preferred to use independent variables
reporting data for precisely the same city grouping. But it did not appear possible to assemble
such data for all our variables, at least without extraordinary effort, so we simply used our
315
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Because of the possibility that particularly groupings of cities might have been
able to implement Miranda more quickly (or been forced to implement it more
slowly), we ran equations for both an immediate MIRANDA effect and the threeyear phase in of the MIRANDA effect we generally use throughout this Article.
Table 11 reports our results:
Table 11. City Subgroups by Population:
Coefficients of the MIRANDA Variable for Robbery Clearances
(both immediate and three-year Miranda phase in)
OLS Regressions on Clearance Rates for Specified City/Agency Groupings
(t statistics in parenthesis)
Population Group

Group I - All cities more than
250,000 population
Group IA - All cities more than 1
million population (data from 19562012)
Group IB - All cities between
500,000 and 1 million population
(data from 1956-2012)319
Group IC - All cities between
250,000 and 500,000 population
(data from 1956-2012)
Group II - All cities between 100,000
and 250,000 population
Group III - All cities between 50,000
and 100,000 population
Group IV - All cities between 25,000
and 50,000 population
Group V - All cities between 10,000
and 25,000 population
Group VI - All cities with less than
10,000 population
Suburban Areas (data from 19612012)
Rural Areas (data from 1961-2012)

Number of Cities/
Agencies Reporting
Data (1966)

MIRANDA
(immediate
effect)
-6.23
(-2.887)**

MIRANDA
(three-year
phase in)
-6.919
(2.763)**

5

-4.48
(-1.413)

-4.516
(-1.230)

22

-13.4
(-6.189)***

-14.960
(-5.870)***

26

-4.38
(-2.061)*

-4.328
(-1.744)†

-3.85
(-1.935)†
-3.685
(-2.129)*
-4.835
(-2.581)*
-4.65
(-2.459)*
-8.69
(-3.758)***
-9.32
(-4.43)***
-16.8
(-4.447)***

-4.267
(-1.856)†
-3.243
(-1.595)
-4.842
(-2.206)*
-5.390
(-2.472)*
-10.190
(-3.842)***
-10.440
(-3.377)**
-19.260
(-3.942)***

53

98
225
429
819
1,233
1,465
623

*** significant at. 001 level ** significant at .01 level * significant at .05 level
† significant at .10 level

existing data. We do not believe this influenced our general results, as it seems very likely
that trends in the national data on such things as police officers and unemployment rates
generally corresponded to trends in the particular city groups. So long as the trends
corresponded, we would be able to reach general conclusions of the type we discuss here.
319 For some initial data sets in the 500,000 to 1 million range, we took an average
(weighted by population) of two subcategories reported by the FBI.
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As can be seen in Table 11, for the immediate MIRANDA effect, we found
statistically significant MIRANDA effects across all population groupings320—
with the exception of Group IA, the nation’s largest cities (i.e., New York City,
Los Angeles, and a few others). For the three-year phase in, we found
statistically significant MIRANDA effects (at the 90% confidence level or
higher) for all population groupings with the exception of Group IA and III
(although Group III is close to statistical significance).
On closer inspection of the groups, it turns out that Group IA contains just a
tiny number of cities. For instance, in the year of Miranda (1966), Group IA
comprised just five cities. And, as Feeney himself points out, around the time of
Miranda, there was some fluctuation in data reporting in the nation’s largest
cities. For example, Group IA apparently excludes Los Angeles in 1965 but
includes Los Angeles in 1966, while excluding New York City from 1966 to
1972.321
With this point in mind, the finding that robbery clearance rates from Group
IA do not show a MIRANDA effect is easily explainable by changes in the
composition of the reporting cities. For example, the inclusion or exclusion of
just one extra city in the population group would mean a 20% increase (6 ÷ 5)
in the number of cities reporting.322 Additionally, the inclusion or exclusion of a
single city could dramatically change the population of the reporting cities in a
single year.323
On the other hand, the other broad groupings are not so susceptible to random
fluctuations attributable to a single jurisdiction or a small group of jurisdictions.
For example, Group VI (cities with populations of less than 10,000) comprises
more than a thousand cities.324 The average clearance rates of those cities are
unlikely to be subject to short-term changes in the data. We find MIRANDA
effects in every single FBI population grouping where there are enough cities to
avoid such random fluctuations—i.e., every FBI grouping for cities and agencies
below the one million population level, extending through suburban and rural
agencies—with the only exception being the “near miss” of Group III in the
three-year Miranda phase in (an anomalous result that we believe does not
undercut the general picture).
To be sure, in theory, it would be desirable to assemble a consistent set of a
large number of cities to examine their clearance rates and see whether any of

320

To be clear, Group II was statistically significant only at the .10 level.
See Feeney, supra note 8, at 30-33.
322 From 1968 to 1969, the number of cities in Group IA changed by 20%, from five cities
to six cities. Compare UCR-1968, supra note 79, at 100 tbl.12, with UCR-1969, supra note
79, at 94 tbl.9.
323 From 1965 to 1966, the population of the cities in Group IA changed substantially,
from 16,149,000 to 11,230,000, a more than 30% change in a single year. Compare UCR1965, supra note 79, at 97 tbl.8, with UCR-1966, supra note 79, at 100 tbl.12.
324 See, e.g., UCR-1966, supra note 79, at 101 tbl.12 (reporting 1233 cities in the Group
VI category).
321
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our conclusions change. But given the almost uniformly consistent findings from
the ten population groupings the FBI currently reports, we think that further
effort in this area would not change our conclusions. It is important to remember
a point (not discussed by Feeney) that the FBI itself emphasized in its crime
reports in the two years immediately following Miranda. In summing up the
1966 data, the FBI noted that the drop in clearances was “universally reported
by all population groups.”325 And in the following year, 1967, the FBI continued
to report widespread bad news.326 Again a clearance rate drop was “universally
reported by all population groups.”327 Record-keeping changes in a few isolated
cities, such as those Feeney identified, cannot explain this pattern.
B. California Clearance Rate Data
Feeney also points to data from California to claim that Miranda had no
harmful effect on the clearance rates. Feeney repeatedly asserts that in the 1960s
“California was . . . widely regarded as having the nation’s best crime
statistics,”328 although he provides no source for this assertion. He then reports
that California clearance rate data show a steady decline in the 1960s, but
“nothing very dramatic.”329
Because Feeney provides no source for the claim that California had the
“premier” state crime data,330 it is difficult to assess his position. Perhaps his
views are colored by the fact (not disclosed in his article) that he served on the
Research Advisory Council for California’s crime statistics and thus helped
oversee the collection of the data whose quality he finds high.331 But, in any
event, the pertinent issue here is not the overall quality of California’s crime
data, but rather the quality of one particular series: the clearance rate series.
One thing that caught our eye in reviewing Feeney’s presentation of the
California clearance rate data is that he used data running only from 1954 to
1969.332 Since the period we are interested in is 1966 to 1968, that gives only
one year of post-Miranda data (1969). It would obviously be better to run the
data out to 1970, 1975, or beyond, to look at long-term trends. Indeed,
confirmation of that fact comes from Feeney’s immediately previous table of
individual city clearance data (discussed in the preceding Section), which
appears just two pages earlier in his article, reporting city clearance rate data
325

UCR-1968, supra note 79, at 27.
See UCR-1967, supra note 79, at 30 (“Whereas police nationally cleared 24.3 percent
of these offenses in 1966, this dropped to 22.4 percent in 1967. The decrease was noted in
every Crime Index offense with auto theft solutions having the sharpest decline . . . .”).
327 Id. at 30.
328 Feeney, supra note 8, at 38.
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS & SPECIAL SERVS., CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA, 1980-1989, at ii (listing advisory board members).
332 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 39 tbl.7.
326
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from 1960 to 1970.333 Why did Feeney fail to run the California data similarly
out to (at least) 1970?
On close inspection of the annual publications from the California Bureau of
Justice Statistics (Crime and Delinquency in California),334 an answer to that
question appears: California stopped reporting clearance rate data entirely in
1970. Crime and Delinquency in California—1969 contains clearance rate data
for the seven index crimes (just as every previous publication back to 1954
had).335 Crime and Delinquency in California—1970 does not contain any
clearance rate data.336 Indeed, California did not report any clearance rate data
until 1985, at which point they made available data collected back to 1980.337
For someone claiming that this California clearance rate data are the best data
on clearance rate changes in the 1960s,338 it is odd that Feeney does not disclose
the fact (which must have been apparent to him339) that the California Bureau of
Criminal Statistics determined, in 1970, that the data set should not be reported
at all. Of course, the natural inference is that in 1970, the Bureau of Criminal
Statistics decided that there was some problem with the data series
(unreliability?), which meant that it was not worthy of reporting. And, of course,
if the 1970-to-1979 data was unreliable or otherwise unworthy of reporting, that
raises the inference that the same problems would likely have existed just a few
years earlier, including the critical 1966-to-1968 period.
But even assuming that the California clearance rate data are reliable, what
are we to make of Feeney’s assertion that it shows only a steady decline in the
1960s, but “nothing very dramatic” and certainly no “sharp fall.”340 The wiggle
words “nothing very dramatic” begin to arouse some suspicion, particularly
when it becomes clear that there were, in fact, significant crime clearance rate
changes in California when 1965 is compared to 1968, as shown in Table 12.

333

Id. at 37 tbl.6.
From 1952 to 1964, the annual publication of California crime statistics was entitled
Crime in California.
335 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN
CALIFORNIA 1969, at 55 tbl.II-3 (reporting statewide clearance rates for 1969).
336 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN
CALIFORNIA 1970 (lacking clearance rates throughout entire report, including in the table of
contents).
337 See CAL. BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA
1985, at 24 (1985).
338 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 38 (“Without question, it was the premier state criminal
justice statistical agency in the nation.”).
339 Presumably Feeney attempted to collect California clearance rate data for 1970 to make
his California series consistent with the fourteen-city series he discusses just a few pages
earlier. Also, Feeney was on the Research Advisory Council when the decision was made to
resume releasing clearance rate data. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
340 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 36-38.
334
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Table 12. California Clearance Rate Changes—1965-1968
Seven Index Crimes
Homicide

Rape

Robbery

Assault

Burglary

Theft

Vehicle

1965
Clearance
Rate

84.2%

56.1%

33.7%

67.3%

21.7%

19.1%

23.8%

1968
Clearance
Rate

77.2%

49.8%

28.3%

63.0%

18.8%

16.9%

18.1%

Percent
Reduction
1965-1968

-8.3%

-11.2%

-16.0%

-6.4%

-13.4%

-11.5%

-23.9%

Sources: CRIME IN CALIFORNIA—1965; CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA—1968

The consistent downward movement of California’s clearance rates
immediately after Miranda would appear to be consistent with our hypothesis of
Miranda’s harms. But Feeney seems to argue that even if California’s clearance
rates moved downward during that time, there was no “sharp fall” in the
clearance rates. Of course, what may seem to a particular observer to be—or not
to be—a “sharp fall” is a matter of judgment. As discussed in the previous
Section,341 however, statistical techniques exist for examining data to determine
whether there has been a structural break in the series. Applying that same
technique—the strucchange algorithm from R—we decided to look at the
California robbery clearance rate data from 1960 to 1969.342 We detected a
structural change, occurring in 1963 with a 95% confidence interval extending
from 1962 to 1965. The 1963 date does not by itself fit our Miranda theory,
although the confidence band (1962 to 1965) is broad enough to accept our
theory.
However, we wanted to look more carefully at the California clearance rate
data to determine whether it was reliable. Our initial assumption was that,
because California was a large state with many different police agencies, the
data would be generally internally consistent through the 1960s. But as we
investigated California crime statistics during that time period more carefully,
we learned that a single county—Los Angeles County—was responsible for a
huge percentage of the reported felonies in the state.343 Looking at the 1965
341

See supra notes 302-04 and accompanying text.
California did not report crime clearance rate data from 1970 to 1984. See supra notes
334-37. We selected 1960 as the beginning for our series because we wanted to compare the
Los Angeles data discussed by Feeney, and the data he reported for that Los Angeles data set
began in 1960.
343 See, e.g., State Crime: More than Half of It in L.A. County, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1965,
342
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statistics for robbery, the crime of most interest to Feeney and to us, well over
half—63.7% (6496)— of the California robbery arrests (10,200) came from Los
Angeles County.344 That suggests that if there were changes in reporting criteria
for clearance rates in that one county, it would have had a very significant effect
on California’s statewide data. It also raises some concern about the
comparability of California data to the rest of the country because Los Angeles
County in 1966 had the highest crime rate in the nation, according to the FBI.345
The argument could be made, however, that Los Angeles County is not, in
fact, a single jurisdiction for crime reporting purposes, but rather comprised of
multiple agencies (the police departments in Los Angeles, Long Beach,
Pasadena, Alhambra, etc.). This is true. However, among the various agencies
in Los Angeles County, a single city—Los Angeles—is far and away the largest.
In 1965, of the robbery arrests made in Los Angeles County, more than half
(4115) were made in Los Angeles.346 This means that in 1965, 40.3% of all
California robbery arrests were made in just this single city.
The fact that so much of the data in California came from one jurisdiction
would be of even greater concern if there were any reason for thinking the Los
Angeles data are problematic. Unfortunately, reasons for concern exist.
Continuing our focus on robbery clearance rates, it is first concerning that,
according to Feeney, Los Angeles data are not included in the FBI’s 1965 UCR,
but are included in the 1966 UCR.347 This suggests perhaps that Los Angeles
had difficulty gathering its data for 1965.348 Moving to the next few years, and
looking at the annual reports from Los Angeles (the Statistical Digests), one
finds reason for concern about the accuracy of the robbery clearance rate data
precisely in the 1965-to-1968 period in which we are most interested.
Specifically, the total number of cleared robberies in Los Angeles fluctuated
wildly during that period:

at A1 (“Los Angeles County contributed more than half of 346,255 felonies reported in
California during 1964 . . . . ).
344 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CRIME & DELINQUENCY IN
CALIFORNIA 1965, at 221 app. 3 [hereinafter CRIME & DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 1965].
345 See Eric Malnic, County Had Highest Crime Rate in U.S. in 1966, FBI Says, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 1967, at 3.
346 CRIME & DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 1965, supra note 344, at 221 app. 3.
347 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 30-31.
348 This hypothesis is supported by the fact that in the Claremont McKenna library, a
depository for the LAPD’s Statistical Digest, the 1965 volume was not received until March
13, 1967—far later than the typical appearance of middle of the following year. For example,
the 1965 volume was received on May 23, 1965.
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Number of Cleared Robberies in L.A.349
2630
2411
3563
3069

These data show a dramatic one-year increase from 1966 to 1967 of 47%—a
total of 1152 additional clearances.350 To be sure, crime was increasing during
this period of time. But the one-year increase in crime during that year (8%351)
is not anywhere close to a 47% increase. Robbery is not the only crime category
for which the 1967 data appears anomalous. For example, the number of
burglary clearances in Los Angeles jumped from 8327 in 1966 to 13,726 in
1967—a 64% increase in a single year.352 These startling increases suggest that
something changed in Los Angeles in 1967, either in its approach to policing or
in its collection of data.
One possibility is that a change in leadership in the Los Angeles Police
Department (“LAPD”) during the critical time period produced a change in
clearance rates. As shown in the chart below, William Parker’s sixteen-year run
as LAPD Chief of Police ended with his death just a few weeks after Miranda.
The LAPD then had three new chiefs of police over the next three years.

349 County of Los Angeles, DEP’T OF SHERIFF, STATISTICAL DIGEST 1965, at 11 [hereinafter
L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1965] (providing data from robbery clearance reports); County of
Los Angeles, DEP’T OF SHERIFF, STATISTICAL DIGEST 1966, at 8 [hereinafter L.A. STATISTICAL
DIGEST 1966] (same); County of Los Angeles, DEP’T OF SHERIFF, STATISTICAL DIGEST 1967,
at 8 [hereinafter L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1967] (same); County of Los Angeles, DEP’T OF
SHERIFF, STATISTICAL DIGEST 1968, at 8 [hereinafter L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1968] (same).
350
The numbers in the text are absolute numbers. The same dramatic fluctuations are
shown in clearance rate changes, from 32.8% in 1965, to 30.4% in 1966, to 35.8% in 1967,
and then 27.1% in 1968. See L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1965, supra note 349, at 11; L.A.
STATISTICAL DIGEST 1966, supra note 349, at 8; L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1967, supra note
349, at 8; L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1968, supra note 349, at 8.
351 Compare L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1966, supra note 349, at 6 (reporting total index
crimes for 1966 of 174,583), with L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1967, supra note 349, at 6
(reporting total index crimes for 1967 of 188,717).
352 L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1966, supra note 349, at 9; L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1967,
supra note 349, at 9. The burglary clearance rate for Los Angeles jumped from 14.9% to
22.9%, a 53% increase in a single year.
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Table 13. Los Angeles Chiefs of Police—1950-1978
Name of Chief

William A. Warton
William H. Parker
Thad F. Brown
Thomas Reddin
Roger E. Murdock
Edward M. Davis
Robert F. Rock
Daryl F. Gates

Initial Date of Service as
Chief
June 30, 1949
August 9, 1950
July 18, 1966
February 18, 1967
May 6, 1969
August 29, 1969
January 16, 1978
March 28, 1978

Last Date of Service as Chief
August 9, 1950
July 16, 1966
February 17, 1967
May 5, 1969
August 28, 1969
January 16, 1978
March 28, 1978
June 27, 1992

Source: Chiefs of the Los Angeles Police Department, L.A. POLICE DEP’T,
http://www.lapdonline.org/chiefs_of_the_los_angeles_police_department
[https://perma.cc/BE77-SQH9] (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).

This instability in LAPD leadership might have produced changes in
approaches either to policing or record keeping during the critical time for our
study. For example, from February 1967 to May 1969, Chief Thomas Reddin
was trying to put a more “human face” on the LAPD.353 Interestingly, 1967 was
also the year that the LAPD returned to the nation’s airwaves courtesy of the
program Dragnet, which showed Los Angeles police officers as “mildmannered, by-the-book cops.”354 The year 1967 was also a year in which
relations between the LAPD and the media took a downward turn, and when
LAPD instituted “sweeping changes” in recruiting and training.355
It is hard to tell how these background changes affected on-the-ground
policing in Los Angeles in 1967. We have located an L.A. Times article from
1967, which suggests that police methods changed in that year. The article
reports that, “Los Angeles police will soon adopt tactical operations in which
forces can be instantly poured into areas where crime problems are greatest.”356
353 David Shaw, Chief Parker Molded LAPD Image—Then Came the ’60s, L.A. TIMES,
May 25, 1992, at A1 (“Chief Reddin, in particular, tried to put a more human face on the
department, with billboards of smiling police officers and LAPD sponsorship of Little League
baseball teams, youth camping trips and neighborhood kaffeeklatsches.”); see also Paul
Houston, Reddin Stresses Firm, Fast Control of Riots, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1967, at EB
(noting buildup of community-relations programs and Chief Reddin’s efforts in this area). See
generally JOE DOMANICK, TO PROTECT AND TO SERVE: THE LAPD’S CENTURY OF WAR IN THE
CITY OF DREAMS 203-08 (1994).
354 See Shaw, supra note 353, at A1.
355 See Paul Houston, Police Dept. Overhauls Recruiting and Training, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
18, 1967, at A1; Shaw, supra note 353, at A1 (describing a critical 1967 article about LAPD
as being viewed by police as “a blatant declaration of war”).
356 Gene Blake & Bob Jackson, Crime War Need: New Concepts, Technology, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 1967, at E12A. This may have been a precursor to the “hot spot” theory of policing
that is currently in vogue. See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga, Andrew V. Papachristos & David M.
Hureau, The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime: An Updated Systematic Review and
Meta-Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633, 634 (2014); Jerry H. Ratcliffe et al., Citizens’ Reactions to
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The Chief of the LAPD, Darryl Gates, notes in his autobiography that in 1967
he was in charge of a newly created unit that focused on robberies.357
Interestingly and perhaps related to these points, we noticed that in the LAPD’s
Statistical Abstract, about half of the 1100 additional clearances in Los Angeles
came from the 77th Street Division of the LAPD—an apparent high-crime area.
We also noticed that the number of detectives assigned to the 77th Street
Division increased significantly that year as well,358 along with a substantial
increase in arrests for FBI index crimes.359 This would seem to suggest that the
LAPD changed its approach to policing in 1967,360 which could have produced
a significant improvement in its robbery clearance rates.

Hot Spots Policing: Impacts on Perceptions of Crime, Disorder, Safety and Police, 11 J.
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 393, 394 (2015); cf. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT
BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 142 (2012)
(discussing New York City crime decline and “hot spot” policing).
357 DARYL F. GATES WITH DIANE K. SHAH, CHIEF: MY LIFE IN THE LAPD 110-13 (1992)
(discussing how Chief Reddin established the new unit).
358 Compare L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1966, supra note 349, at 82 (noting that there were
eighty-one detectives in the 77th Street Division), with L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1967, supra
note 349, at 82 (noting that there were eighty-seven detectives in the 77th Street Division).
359 L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1967, supra note 349, at 3.
360 See JAMES A. BULTEMA, GUARDIANS OF ANGELS: A HISTORY OF THE LOS ANGELES
POLICE DEPARTMENT 229 (2013) (recounting changes made by Chief Reddin).
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The 1967 anomaly in the Los Angeles data is sufficiently large to noticeably
affect the California clearance rate trend line data for this time, as shown in
Figure 12.

Plotting the Los Angeles robbery clearance rate data on a graph over time,
there is a small drop in 1966, a sharp spike upward in 1967, and then a drop in
1968. Because Los Angeles data forms such a significant part of the California
data, that single spike tends to obscure (i.e., tends to level or smooth out) a
downward drop in California crime clearance rates from all other
jurisdictions.361 While California’s robbery clearance rate declines throughout
the 1966-to-1968 period, the drop is not a sharp fall (as also shown in Figure
12)—the point on which Feeney seizes.
The complication for our purposes is that LAPD’s apparent change in police
approaches in 1967—and the anomalous one-year upward spike in clearance
rates—renders Los Angeles an unsuitable jurisdiction for a simple before-andafter comparison of clearance rates. The change in policing is a confounding
variable that makes it impossible to determine what effect Miranda alone had
on policing. It is, however, possible to eliminate the effect of anomalous Los
Angeles data on the California clearance rate data by removing Los Angeles
361

Because Los Angeles is one of the nation’s ten largest cities, L.A. data form part of the
ten-city average we discussed in the previous Section. And because of Los Angeles’s
anomalous 1967 upward spike in clearance rate, its data tend to obscure the post-Miranda
clearance rate drop in Figure 10.
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from the trend line.362 Figure 13 plots robbery crime clearance rates during the
1960s not only for Los Angeles, but also for all California police agencies apart
from Los Angeles, all California agencies (as just discussed), the “Pacific”
region of the United States as reported in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports,363
and the national city data that we have relied on throughout this Article. As can
be seen—and as would be expected to be the case with progressively larger data
sets plotted on a single graph—the one data set that is most subject to
fluctuations is, unsurprisingly, the smallest of these groupings: the city of Los
Angeles. As the groupings become progressively larger, the trend lines become
generally smoother. This suggests that the fluctuating “tree” of Los Angeles is
tending to obscure the “forest” of many other jurisdictions.

362 To back out the Los Angeles data from the California data, one only needs to know
what percentage of the data come from Los Angeles and what the Los Angeles clearance rate
was compared to the California clearance rate. To simplify calculations, we assumed that Los
Angeles’s percentage of (adult) arrests from 1965 (the midpoint of the series) fairly reflects
its percentage throughout the decade. We were forced to use this estimate because we were
unable to easily locate a series that would allow us to calculate Los Angeles’s percentage of
the overall California data throughout the decade, as California Crime and Delinquency
stopped reporting individual city data around 1966. In 1960, Los Angeles City (adult) robbery
arrests constituted 42.7% of all (adult) arrests in California for robbery, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 1960, at 49 tbl.III-5, which is not too
different from the 40.3% reported in 1965, CRIME & DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 1965, supra
note 344, at 221 app. 3, the figure we used for the entire decade. We do not believe that a
more precise calculation of the percentage throughout the decade would alter the findings we
report.
363 This includes not just California, but also Oregon, Washington, Alaska, and Hawaii.

2017]

STILL HANDCUFFING THE COPS?

773

So far we have been discussing what is apparent simply from visual
observation of the trend lines. But a more rigorous analysis of the trends is
possible. In particular, because of the seemingly anomalous fluctuations in the
1967 Los Angeles data, we thought it would be instructive to run the structural
break algorithm discussed earlier on California’s robbery clearance rate data, but
now removing the Los Angeles data. Over the 1960-to-1969 period, the
strucchange algorithm found two structural breaks in that series: (1) 1963 (with
95% confidence interval break dates between 1962 and 1964); and (2) 1966
(with 95% confidence interval break dates between 1965 and 1967). This second
break fits our Miranda theory precisely. Put another way, removing from the
California data series the fluctuating data from one possibly anomalous
jurisdiction (which had multiple police chief changes between 1966 and 1969),
the data from all other jurisdictions in California reveal a sharp—i.e., structurally
significant—downward drop in robbery crime clearance rates starting
somewhere between 1965 and 1967. This is exactly when the drop should have
occurred to be consistent with our theory. Thus, far from contradicting our
conclusions, if anything, the California robbery clearance rate data support it.
V.

WHY CLEARANCE RATES WILL INHERENTLY UNDERESTIMATE
MIRANDA’S COSTS

The crime clearances rate data we have discussed thus far suggest that
Miranda did harm law enforcement. It is possible to argue, however, that crime
clearance rates are a “poor” way to measure Miranda’s effect on law
enforcement, as Feeney has also contended in his article—after arguing (as just
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discussed) that the clearance rates did not really decline after Miranda.364 We
agree with Feeney’s general point about limits on Miranda’s ability to harm
police clearance rates. But that does not make clearance rates a “poor” way of
measuring Miranda’s impact on police, but rather an understated way of
measuring that impact.365 Put another way, if Miranda’s harmful effects can be
detected even in nationally aggregated crime clearance rates which would miss
many of the harmful effects, then Miranda’s actual impact on law enforcement
would likely be substantially greater.
In this Part, we develop the reasons for concluding that clearance rate data
will understate any harmful effects from Miranda. In Section V.A, we develop
the ways in which Miranda could affect clearance rates. In Section V.B, we
review Feeney’s studies on police conduct investigations to see what they tell us
about Miranda’s capacity to affect clearance rates. And in Section V.C, we
consider whether Miranda’s effects would be detectable only in “secondary”
clearance rates, or in primary and other clearance rates as well. In Section V.D,
we present reasons for believing that declining clearance rates are a product of
declining confession rates. We conclude, in Section V.E, with an explanation of
why confessions remain extremely important even in an era of advancing
forensic science.

A. How Miranda Is Relevant to Clearance Rates
As Feeney points out, Miranda’s impact on clearance rates might be
somewhat limited. Many crimes will be “cleared” before police interrogate any
suspect. Feeney offers as straightforward examples several different bank robber
scenarios, such as when a guard walks into a bank during a robbery and makes
an arrest; when the police identify a robber with a photo from a camera inside
the bank; or when a bank teller sees a picture of the robber in the suspect mug
book.366 Those cases will be cleared by the arrest of the suspect before Miranda
comes into play. In cases such as these, Miranda has, in Feeney’s words, “very
little capacity to impact the ability of the police to identify and apprehend
offenders.”367
Feeney does not appear to contest that Miranda could have an effect on
clearance rates, but instead argues that any effect would be quite modest.368
Accordingly, it may be useful to set out initially the three different ways in which
364

See Feeney, supra note 8, at 113.
On this point, Donohue agrees with us. See Donohue, supra note 7, at 1156 (“If
Miranda significantly stops the flow of damaging statements by criminals to the police, it
could well reduce the rate of successful prosecutions of crime even if it has no impact on
measured clearance rates.”).
366 Feeney, supra note 8, at 42.
367 Id.
368 Id. (“It is certainly possible that giving the Miranda warnings has some impact upon
the willingness of a suspect to talk with the police and that the decision hampers the police in
conducting post-arrest interrogations.”).
365
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Miranda could have theoretically harmed law enforcement clearance rates, two
of which Feeney discusses and one of which he does not.
The most obvious way in which Miranda could harm the police would be by
affecting “primary clearances”—that is, by interfering with the ability of police
to interrogate suspects for crimes that the police suspect they have committed.
As we noted briefly earlier, police might wish to question a suspect about a crime
and Miranda might interfere with their ability to do so, either by blocking
interrogation entirely (because a suspect “lawyers up”) or by making
interrogation less effective.369 To be sure, many cases will be cleared by arrest
before Miranda comes into play. But for cases in which a suspect is questioned
in custody but never ultimately formally arrested, Miranda could have a harmful
effect on the primary clearance rate—that is, a reduction in the ability of police
to get information that they need to clear a crime in the first instance.
Miranda might also interfere with so-called “secondary clearances”—that is,
situations where police arrest a suspect for one crime and he secondarily
confesses to other similar crimes. For example, a robbery suspect caught by
police might confess not only to the robbery for which he was caught but also to
several others.370 But because secondary clearances occur after an initial arrest,
there seems to be little doubt that Miranda could harm law enforcement
secondary clearance rates, as even Feeney himself concedes.371
There remains a third type of clearance not specifically discussed by Feeney,
a form that we will label “more-serious-crime” clearances. Consider, for
example, a drug dealer arrested for a traffic offense or a small drug deal. Before
Miranda, the drug dealer might have been interrogated and confessed to a more
serious crime—a robbery or homicide perhaps. But after Miranda, this drug
dealer “lawyers up” and thus avoids police questioning.372 As a result, the police
never clear that more serious crime.
This kind of clearance has been discussed in the literature in connection with
so-called “broken windows” policing. The theory behind broken windows
policing is that disorder (i.e., things like broken windows in a neighborhood)

369

See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
JOHN E. CONKLIN, ROBBERY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 147 (1972); see also
infra Section V.C.2.
371 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 65 (noting eighteen percent of robbery clearances in
Boston studied by Conklin were secondary clearances, “clearly sufficient to cover a drop of
the magnitude claimed by Professors Cassell and Fowles”).
372 Once a suspect invokes his Miranda right to an attorney, Miranda blocks not only
questioning about the offense for which he was initially being questioned, but any other
offense as well. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 150 (1990) (holding that the “Fifth
Amendment protection of Edwards is not terminated or suspended by consultation with
counsel”); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 678-79 (1988) (holding that, once a suspect
invokes right to counsel, a suspect cannot be interrogated for any offense); Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (finding that after request for counsel police questioning
had to cease).
370
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and crime are inextricably linked.373 If police focus on order maintenance
policing, then crime levels will ultimately drop.374 Studies dispute whether such
order maintenance policing actually reduces crime rates and, if so, how it
reduces crime rates.375 But for present purposes, it is informative to focus on one
way in which order maintenance policing might operate to shed light on how
Miranda could harm clearance rates.
One mechanism by which order maintenance policing is said to work is that
increased arrests of petty offenders give police more opportunities to interrogate
offenders.376 This kind of clearance has been discussed in the clearance rate
literature.377 For example, in one case, the NYPD solved numerous interwoven
homicides based on one misdemeanor arrest, when a vehicle stop led to a
misdemeanor arrest and subsequent interviews of the passengers.378 Of course,
if Miranda makes such post-arrest interviews more difficult to conduct, then it
will have a depressing effect on clearance rates.
This more-serious-crime clearance possibility was recently raised by Graham
Ousey and Matthew Lee in their multivariate regression analysis of declining
homicide clearance rates from 1980 to 2000 across several hundred cities.379
They found a link between increased drug dealing arrests and improved
homicide clearance rates.380 As an explanation, they offered the possibility of
the more-serious-crime clearance, specifically:
[The] war on drugs policies of the 1980s and 1990s may have resulted in
“sweeps” that cast wide nets that snagged many offenders. Even if the vast
majority of those arrested in drug sweeps were nonviolent drug offenders,
373

See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 30-31.
374 GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 14 (1996).
375 Compare GEORGE L. KELLING & WILLIAM H. SOUSA, JR., MANHATTAN INST. CTR. FOR
CIVIC INNOVATION, CIVIC REP. NO. 22, DO POLICE MATTER?: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF
NEW YORK CITY’S POLICE REFORMS 18 (2001), with BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF
ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 4-6 (2001).
376 See Jang, Hoover & Lawton, supra note 153, at 531 (describing a study by Jack Maple
and Chris Mitchell in 1999 that found that “increased arrests of petty offenders provide police
more opportunity to interview offenders”); see also JACK MAPLE WITH CHRIS MITCHELL, THE
CRIME FIGHTER: HOW YOU CAN MAKE YOUR COMMUNITY CRIME-FREE 156-57 (1999) (listing
objectives for interrogations of minor offenders, including “statements about any other crimes
the suspect might admit” and concluding that broken windows policing was a significant
contributor to crime reduction in New York City).
377 See Lockwood, supra note 160, at 750.
378 Jang, Hoover & Lawton, supra note 153, at 531-32.
379 See Ousey & Lee, supra note 85, at 141 (“Against the backdrop of the precipitous
decline in urban homicide clearance over the past several decades, this study examines factors
that may be linked to within-city, over-time variation in homicide clearance rates from 1980
to 2000.”).
380 Id. (“[D]rug market arrests are associated with higher clearance rates.”).
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a small segment may have been “persons of interest” in open homicide
cases who previously had managed to avoid detection by the police. Thus,
a by-product of aggressive drug law enforcement may have been that police
were able to detain and ultimately arrest (i.e., clear) wanted perpetrators of
murder. Related to the above possibility, aggressive drug enforcement may
have increased avenues of acquiring information on existing unsolved
homicide cases. In essence, perpetrators of drug offenses who were caught
in drug sweeps may have been questioned regarding open murder cases,
with reduced charges offered as an incentive for “rolling over” on known
homicide perpetrators.381
Ousey and Lee’s suggestion of a linkage between drug arrests and homicide
clearances, detectable even in the aggregate data they were reviewing, suggest
the real possibility of important more-serious-crime clearances. But the evidence
on this point is conflicting. For example, a study by Hyunseok Jang and his
colleagues investigated what effect broken windows law enforcement had on
clearance rates. They found inconsistent results across different crime
categories, with broken windows enforcement having a positive impact on
clearance rates for burglaries, a marginal impact on auto theft clearances, and a
negative relationship with larceny clearances.382 On the other hand, Brian
Lockwood’s more recent article on burglary clearances in Philadelphia found
empirical support for the theory.383
A similar argument can be made with regard to Miranda’s indirect effects on
stop-question-and-frisk (“SQF”) tactics that police employ. An expansion of
broken windows policing,384 SQF involves police aggressively stopping and
questioning suspected criminals, and in some cases frisking them in an effort to
fight crime.385 Developing empirical research appears to support the proposition
that concentrated police tactics in concentrated areas can be effective in fighting

381

Ousey & Lee, supra note 85, at 153.
Jang, Hoover & Lawton, supra note 153, at 534-35.
383 Lockwood, supra note 160, at 757. Some further indirect support for the theory is found
in the “field interrogation” studies and related literature. Infra note 415.
384 See Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 335, 337 (2014) (describing SQF as a deepening and expansion of order
maintenance policing).
385 James Q. Wilson & Barbara Boland, The Effect of the Police on Crime, 12 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 367, 370 (1978).
382
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crime,386 although the research on SQF tactics in particular is mixed.387 We have
not focused on such tactics extensively here, because Miranda does not directly
harm police SQF efforts, since a suspect who is merely “stopped” is not entitled
to the Miranda warnings-and-waiver procedures.388 But Miranda may indirectly
harm such crime fighting efforts to the extent that suspects arrested through stopand-frisk operations may invoke their rights and prevent subsequent questioning
about other offenses.
We need not definitively determine here who has the better of the argument
on the underlying debate over the effectiveness of broken window policing or
stop and frisk tactics. Our limited purpose in describing how Miranda might
have influenced more-serious-crime clearances, along with primary clearances
and secondary clearances, is only to suggest that such a linkage is possible—a
possibility we then explore through our regression equations. Given these three
ways in which Miranda might affect clearance rates, our project of looking for
possible effects from Miranda is a reasonable one.
One additional point is worth making. Some scholars have speculated that
Miranda might actually increase the number of confessions that suspects give
by providing false assurances to suspects.389 Our methodology allows for this
possibility, since it is not uniquely tied to a reduction in clearance rates;
clearance rates could have increased after Miranda. However, we saw no
evidence that Miranda was useful in obtaining additional clearances.

B. Empirical Studies on Miranda’s Capacity to Change Clearance Rates
Given the three possible ways in which Miranda could have depressed crime
clearance rates, we were surprised at the extent to which Feeney attempted to
386 CHRISTOPHER S. KOPER & EVAN MAYO-WILSON, POLICE STRATEGIES TO REDUCE
ILLEGAL POSSESSION AND CARRYING OF FIREARMS: EFFECTS ON GUN CRIME 8, 14-28 (2012)
(reviewing literature on proactive investigation and enforcement, described as “intensified
traffic enforcement and field interrogations of suspicious persons,” and finding that they
reduced gun crimes); Lawrence W. Sherman, James W. Shaw & Dennis P. Rogan, The Kansas
City Gun Experiment, in NAT’L INST. OF JUST., RESEARCH IN BRIEF 1 (1995),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/kang.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7LP-SMPA] (discussing results
from an experiment in Kansas City involving an increased number of traffic citations, car
checks, pedestrian checks, and arrests, which produced a drop in gun crimes); Robert J.
Sampson & Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police on Crime: A Replication and
Theoretical Extension, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163, 163 (1988) (finding strong effects of
proactive policing, particularly on robbery crime rates).
387 Compare Dennis C. Smith & Robert Purtell, Does Stop and Frisk Stop Crime? (Nov.
6, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (finding statistically significant
negative effects of stops on robbery, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and homicide, but not on
other crimes), with Richard Rosenfeld & Robert Fornango, The Impact of Police Stops on
Precinct Robbery and Burglary Rates in New York City, 2003-2010, 31 JUST. Q. 96, 98, 10304 (2014) (finding, “contrary to prior research,” few effects of SQF on robbery and burglary).
388 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984).
389 See Duke, supra note 14, at 558-60.
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make the case that Miranda could have had “very little capacity” to depress
clearance rates390 and that “[o]nly if police interrogation plays an important role
in identifying and arresting suspects . . . is it possible that the Miranda decision
has the effects” we find in our regression equations.391 In support of his
argument, Feeney marshals a series of studies of police investigatory techniques.
But while these studies support the conclusion that Miranda could have had only
a limited—i.e., understated—effect on police clearance rates, they hardly
support Feeney’s claim that Miranda effects would have been undetectable in
clearance rates.
Feeney presents two types of studies in support of his argument: a preMiranda study and several post-Miranda studies. We analyze these two groups
differently because they have different imports.
1. A Pre-Miranda Study on Police Investigations
Perhaps the most important study cited by Feeney is a detailed analysis of
cases investigated by the LAPD in January 1966 (just a few months before
Miranda) conducted by the Science and Technology Task Force of the
President’s Crime Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice.392 This study is important because it is the only pre-Miranda study cited
by Feeney, and thus it provides a unique glimpse into what the police world
looked like before the Miranda rules came into play.
This President’s Crime Commission study analyzed 1905 reported crimes in
two field divisions of the LAPD.393 Feeney believes that this study provides a
“good general picture of how the police apprehended offenders in the period
immediately prior to Miranda,”394 citing it to support his argument that
interrogation did not play an important role in identifying and arresting
suspects.395 But Feeney never explains how his position can square with the
study’s own explicit finding: that the “interrogation of arrestees” was among the
principle methods used by detectives to identify suspects.396 Indeed, the study
presents a table on police methods used to link unnamed suspects to crimes in
which interrogation is the single most successful method.397
Rather than discuss this overall conclusion from the study’s own authors,
Feeney constructs his own subset of data from the study. Lumping his analysis
390

Feeney, supra note 8, at 42.
Id. at 43.
392 See id. (citing Herbert H. Isaacs, A Study of Communications, Crimes, and Arrests in a
Metropolitan Police Department, in INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSES, TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY—A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 88 (1967)).
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 Id. at 48.
396 Isaacs, supra note 392, at 8.
397 Id. at 98 tbl.B-18.
391
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of the study into a section devoted to “how the police catch burglars,”398 Feeney
extracts from the study’s 1905 total crimes a subset of 626 burglary cases.399
Feeney then derives his own clearance rate for burglaries (based on another
table) and concludes that “interrogation is credited with a burglary clearance all
by itself in only 4% of the burglary clearances.”400
But in the process of jerry-rigging his own statistics, Feeney has made basic
arithmetic errors. Properly calculated, the study actually shows (using Feeney’s
method of calculation) that interrogation was credited with producing a
clearance all by itself for 11.1% of the burglary clearances.401 And when we
include additional clearances where interrogation was involved “in
combination” with other police investigative methods, the percentage of the
burglary clearances in which interrogations was a factor rises to 26.4%.402
In addition, Feeney chose to focus solely on the study’s data on burglary. But
burglary was not one of the individual crime categories where we have a
consistent MIRANDA effect.403 Instead, robbery is the individual crime where
we find the most consistent MIRANDA effects. And the study suggests that
interrogation was involved in 25.4% of all robbery clearances (and 7.8% of all
robbery cases).404
Still further, the study appears to have entirely excluded secondary
clearances; the study followed cases to an arrest, not to a clearance.405
Accordingly, if a robbery suspect was arrested and later confessed to several
other robberies, the study would not have necessarily captured those clearances.
As a consequence, the study’s clearance rate numbers are artificially depressed,
particularly given the fact that the study looked at cases cleared over one month
398

Feeney, supra note 8, at 48.
Id.
400 Id.
401 See Isaacs, supra note 392, at 98 tbl.B-19 (finding that interrogation was the “unique
method” of clearance in eight cases which, divided by the seventy-two burglary clearances
(626 burglary cases x 11.5% clearance rate) equals 11.1%).
402 See id. (finding that interrogation was the “unique method” or “in combination” method
of clearance in nineteen cases, which divided by the seventy-two burglary clearances (626
burglary cases x 11.5% clearance rate) equals 26.4%).
403 See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
404 Unlike for burglary, the study does not report a specific clearance rate for robbery.
Because the study was done in Los Angeles in 1966, however, we can estimate the clearance
rate for the robbery in the study by using the LAPD’s robbery clearance rate for 1966 which
is 30.4%. See L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1966, supra note 349, at 8. The study reports 102
robbery cases, which multiplied by the 30.4% clearance rate implies approximately thirty-one
cleared robberies. The study reports that two robbery cases were uniquely solved by
interrogation and six cases by interrogation in combination with other methods.
405 See Isaacs, supra note 392, at 90 (“Where no arrest was made, no case was actually
counted as cleared . . . even though there may have been some other method of clearance.”);
see also id. at 95 tbl.B-11 (defining “other clearances” so that they appear to primarily involve
prosecutor decisions not to charge).
399
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in two particular field divisions,406 and thus would automatically exclude
clearances in other time periods or originating from other areas.
Good reasons exist for believing that even these figures significantly
understate interrogation’s role in clearing crimes. The study could easily collect
standard information about robberies that was normally reported to the FBI—
e.g., the study’s apparatus was triggered when a robbery was reported to the
police and then the clearance status (cleared or not cleared) would have been
collected in the ordinary course of business. But collecting information about
whether interrogation occurred in a particular case was trickier business. To
gather that statistic, the study examined the “followup” reports filed by
detectives.407 Of course, if a detective for any reason failed to file follow-up
paperwork—or to memorialize questioning in that paperwork—then the study
would not have detected any role of interrogation.
In addition, the study reported information on interrogation only where it was
involved in linking to a crime a suspect who had not been named in the initial
police report.408 If for any reason a suspect’s name appeared in the initial report,
then the study did not collect information about the methods police used to solve
that crime—including interrogation.409 And because the focus was on police
successes (i.e., cleared crimes) and not on police failures, the study collected no
data on police interrogations in cases involving uncleared crimes, which were
about three quarters of the total crimes in the study.410
In assessing all these numbers, it is important to remember that we do not
purport to offer an explanation for the trajectory of, for example, all robbery
cases, but only a fraction of them. Our best estimate of the harmful effect of the
Miranda variable on robbery clearances is 7.1%,411 a number that can coexist
quite comfortably with the numbers recounted above about the role of
interrogations in clearances.
2. Post-Miranda Studies on Police Investigations
We have spent considerable time analyzing the President’s Crime
Commission study because it appears to be the only pre-Miranda study that
Feeney discusses. With regard to several post-Miranda studies that, in Feeney’s
view, show a limited role for interrogation, one simple point to be made is that
the data from these studies likely supports our argument, rather than detracts
from it. We believe that in the post-Miranda world, clearance rates are depressed
precisely because of Miranda. A finding that interrogation does not solve many
crimes after Miranda is consistent with that argument. Put another way, as a
theoretical matter, even if the post-Miranda clearances attributable to
406
407
408
409
410
411

Id. at 88.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 98 tbl.B-18.
See id. at 98 (discussing methods used in “unnamed suspect cases”).
See id. at 97 tbl.B-15 (comparing 1423 uncleared cases with 482 cleared cases).
See supra note 268 and accompanying text.

782

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:685

interrogation are 0, that hardly disproves our position that, in the absence of
Miranda, they would be, for example, 7.1 percentage points higher in the case
of robbery or 1.0 percentage point higher in the case of larceny.412
Feeney nonetheless seems to believe that these post-Miranda police studies
demonstrate empirically that Miranda could not have had the kinds of effects on
clearance rates that we ascribe to the decision.413 But Feeney relies on a certain
kind of study, specifically studies on how to manage police investigations. These
studies do not focus mainly on police interrogations and, accordingly, rarely
discuss police interrogations—much less Miranda’s possible depressing effect
on clearance rates. A much more direct effort to assess Miranda’s effects is
found in the studies that asked police officers for their assessment of Miranda’s
impact. We canvass the relevant studies below, reporting the findings that police
officers who had experience operating both with and without Miranda
consistently believed that Miranda was harming their investigative efforts,
including, in particular, clearance rates.414 Feeney does not explain why he
ignores this research.415
But even if we confine ourselves to Feeney’s selected post-Miranda
investigative management studies, these studies fail to prove Feeney’s claim that
Miranda has little capacity to effect police clearance rates. Feeney discusses
studies involving three kinds of crimes: robbery, burglary, and larceny.416 We
will look at these three areas separately to show the problems with his approach.
a.

Robbery Studies

Turning to robbery, Feeney relies on studies that are designed to answer not
the question of how significant is police interrogation in solving crimes, but
412

See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
See Feeney, supra note 8, at 36 (arguing that post-Miranda clearance rate trends could
be described as a “mixed trend with a downward slide,” but not a “sharp fall”).
414 See infra notes 531-44 and accompanying text.
415 Feeney spends only one sentence in his article on this point, obliquely noting, without
clarification, that “surveys of detective opinion sometimes place greater value on police
interrogations as a method of solving crimes.” Feeney, supra note 8, at 47 n.121.
Feeney also does not review studies on “field interrogation” and related police tactics,
which tend to provide support for the importance of interrogations to effective law
enforcement. See, e.g., JOHN E. BOYDSTUN, SAN DIEGO FIELD INTERROGATION: FINAL REPORT
27 (1975) (presenting a controlled experiment finding that suspensions of field interrogations
was associated with a significant increase in the frequency of crimes); Sampson & Cohen,
supra note 386, at 185 (favoring “the interpretation that proactive policing directly reduces
crime rates”); Gordon P. Whitaker et al., Aggressive Policing and the Deterrence of Crime, 7
LAW & POL’Y 395, 407 (1985) (finding support for field interrogations deterring crime). See
generally Wilson & Boland, supra note 385, at 367 (discussing ways in which aggressive
policing might reduce crime rates); Rushin & Edwards, supra note 127 (manuscript at 40)
(finding that externally imposed regulation of police, through consent decrees, “may, at least
initially, make officers less aggressive or less effective in combatting crime”).
416 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 48, 52, 57.
413
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rather the question of how to manage police investigations. Thus, the studies
often look at issues regarding how to assign police manpower in optimal ways,
such as among patrol and detective units.417 As Feeney is forced to concede,
these studies do not typically directly analyze the question of how cases are
solved.418
Because these studies were not designed to focus on questions relating to
police interrogation, Feeney has to jerry-rig his own statistics by selectively
extracting numbers from the reported data addressing other subjects. Feeney’s
most extended discussion of robbery clearance is his presentation of data from a
1969 Oakland, California study, which (according to Feeney) shows that only
2% of robbery clearances (2 cases out of 83) came from interrogating
suspects.419 Feeney presents this figure in a table in his article, but describes the
numbers as being “[a]dopted from” a study done by William Smith.420 But
Smith’s study did not purport to even address the number of cases in which
interrogation of a suspect was involved in a clearance. To derive his 2% figure,
Feeney appears to have scanned through the write-ups of some examples given
by Smith in various categories. And, finding only two examples that directly
mention interrogation, Feeney then infers that only 2% of the entire body of
cases involved interrogations.
As a method for calculating how often interrogation clears crime, this
approach is badly flawed. Obviously, looking at only a limited number of
written-up examples does not provide a comprehensive assessment of the total
universe of the cases. Given that only approximately one-third of the cases had
detailed write-ups,421 we might reasonably assume that the two examples Feeney
found might more realistically be just one-third of the total interrogation cases,

417

See, e.g., GREENWOOD, supra note 220. While we discuss the quantitative aspects of
these studies below, it is interesting to find qualitative suggestions in the studies that police
interrogation is a significant factor in clearance rates. See, e.g., id. at 17 (discussing burglary
cases and noting that “[t]he large majority of cases cleared that meet the FBI definition [of a
clearance through an arrest for stolen property] rely on the suspect’s admission of guilt”).
418 See, e.g., Feeney, supra note 8, at 49 n.130 (discussing the Greenwood study in the
preceding footnote and concluding “[t]he study did not analyze how cases were solved”); see
also id. at 50 (discussing Bernard Greenberg and his colleagues’ model for predicting which
cases police could most easily clear); id. at 55-56 (discussing Greenberg and his colleagues’
“predictive model” for robbery clearances). Greenberg and his colleagues developed this
model in two studies published in the 1970s. See BERNARD GREENBERG ET AL., FELONY
INVESTIGATION DECISION MODEL: AN ANALYSIS OF INVESTIGATIVE ELEMENTS OF
INFORMATION (1977) [hereinafter GREENBERG ET AL., FELONY INVESTIGATION]; BERNARD
GREENBERG ET AL., ENHANCEMENT OF THE INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTION: ANALYSIS AND
CONCLUSIONS (1972) [hereinafter GREENBERG ET AL., ENHANCEMENT].
419 Feeney, supra note 8, at 53 (discussing William Smith, How Cops Catch Robbers, in 4
THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF ROBBERY 39 (Floyd Feeney & Adrianne Weir eds., 1973)).
420 Id. at 54 tbl.11.
421 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 50-74 (writing up approximately twenty-six examples).
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suggesting that rather than a 2% clearance rate due to interrogation reported by
Feeney, the actual rate would have been about 6%.
But an even more serious problem develops on close scrutiny of Feeney’s
method for “adopting” the figures from Smith’s study. Feeney notes that the
study initially involved 106 robbery clearances, but his 2% figure involves only
83 cases.422 What happened to the missing 23 cases?
It is not easy to determine how Feeney boiled down Smith’s 106 clearances
to just 83 cases,423 but one thing that is clear is that Feeney artificially excluded
a significant number of Smith’s cases that involved interrogations and
confessions. Smith notes that one of the ways in which robbery cases are cleared
is that a robber is apprehended at the scene and then “is questioned about [other
similar robberies].”424 Smith calls these clearances “secondary clearances” and
identified thirteen such secondary clearances in the sample (along with an
additional seven cases charged to the arrested suspects, but not cleared within
the period).425 Smith’s later discussion of these secondary clearances makes
clear that at least some of these involved confessions. Indeed, a later table in the
study explains that, of the thirteen secondary clearances, four cases involved a
cab robbery for which the basis for the clearance was “the suspect confessed,”
and, in another case involving a laundromat robbery, the suspect “confessed to
[a] street holdup two weeks earlier.”426 This means that Feeney excluded at least
five clear cases of interrogations clearing crimes by crafting his smaller sample.
Smith also notes that there were two cases in which “the robber did identify
himself as responsible for a number of robberies,” including one case in which
the arrestee “identified himself as responsible for 40 pursesnatches, but the
detective was able to identify . . . six of the instances.”427 Here again, given that
Feeney had only two clearances in his entire sample, he didn’t count (for
example) these extra robbery clearances.
If we start to add in all of these cases that Feeney dropped for unexplained
reasons, it becomes clear that interrogation is a significant feature of the way in
which some robbery cases are cleared. And it is important to remember that all
of these data are post-Miranda, where it might be expected that police would
encounter obstacles to clearing crimes—precisely the obstacles that we are
422

Compare id. at 53 n.148 (describing the study as involving 106 clearances), with id. at
54 tbl.11 (reporting statistics involving a total of 83 clearances).
423 We have reviewed the Smith chapter several times and cannot find any obvious way to
narrow down the 106 total clearances Feeney references to 83 clearances. One nonobvious
way is to look only at cases where victims and witnesses played the decisive role identifying
a suspect. See Smith, supra note 419, at 50 (referring the victim and witness playing the
decisive role in 36 of the 48 unshared roles and 47 of the shared roles; 36 + 47 = 83). But if
this is how Feeney constructed his subset, then he specifically excluded all cases in which
police investigation played a decisive role in the clearance.
424 Smith, supra note 419, at 43.
425 Id. at 46 tbl.4.
426 Id. at 80 tbl.11.
427 Id. at 79.
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trying to assess in this Article. Indeed, the Smith study reported that robbery
suspects were often unwilling to talk to investigators,428 presumably after receipt
of Miranda warnings.
Among the remaining studies Feeney cites on robbery, only one of them
follows police actions through the investigative process and collects data on how
police collect crime-related information.429 That study—a four-city study
conducted by John Eck—actually suggests that questioning of suspects is
important to the investigative process. Eck noted that “[s]uccessfully
investigating crimes is, in large part, reliant on the collection and interpretation
of information that may identify a suspect.”430 Accordingly, Eck collected
information about how police agencies gathered information. Eck provided a
table showing the probability of obtaining related crime information through
various actions of robbery investigators, which identified “suspect interview” as
a highly productive approach for obtaining information by robbery
investigators.431 Indeed, “suspect interview” was the most productive approach
in DeKalb County, one of the four areas studied.432 This seems to directly
support our conclusion that interrogation of suspects could be an important tool
in robbery investigations.
b. Larceny Studies
With regard to larceny investigations, Feeney argues that most larceny crimes
are solved not by interrogations, but by “apprehension in the act of theft,
apprehension in the possession of stolen property, or identification of a suspect
by the victim.”433 We can stipulate that these are the main ways in which
larcenies are solved, as we do not purport to offer a theory addressing most
larceny clearances. Rather, our theory is that Miranda has caused larceny
clearance rates to drop about 2 percentage points—for example, that in 2012,
larceny clearance rates would have been about 24% without Miranda rather than

428

Id. at 78-79.
See JOHN E. ECK, SOLVING CRIMES: THE INVESTIGATION OF BURGLARY AND ROBBERY
244-45 (1983) (distinguishing his study from earlier studies because those studies “did not
collect data on what detectives did after the preliminary investigation had been conducted”).
The Eck study was also published in the same year by the Police Executive Research Forum.
Following Feeney, we cite here the National Institute of Justice version.
430 Id. at 165.
431 Id. at 196 tbl.6-14 (listing “Probability of Obtaining Related Crime Information Given
That Activities are Conducted by Investigators of Robberies (% of Case-Days)” and listing
for “Suspect Interview” percentages for both patrol officer conduct and detective conduct).
432 In DeKalb County, “suspect interview” produced related crime information 51.5% of
the time, compared to “discussion with detective” (32.7%), and “informant interview”
(26.7%), among other approaches. Id.
433 Feeney, supra note 8, at 58.
429
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22% with it.434 Thus, the question is whether Miranda’s rules hamper clearances
for about 2% of total larcenies.435
Feeney writes that “[i]f Professors Cassell and Fowles are serious about their
claim that Miranda resulted in a sizable loss of larceny clearances, they might
begin by showing that the police actually interrogated a significant proportion
of the 1966-68 larceny arrestees.”436 As Feeney presumably knows, no empirical
studies exist on the precise number of larceny suspects questioned during those
three years. Indeed, there is very little data from the fifty years since Miranda
on the frequency of police questioning. But what little data do exist suggest that
a significant percentage of larceny arrestees are in fact questioned. As discussed
earlier,437 Cassell, joined by Hayman, studied cases presented by law
enforcement to the Salt Lake County Attorney’s Office for prosecution in 1994.
For the property crimes in the study,438 79.7% of suspects were in fact
questioned,439 giving significant room for Miranda to operate in the percentage
of cases we are trying to explain.
To try and prove that police do not often question larceny suspects, Feeney
discusses the crime of shoplifting. He notes that shoplifting is generally reported
to the police only when store detectives have apprehended a shoplifter—thus,
police do very little, yet the clearance rate for shop lifting is extraordinarily high
(80% to 90% or higher).440 But shoplifting (with its high clearance rate) is clearly
a small part of the FBI’s larceny crime category. According to the FBI, in 2010,
shopliftings were only 17.2% of larceny theft offenses, with the other important
categories being theft from motor vehicles (26.4%), theft from buildings
(11.3%), theft of motor vehicle accessories (8.9%), and a catchall of “others”
(31.8%).441 Shoplifting and its high clearance rates is an anomaly among all
larceny offenses.
Finally, Feeney appears to betray his ignorance about how regression
equations operate when he writes that if we “are serious” about our claim that
Miranda resulted in a sizeable loss of larceny clearances, we “need also to deal
434

See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
As noted earlier, even a two-percentage-point delta in larceny clearance rate means that,
without Miranda, larceny clearances would have been 9.4% higher and about 500,000
additional larcenies would have been cleared in recent years. See supra Table 5.
436 Feeney, supra note 8, at 58-59 (footnote omitted).
437 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussing Cassell and Hayman’s
study).
438 Most of the cases reviewed (58.4%) involved property crimes (i.e., theft, burglary,
larceny/forgery, and auto theft). Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 853 tbl.1.
439 Id. at 870 tbl.5, 853 tbl.1 (deriving the percentage figure by taking the number of
property cases in which suspects were questioned and dividing by the number of property
cases). About two-thirds of the questioning in the study was custodial questioning. Id. at 883
tbl.6.
440 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 57-58.
441 UCR-2010, supra note 79, at 26 (displaying a chart of “Larceny-Theft Distribution,
2010”).
435
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with the problem of statistical error. [The] ‘sharp fall’ for larceny is barely
perceptible even in the FBI figures. Although [Cassell and Fowles] find
statistical significance in the drop, the statistical effect that they find is not
particularly strong.”442 Feeney seems to be confused here, because the “barely
perceptible” drop in larceny clearance rates to which he refers is a drop that
ultimately is explained with high confidence by our Miranda equations—both
in their current iteration and in our earlier article’s version.443 Our finding is,
indeed, “particularly strong”—statistically significant at conventional levels,
and not fragile as confirmed by Bayesian model averaging.
c.

Burglary Studies

A final type of crime that Feeney believes could not have been affected by
Miranda is burglary.444 Burglary was a crime for which we found statistically
significant MIRANDA effects in some of our regression equations but not
others.445 Perhaps burglary is simply a crime for which interrogation plays a less
important role in solving cases than for other crimes, which is why our
MIRANDA effect is not as robust.
But even for the crime of burglary, Feeney’s data fail to demonstrate that
Miranda lacks any capacity to affect clearances—at least to the degree required
to be consistent with our findings. Our models suggest that Miranda might have
an effect on burglary clearances of about two percent.446 We can thus readily
accede to Feeney’s point that the most important way in which burglary suspects
are identified and apprehended is through on-the-scene information, such as
initial identifications by burglary victims or witnesses.447 We are trying to
explain change not in these quickly solved “slam dunk” burglary cases, but the
more difficult-to-solve cases where follow-up investigation is required.
As with the robbery studies discussed earlier, most of Feeney’s cited burglary
studies focus on the initial identification of suspects rather than on follow-up

442

Feeney, supra note 8, at 59.
See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text; supra Table 4 (showing that Miranda’s
effect on larceny clearance rates is statistically significant at conventional 95% confidence
level); supra Table 7 (showing that 60.9% of all equations have a larceny effect, including
80% of the top five equations, for data 1950-2012; supra Table 8 (showing that 99.1% of all
equations have a larceny effect, including 100% of the top five equations, for data 1950-2007,
before the recession occurred).
444 Feeney, supra note 8, at 48.
445 See supra note 204 and accompanying text; supra Table 6 (MIRANDA effect found for
1950-2007 data but not 1950-2012 data in Cassell/Fowles model); supra Table 6 (MIRANDA
effect found (at ninety percent confidence) in 1950-2012 data in Donohue model, but not
1950-2012 data); supra Table 7 (Bayesian model average shows MIRANDA effect only in
42.9% of equations); see also Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1088 tbl.3 (statistically
significant effect found for burglary).
446 See supra Table 6.
447 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 48-52.
443
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investigation.448 The one study that tries to follow burglary cases throughout the
investigative process is the Eck study, which (as with robbery) found the suspect
interviews were important (although slightly less important than in the robbery
cases).449 A table showed that “suspect interview” was important in obtaining
related crime information for burglary.450 Eck’s data supports our thesis that
police interrogation can be an important method of obtaining information used
to clear burglaries—and that Miranda, by restricting that method, could have
caused a noticeable reduction in burglary clearances.

C. Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Primary and Secondary Clearances
For all the reasons just explained, we believe Feeney is incorrect in his
assertion that Miranda did not have the “capacity” to cause clearance rate
changes of the type and magnitude we found in our regression equations. And it
appears that Feeney is, perhaps, not entirely convinced by his argument either.
Immediately after arguing at length against Miranda’s capacity to reduce crime
clearance rates, Feeney next advances the argument that any reduction in
clearance rates would have been confined to “secondary” rather than “primary”
clearances.451 Feeney appears to concede that Miranda could depress secondary
clearance rates.452 Indeed, Feeney specifically suggests that changes in
secondary clearances could have explained the drops in the clearance rates that
we observed.453 Other scholars have advanced similar theories in the past,
including Kamisar.454
Feeney first argues that the lost clearances that our regression equations
identify are probably all secondary clearances.455 He then further argues that lost
secondary clearances “would have had little real effect on law enforcement—
because solving older crimes typically contributes little to the fight against
crime.”456 Serious problems exist with both prongs of his argument.

448

See supra notes 417-21.
See ECK, supra note 429, at 192 (discussing results of study as to importance of suspect
interviews for burglary suspect information).
450 Id. at 191 tbl.6-11.
451 Feeney, supra note 8, at 42-43 (“[Miranda] may have affected what the British call
‘secondary clearances’ . . . [b]ut it has had little to do with ‘primary clearances’ . . . .”).
452 Cf. id. at 42 (conceding that Miranda may have affected secondary clearances).
453 See id. at 65 (“Professors Cassell and Fowles point to no empirical studies indicating
that the number of secondary clearances was too small to account for the ‘sharp fall’ in
clearance rates that they claim.”).
454 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1122 & nn.325-26 (discussing Kamisar’s study
and citing to additional supporting sources).
455 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 60 (“One response to the Cassell-Fowles claims of a
‘sharp’ post-Miranda fall in clearance rates has been to attribute the decline to a drop in the
number of [secondary clearances].”).
456 Id.
449
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1. Lost Clearances as Lost Primary Clearances
Turning first to the question of whether the lost clearances were primary or
secondary, it is useful to begin by getting some sense of the proportion of these
two kinds of clearances in the FBI data. The FBI does not regularly distinguish
primary clearances from secondary clearances,457 so we must look to other
sources to make a determination. Unfortunately, as with many other aspects of
crime clearance rates, there is limited data on the extent to which clearances are
primary versus secondary clearances.
In our earlier article, we acknowledged that there was limited empirical
evidence on this point, but cited two specific studies with data on secondary
clearances suggesting that only a small percentage of crimes were clearances of
this type. Our first study was a 1967 Vera Institute study of arrested suspects in
one precinct in New York.458 The study found that, after Miranda, only a small
fraction of additional crimes were solved through interrogation.459 We also cited
the Yale Law Journal study from New Haven the summer after Miranda, which
suggested that about ten to fifteen percent of clearances might be attributable to
secondary clearances.460 Curiously, while Feeney discusses other aspects of our
argument, he does not discuss these two studies.461
457

The FBI does collect data on two different kinds of clearances: (1) crimes cleared by
arrest; and (2) crimes cleared by “exceptional means” (such cases where police have identified
the perpetrator but are unable to arrest him because he is located in another jurisdiction). See,
e.g., UCR-2010, supra note 79, at 313 (discussing exceptional clearances). Our sense is that
such “exceptional” clearances are, indeed, exceptional and are not worth discussing separately
here. See Marc Riedel & John G. Boulahanis, Homicides Exceptionally Cleared and Cleared
by Arrest: An Exploratory Study of Police/Prosecutor Outcomes, 11 HOMICIDE STUD. 151,
151-63 (2007) (finding that 10.7% of homicide cases reported to the Chicago Police
Department were cleared by exceptional means); see also John P. Jarvis & Wendy C.
Regoeczi, Homicide Clearances: An Analysis of Arrest Versus Exceptional Outcomes, 13
HOMICIDE STUD. 174, 178-79 (2009) (discussing the Riedel & Boulahanis study). But cf.
Cassia Spohn & Katharine Tellis, Justice Denied?: The Exceptional Clearance of Rape Cases
in Los Angeles, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1379, 1380-99 (2011) (finding large numbers of sexual
assault cases cleared by exceptional means in Los Angeles). Not only are exceptional
clearances a relatively small fraction of clearances, but we have also seen no developed
argument that the proportion of exceptional clearances would have been significantly altered
by Miranda.
458 See VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 292.
459 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1123 n.329 (citing VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra
note 292, at 68 & n.27).
460 See id. (citing Wald et al., supra note 51, at 1595 n.203).
461 Since publication of our earlier article, we have located one additional study with data
showing only a small percentage of clearances to be secondary clearances, at least in the crime
categories for which we consistently find a general MIRANDA effect. A study in Rochester,
New York, found that 8.8% of robbery clearances, 4.4% of larceny clearances, and 50.8% of
burglary clearances by regular police units were secondary arrest clearances. PETER B. BLOCH
& JAMES BELL, MANAGING INVESTIGATIONS: THE ROCHESTER SYSTEM 27 tbl.5 (1976)
(reporting data for “nonteam” clearances). While the burglary secondary clearance percent is
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Instead of discussing our data, Feeney turns to the individual police agency
studies just discussed. We find it interesting that Feeney fails to consider some
of the same studies that he had reviewed when he was arguing that police
interrogation is a relatively insignificant way in which police officers solve
crimes. Perhaps the reason Feeney fails to discuss these studies is that they
would show a very low percentage of cases (sometimes bordering on 0%) in
which secondary clearances were obtained, which is perhaps why they tended to
show a small role for interrogations in the first place.462 Because these studies
were designed to follow cases that led to an arrest, they tended not to capture
cases in which a crime was cleared without an arrest—the very kinds of cases
where secondary clearances ordinarily occur.
Illustrative of this problem of undercounting secondary clearances is the study
by Bernard Greenberg and his colleagues in 1974 of the Oakland Police
Department. He found that 42 of 330 robberies during the study period in
Oakland were cleared, all of them by arrest and prosecution463—suggesting that
the primary clearance rate was 100%, mathematically leaving a secondary
clearance rate of only 0%.464 Similarly, in an earlier study by Greenberg and his
colleagues, the means of identification for various crimes was only rarely (3 of
58, or 5.2%) due to “unrelated interrogation.”465
Similar low percentages of secondary clearances come from the one preMiranda study cited by Feeney, the President’s Crime Commission study in Los
Angeles in early 1966. This study showed very high percentages of cases cleared
by arrest and only a small percentage that could have been cleared through a
secondary clearance. For example, the study found that 24 of 26 (92.3%) robbery
cases were cleared by arrest, leaving only 2 cases that could have been solved in
“other” ways.466 Similarly, most burglaries (55 of 68, or 80.8%) were cleared by
arrest.467 With regard to the “other” category (apart from arrest) for clearing,

very high, the more salient number for present purposes are the robbery and larceny
percentages—as they come from categories in which we found a MIRANDA effect. The study
reported higher secondary clearance numbers for specialized experimental “teams” that were
created to investigate crimes, but cautioned that these numbers “cannot be accepted too
readily” because the teams may have worked especially hard to show that the experiment was
working. See id. at 29.
462 See, e.g., supra notes 405-06 and accompanying text (noting reasons for thinking that
the cited studies exclude secondary clearances).
463 GREENBERG ET AL., FELONY INVESTIGATION, supra note 418, at 8 tbl.I-2 (displaying
results of study).
464 Feeney argues that the way in which police usually obtain secondary clearances is by
promising suspects that they will not be prosecuted for the additional offenses. Feeney, supra
note 8, at 64-65. On this theory, if all cleared crimes are prosecuted, the secondary clearance
rate is 0%.
465 GREENBERG ET AL., ENHANCEMENT, supra note 418, at 70 tbl.6-4.
466 Isaacs, supra note 392, at 95 tbl.B-12.
467 Id.
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secondary clearances were not specifically mentioned at all, suggesting that they
must have been a tiny percentage (if any) of the cases involved.468
Rather than discuss these studies, Feeney reviews two individual studies that
collected data on the proportion of primary clearances to secondary clearances.
Both studies show the great majority of clearances are primary clearances. One
of these studies is Smith’s study in Oakland in 1969.469 Within a study period of
several weeks, Smith collected data on 106 robbery clearances.470 He identified
only thirteen of those 106 (12.3%) as secondary clearances.471 Smith also noted
that he found “no evidence of the robbery detectives attempting to aid their
clearance records by clearing a number of reports on spurious . . .
confessions.”472 He explained that part of the reason for this was that in 1969
(three years after Miranda) “robbers for the most part did not confess . . . [and
if] they did confess, it was mainly for the robbery for which they were
caught.”473 Smith concluded that “[i]n general it was not rewarding for the
detective to try to link a suspect with a large number of cases as it was time
consuming,” particularly in light of the fact that detectives were “[f]requently
stymied by the suspect’s unwillingness to talk.”474
John Conklin studied the clearance of robberies in Boston in 1968. He found
a slightly larger percentage of secondary clearances, with the vast majority of
clearances being primary clearances. Specifically, Conklin found that 17.9% of
the robbery clearances in that year came from “clearance[s] by multiple
confession[s].”475 Conklin noted that “[m]ost robberies solved in this manner
were cleared some time after the offense occurred, suggesting that the victim
might have been unavailable to make an identification or might have been unable
468 The table explaining “other clearance methods” apart from arrests lists juvenile
prosecution, declination by prosecutor, victim refusal to procedure, and no-crime
determinations as the other specifically identified reasons for a clearance. Id. at 95 tbl.B-11.
469 See supra notes 422-30 and accompanying text (discussing Smith’s study and Feeney’s
analysis of the data). The qualitative data on secondary clearance rates is largely limited to
the anecdotal observation that some police officers will try to increase their clearance rates by
having an arrested suspect “confess” to a large number of similar crimes. See, e.g., JEROME
H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 169-73
(3d ed. 1994). For our purposes, such qualitative assessments are unhelpful. While we agree
that such inflated secondary clearances exist, our focus is on the extent of such clearances.
470 Smith, supra note 372, at 46 tbl.4.
471 Id.
472 Id. at 78.
473 Id. at 79.
474 Id.
475 CONKLIN, supra note 370, at 147. Interestingly, Conklin also noted (consistent with the
findings in this Article) that in the nation’s largest cities, there was little change in robbery
clearance rates from 1960 to 1965, but then clearance rates fell significantly over the next
several years. Id. at 133. Conklin also found a drop in clearance rates in Boston from 1964 to
1968, although the extent of the drop (from 37.4% to 35.8%) was not as large as in other
cities. Id. at 133-34.
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to identify the offender after a lapse of so much time.”476 Conklin also added
that a suspect who confessed to multiple crimes was rarely punished for his
admissions.477
As between the Smith study reporting a 12.3% secondary clearance rate and
the Conklin study reporting a 17.9% rate, Feeney seizes on the larger of the two
numbers to argue that it is “clearly sufficient to cover a drop of the magnitude
claimed by Professors Cassell and Fowles.”478 It is not clear why Feeney
believes it is appropriate to use the single largest figure of secondary clearances
that is reported in any of the studies discussed, particularly when Conklin
himself thought that his 17.9% figure might have been higher than in other
cities.479 But, in any event, Feeney has done his math incorrectly in asserting
that the 17.9% figure is sufficient to account for our findings.
Feeney appears to misunderstand how coefficients associated with regression
equations operate. Feeney is discussing percentages of clearances, while our
regressions show a percentage point change or “delta” (a difference between two
values, i.e., delta = x – y). When this fact is correctly appreciated, secondary
clearances are not sufficient to explain the Miranda coefficients on our
equations.
For example, taking the robbery category that Feeney discusses, our standard
1998 regression equation480 showed a Miranda coefficient (i.e., delta) of -6.4%
for robbery at a time when robbery clearance rates were 24.2%.481 Our equation
thus predicts that robbery clearance rates for 1995 without Miranda would have
been 30.6% (24.2% + 6.4%)—i.e., that clearance rates would have been about
26% higher (30.6%/24.2%) without Miranda. The net result is that the delta, or
change due to Miranda, exceeds the 17.9% of clearances that Feeney estimates
could be due to secondary clearance.482 Thus, contrary to Feeney’s claim, even
using Feeney’s handpicked high number of secondary clearances does not
produce a “clearly sufficient” number to cover the magnitude of our drop.483
476

Id. at 147.
Id.
478 Feeney, supra note 8, at 65.
479 CONKLIN, supra note 370, at 148 (suggesting that this technique of clearing cases may
have been more common in Boston).
480 The “standard” equation is the three-year Miranda phase in that both we and Donohue
believe best fits the data.
481 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1086 tbl.II, 1106 tbl.VIII.
482 Assuming that 17.9% of the 30.6% predicted clearance rate without Miranda was due
to secondary clearances, that would mean a 5.4% delta in clearance rates (30.6% x 17.9%)—
which is smaller than the 6.4% delta that our equations found.
483 Because Feeney was criticizing our earlier article, the numbers quoted above come
from our earlier article on data through 1995. The problems with Feeney’s argument also
apply given our current robbery clearance rate coefficients. Our latest equations estimate a
delta for robbery of about -7.1%. See supra note 411 and accompanying text (reporting a
Bayesian average coefficient for Miranda of -7.092). Given a 2012 robbery clearance rate of
28.1%, see supra note 193 and accompanying text, our current predicted clearance rate in the
477
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Even more clear-cut is the case of vehicle theft. Assuming the percentage of
secondary clearances for vehicle theft is the same that Feeney selects for robbery
(17.9%), that percentage of secondary clearances is far lower than the number
needed to explain our delta for vehicle theft. Given that so few vehicle thefts are
cleared, our delta for the vehicle theft is a substantial part of the total. Our
regression equations suggest that, without Miranda, clearance rates for vehicle
theft would have been 31% higher (using our 1995 article and data) or 42%
higher (using our current article and data).484 For Feeney’s secondary clearance
theory to account for our findings, it has to explain all of the crime categories
where we found a MIRANDA effect. Because it clearly fails to explain the
vehicle theft category, his theory should be rejected.
For all these reasons, we do not believe that individual studies demonstrate
that the declining clearance rates we have found are all attributable to lost
secondary clearances. But lost secondary clearances surely may have played a
role, and it would be nice to have a better quantitative method for determining
what fraction of our drop might be attributable to lost secondary clearances. An
approach for calculating such a fraction comes from recognizing that
analytically the clearance rate consists of two components: (1) the number of
arrests per crime, and (2) the number of clearances per arrest.485 Feeney’s
ultimate claim is that a change in the second component—clearances per
arrest—is responsible for the observed clearance rate drop. But the available FBI
data suggest that clearance rates fell immediately after Miranda not only because
police were obtaining fewer statements (and thus confessions) from suspects,
but also because they were making fewer arrests per crime. In other words, both
clearances per arrest and arrests per crime fell after Miranda. FBI data for violent
crimes from 1965 to 1991486 on this issue are plotted in Figure 14.

absence of Miranda is 35.2%. Assuming that 17.9% of the 35.2% predicted clearance rate
without Miranda was due to secondary clearances, that would mean that a -6.3% delta in
clearance rates (35.2% x 17.9%)—which is smaller than the -7.1% delta that our equations
found.
484 In our earlier article, our regression for vehicle theft produced a Miranda coefficient
of -4.148. See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1096 tbl.4. Given a 1995 clearance rate for
vehicle theft of 13.2%, that means we were predicting that the clearance rate without Miranda
would have been about 31% higher (17.2%/13.1%)—far more than Feeney’s 17.9%
secondary clearance number could explain. Our current equations lead to similar results, given
that we find a -5.1% delta in vehicle clearance rates, see supra note 193 and accompanying
text (Table 7), which, given a 2012 clearance rate for vehicle theft of 11.9%, means we are
predicting that the clearance rate without Miranda would have been about 42% higher
(17.0%/11.9%)—again, far more than Feeney’s 17.9% secondary clearance number could
explain.
485 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1123.
486 The FBI has published a consistent revision of its arrest data that extends back only to
1965. For further details about this chart, see Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1123-24.
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Figure 14 - Arrests/Crime and Clearances/Arrest

On close examination of the chart, the years 1966 to 1968 show a substantial
decline in the number of arrests per violent crime. In fact, so far as we can tell
from simple visual observation of the available data, more than half of the 1966to-1968 drop in violent crime clearance rates stemmed from reductions in arrests
per crime.
Feeney’s response to this chart is primarily to fall back on his other main
arguments—i.e., that (despite FBI data to the contrary) clearance rates did not
sharply fall from 1966 to 1968, and that there is no reason to think that Miranda
would have an effect on clearance rates.487 These primary arguments have been
rebutted elsewhere in our current Article.488 Feeney also nitpicks several other
points, which hardly suffice for him to carry his point.489
487

Feeney, supra note 8, at 61.
See supra notes 280-327 and accompanying text (arguing that clearance rates did, in
fact, fall sharply after Miranda as the FBI and many other observers reported) and notes 280308 and accompanying text (explaining why Miranda could harm clearance rates).
489 Having established through our regression equations (and related Bayesian model
488
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2. The Harm of Lost Secondary Clearances
For these reasons just given, we think it is likely that most of the clearance
rate drop is due to reductions in primary clearances rather than secondary
clearances. But even if Feeney is correct in isolating the cause of the clearance
rate drop to be only secondary clearances, the other part of his argument—that
society is unharmed when police officers solve fewer crimes from each arrest—
is incorrect. Perhaps the most important reason to be concerned about lost
secondary clearances is their effect on crime victims. Uncleared crimes harm
crime victims, who never receive the reassurance that their attackers have been
apprehended.490 As Jeff Fagan and Daniel Richmond recently put it, “[c]learance
rates matter in reassuring people that police are dedicated to their safety, and
that they can deliver on promises of security.”491 Evidence suggests that the
principle harms suffered by crime victims includes psychological trauma.492
Without a clearance, they will likely continue to fear that they will be victimized

averaging) significant negative MIRANDA effects on clearance rates, as well as the fact that
the great majority of crime clearances are primary clearances, we think the burden of proof
can properly be assigned to Feeney to prove that our negative effects are mostly attributable
to secondary clearances. Along these lines, we find it interesting that Feeney criticizes our
graph of the FBI data by arguing that, instead of plotting clearances/arrests and arrests/crimes,
we should have plotted arrests/crimes. Feeney, supra note 8, at 62-63. But Feeney provides
no clear reason why this is the proper approach. Nor does he choose to present such a
calculation himself. We see no reason to chase down such a calculation, particularly because
our chart plots clearances/arrests. Clearance rates are, of course, composed entirely of crimes
(i.e., crimes solved divided by crimes committed).
Feeney also says (correctly) that our chart includes data from major cities like New York
City, which should (in his view) be eliminated from the data to reach accurate conclusions.
See id. at 63-64. We have shown earlier that eliminating flawed large city data from
consideration does not alter our conclusions. See supra notes 280-308 and accompanying text.
Feeney also complains that our graph starts in 1965 and that a longer pre-Miranda period
would be preferable. See Feeney, supra note 8, at 64. We naturally would like more preMiranda data, but the FBI has not made any such data available. Finally, Feeney notes that
attitudes about the importance of secondary clearances may have changed at some point, with
the effect of minimizing officers’ interests in obtaining such clearances. See id. at 66-71. But
Feeney does not press this argument very hard, and he even ends up conceding that such
changing attitudes would not have occurred during the 1966-to-1968 period of interest to us.
See id. at 70 (“It is highly doubtful that much of the criticism of secondary clearances . . . had
filtered its way down to working level police officers by 1966-68.”).
490 See Spohn & Tellis, supra note 457, at 1399-415 (discussing the experiences of sexual
assault victims in the crime clearance process).
491 Jeffrey Fagan & Daniel Richman, Understanding Recent Spikes and Longer Trends in
American Murders, 117 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 41) (on file with
authors).
492 See Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
611, 619-21 (2009); see also LESLIE SEBBA, THIRD PARTIES: VICTIMS AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 80-81 (1996).
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again.493 Elizabeth Mustaine explained: “For victims, witnesses, and others
connected to criminal events, whether or not a criminal offense is cleared by the
police is an important personal and emotional issue. For victims, knowing that
perpetrators who offended against them are identified and arrested may be
important for mental health and daily functioning.”494 Uncleared crimes leave
their “victims without answers.”495 Victims understandably want to see justice
done, and that is often not possible until the crime is cleared. Victims of property
crimes also benefit from each clearance, because even if the suspect is never
charged or convicted for the secondary crime, the confession creates the
possibility of the return of stolen property496 or restitution.497
Fewer secondary clearances also harm law enforcement. Fewer cleared
crimes leave police investigators less able to focus effectively on crimes that
require their attention. They are forced to spend time attempting to solve crimes
that would have been solved by talking with a suspect briefly.498 The paucity of
police resources makes this unnecessary diversion a possible concern. Multiple
confessions are also useful to help police officers discern the modus operandi
(or “MO”) of professional criminals.499

D. Falling Clearance Rates as an Understated Telltale for Lost Convictions
For the reasons just given, lost secondary clearances are a matter of concern
in and of themselves. However, a much broader response is also available to the
argument that lost secondary clearances are of little consequences. The broader
point is that we are interested in declining clearance rates not only because of
the intrinsic value of clearances, but also because they signal a presumably much

493 See Riedel, supra note 110, at 1148; Roberts, supra note 153, at 61; see also
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 28 (1982),
https://www.ovc.gov/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/87299.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVR6T2LQ].
494 Mustaine et al., supra note 148, at 256.
495 Fagan & Richman, supra note 491 (manuscript at 34).
496 See GREENBERG ET AL., ENHANCEMENT, supra note 418, at 45 (reporting detectives’
views that the possibility of returning property to burglary victims justified attempts to obtain
multiple clearances).
497
See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (2012) (providing for restitution to victims). See
generally DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL & STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 607-18 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the importance of restitution).
498 See Leo, Police Interrogation in America, supra note 57, at 99 (reporting police views
that “getting a confession makes the investigator’s job a lot easier . . . . If he gets a
confession . . . he doesn’t have to spend hours tracking down witnesses, running fingerprints,
putting together line-ups, etc.”). But cf. Smith, supra note 419, at 79 (noting that police
officers in Oakland were not rewarded for trying to link a suspect to “a large number of
cases”).
499 See GREENBERG ET AL., ENHANCEMENT, supra note 418, at 45-46 (reporting detectives’
views to this effect).
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larger decline in the confession rate. And declining confession rates are clearly
a matter of significant public concern.
If police clear fewer crimes because they obtain fewer statements from
suspects, subsequent prosecutions will be impaired. It could conceivably be true
that it makes little difference whether an arrested robber confesses to four crimes
or to one. But it makes a considerable difference whether he confesses to one
crime or none, as a confession is quite important to prosecutors.500 Miranda does
not generally reduce the number of confessions from four to one; it reduces them
to zero by occasionally blocking police interrogation entirely.501 It seems hard
to view such declining clearances as anything other than a serious social cost.
Moreover, there is every reason to think that the clearance rate changes that
we have been investigating significantly understate Miranda’s harmful effects.
As Feeney (and others) has accurately explained, good reasons exist for thinking
that in many cases Miranda will not prevent police from clearing a crime, but
could prevent police from obtaining a conviction.502 If police have enough
evidence for probable cause to arrest, but not enough evidence to obtain a
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, interrogation may be critical to securing
a confession needed for conviction.503
Confessions can be extremely important in securing a conviction.504 Feeney
himself has collected data on precisely this point. In his 1983 study Arrests
Without Conviction: How Often They Occur and Why, Feeney emphasizes the
importance of confessions, writing that “[a] confession by the defendant stating
that he committed the crime is powerful evidence . . . . The conviction rate in
robbery and burglary cases involving confessions is 40 to 180 percent greater
than in the cases not involving confessions.”505 In his article responding to us,

500 See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 909-16 (finding that whether police obtain an
incriminating statement makes a significant difference in case outcome); Leo, Police
Interrogation in America, supra note 57, at 295 (suspects who incriminated themselves were
twenty-six percent more likely to be convicted).
501 See Cassell, supra note 16, at 494-96 (presenting data on what percentage of suspects
do not waive rights and thus cannot be interrogated).
502 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 42 (“It is certainly possible that giving the Miranda
warnings has some impact upon the willingness of a suspect to talk with the police and that
the decision hampers the police in conducting post-arrest interrogations.”); see also Donohue,
supra note 7, at 1156 (“If Miranda significantly stops the flow of damaging statements by
criminals to the police, it could well reduce the rate of successful prosecutions of crime even
if it has no impact on measured clearance rates.”).
503 See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 912 tbl.16 (reporting data showing that
suspects who confessed are more likely to be convicted and less likely to receive favorable
plea bargains).
504 See Cassell, supra note 16, at 422-37 (collecting multiple studies regarding the
importance of obtaining a confession to securing a conviction).
505 FEENEY, DILL & WEIR, supra note 56, at 141.
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however, Feeney repackages his earlier findings, explaining (in a footnote) that
confessions show only a “marginal contribution” to convictions.506
Conviction rates 40% to 180% higher are not “marginally” better—they are
substantially better. And it is for this reason alone that society should be
extremely concerned about declining clearance rates. They stand as a surrogate
for declining confession rates—and thus ultimately as an understated measure
of the number of criminals who are escaping prosecution due to the decline in
confession rates after Miranda.507
In this connection, it is interesting to observe that the title of Feeney’s article
is Police Clearances: A Poor Way to Measure the Impact of Miranda on the
Police. His title brings to mind Winston Churchill’s quip that “democracy is the
worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from
time to time.”508 Clearance rates may, indeed, be a poor way—or more precisely,
an understated way—of measuring Miranda’s impact. But they appear to be the
only quantitative way to measure Miranda’s effects across the country over its
fifty years of existence.
Feeney’s argument against clearance rates as a way of measuring Miranda’s
effect also might have more bite if he proposed an alternative. But remarkably
for someone who has written an article spanning some 114 pages, Feeney does
not offer any alternative approach to determining Miranda’s effects. We are thus
left to draw the best inferences we can from the only long-term measure we have.
Clearance rates for several important crime categories had statistically
significant reductions following Miranda—reductions that have persisted over
time and cannot be explained through other factors. These clearance rate
declines strongly suggest that Miranda’s dissenters were correct in predicting
significant reductions in confession rates due to the Miranda regime.

E. How Police Interrogation Remains Important in an Era of Advancing
Forensic Science
So far in this Part, we have discussed the studies cited by Feeney, most of
which were conducted in the 1970s and 1980s. Have things changed since then?
In particular, have advances in forensic science rendered police interrogation
irrelevant?
The idea that crimes are now typically solved through advanced forensic
science techniques—rather than through old-fashioned methods such as police
interrogations—has been overstated to such an extent that it has its own
Wikipedia entry: the “CSI effect.”509 The basic idea is that exaggerated portrayal
506

Feeney, supra note 8, at 42 n.107.
Cf. Cassell, supra note 16, at 437-40 (calculating based on confession measure that
Miranda produces a loss of about 3.8% of all convictions).
508 Winston Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, November 11, 1947, in 7 WINSTON S.
CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963, at 7563, 7566 (Robert Rhodes James ed.,
1974).
509 See
CSI
Effect,
WIKIPEDIA
(Feb.
2,
2017,
11:09
AM),
507
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of forensic science on crime television shows, such as CSI: Crime Scene
Investigation, creates the inaccurate belief (in the general public and jurors in
criminal cases) that forensic evidence is often available to the police.510 In fact,
despite important advances in forensic science, traditional law enforcement
techniques, including interrogation, remain vital for solving cases.511
Forensic science relies on the examination of physical trace data collected
from crime scenes to identify criminals.512 Despite the continued advancement
of forensic science’s ability to assist law enforcement in crime investigation,513
national crime clearance rates generally show no improvement in recent years.514
Part of the reason forensic science has been unable to reverse clearance rate
trends is the frequent unavailability of physical trace data at crime scenes.515 For
example, a recent report has found that forensic evidence was submitted to crime
labs in less than 15% of burglaries and robberies, and less than 10% of assault
cases had physical evidence examined in crime labs.516 Even where physical
evidence has been collected and submitted to forensic scientists, “a very low
percentage of arrests actually [have] physical evidence examined before the
arrest.”517 Indeed, “more forensic analysis occur[s] after arrests than before

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CSI_effect [https://perma.cc/5V3D-FZRS].
510 Id.
511 See INBAU ET AL., supra note 82, at xii (“Many criminal cases, even when investigated
by the best qualified police departments, are capable of solution only by means of an
admission or confession from the guilty individual or upon the basis of information obtained
from the questioning of other criminal suspects.”).
512 See Forensic Sciences: Types of Evidence, NAT’L INST. JUST. (May 29, 2015),
https://nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/Pages/welcome.aspx
[https://perma.cc/4SUHPKRX].
513 See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF FORENSIC SCIENCE RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT
6
(2015),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248572.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J2CF-D598] (analyzing how advancements in forensic science improve
scientists’ ability to effectively assist law enforcement in solving crimes).
514 See supra Figures 2-7; see also Nagin, supra note 151, at 77 (“Modern forensic
methods could improve the effectiveness of postcrime investigations, but . . . clearance rates
for seveal crime types have remained stable over the period 1970 to 2007.”). Interestingly, the
only exception to this fact is the clearance rate for larceny, a crime for which forensic science
does not seem to be generally important. See supra Figure 6 (depicting the increase in larceny
clearance rates in recent years).
515 See, e.g., JOSEPH PETERSON ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF
FORENSIC EVIDENCE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS
3-7
(2010),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/231977.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VDJ6-GY9A]
(providing summaries of the low forensic evidence in various property crimes).
516 Id. at 122; see also BRENT E. TURVEY, CRIMINAL PROFILING: AN INTRODUCTION TO
BEHAVIORAL EVIDENCE ANALYSIS 148-49 (4th ed. 2012) (examining additional reports of low
availability of forensic evidence and the “diminished role for forensic evidence and a lack of
emphasis on it in criminal investigations and subsequent prosecutions”).
517 PETERSON ET AL., supra note 515, at 123.
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arrests.”518 Even for crimes like homicide where forensic evidence is often
submitted to crime laboratories,519 clearance rates continue to be low.520
The fact that forensic evidence is not generally available in criminal cases
provides a response to Dripps’s argument, advanced in this Symposium, that the
chain of events needed for Miranda to produce a loss of evidence is “long and
improbable.”521 Without going through each step in his logic, several points are
worth highlighting. Dripps mentions the possibility of noncustodial questioning
of a suspect outside the Miranda regime; but the available data shows that about
seventy percent of all police questioning of defendants is custodial and that
noncustodial questioning is less effective.522 Dripps mentions informants as a
possible alternative source of information. But, as the police studies just
reviewed show, informants are involved in a tiny sliver of cases.523 Dripps also
alludes to the possibility that a “digital portrait” might exist of the suspect,
without providing any suggestion that this happens with enough regularity to be
a significant factor in discussions about Miranda.524 So too with an electronic
surveillance order, which is so time consuming and expensive as to be all-butimpossible to use in anything other than the most extraordinary cases.
In any event, it is possible to determine how often lost confessions are
necessary to obtain a conviction. Cassell collected all of the available data on
this subject in 1996, finding that confessions were needed in about 23.8% of all
cases.525 Dripps offers no good reason to think that this figure has changed
significantly in recent years.

518 TOM MCEWEN, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT: THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF
FORENSIC
EVIDENCE
IN
THE
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SYSTEM
118
(2010),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/236474.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA8P-ZA4R].
519 See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 515, at 122 (finding that forensic evidence is submitted
to the crime lab eighty-nine percent of the time for homicides).
520 See supra Figure 4; see also Getting Away with Murder, ECONOMIST (July 4, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21656725-police-fail-make-arrest-morethird-nations-killings-getting-away [https://perma.cc/J57M-M58N] (commenting on
continually declining homicide clearance rates).
521 Donald A. Dripps, Miranda for the Next Fifty Years: Why the Fifth Amendment Should
Go Fourth, 97 B.U. L. REV. 893, 927-28 (2017).
522 See infra notes 726-28 and accompanying text (noting that the Cassell and Hayman
study found a 56.9% success rate for custodial questioning versus a 30.0% success rate for
noncustodial questioning).
523 See, e.g., ECK, supra note 429, at 177 tbl.6-4 (showing that informants provide a suspect
description to patrol officers in between 0.0% and 0.9% of patrol officer cases and 0.0% to
7.3% of detective cases).
524 Dripps, supra note 521, at 928 (claiming that police could use a digital portrait of the
suspect “to convict or to support additional warrant searches”).
525 Cassell, supra note 16, at 434 tbl.2.
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VI. THE CAUSALITY QUESTION: ATTRIBUTING DECLINING CLEARANCE
RATES TO MIRANDA
So far we have presented our updated evidence that, controlling for major
criminal justice and socioeconomic variables, in our regression equations the
crime clearance rates for robbery, larceny, vehicle theft, and possibly burglary
fell significantly after Miranda.526 The question remains whether Miranda
caused those drops. Regression analysis can never establish causality. Instead,
the causal conclusion can only come from combining the information provided
by the regression equations with theory and other information to determine
whether a causal interpretation is a reasonable one. The potential obstacle to
concluding that Miranda was the cause of the 1966-to-1968 drop in clearance
rates is the problem of the “omitted variable” or “alternate causality”—that is,
some other change in society, unaccounted for in our regression equations, was
responsible for the reduction in clearance rates.
In interrupted time series analysis, especially without control groups, it is
important to consider such potentially omitted variables. In working on both our
1998 article and this Article, we have made aggressive efforts to identify
possible “omitted” variables that might influence our conclusions527 and discuss
the various possibilities of such an omission in this Part. Before turning to these
other, thus-far-unconsidered candidates for the omitted variable, we should first
discuss briefly what we are looking for. To be a strong candidate for the omitted
variable, the variable must change sharply in the critical 1966-to-1968 period—
but not elsewhere. For example, Figure 5 above showed that robbery clearances
plunged from 37.6% in 1965 to 26.9% in 1968 and have remained relatively
stable since.528 Our regression equations suggest that about half of this drop is
explained by a structural shift at the time of Miranda, controlling for such
criminal justice variables as crime rates and police personnel and such
socioeconomic and demographic variables as unemployment and juveniles in
the population. BMA analysis confirms that these findings are not caused by
specification of our equations. Now that we have used such analysis to rule out
the influences of those factors, we next look to the relevant theoretical,
anecdotal, and logical explanations that could reveal what was the cause of the
shift in the clearance rate: Miranda or something else?
A. Contemporaneous Explanations of the Clearance Rate Decline
In assessing plausible causal factors for the decline in clearance rates, it is
useful to first examine the contemporaneous assessments that were made. Crime

526

In some other specifications, clearance rates for other crimes fell as well. We focus on
our main equations in this Part.
527 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1081, 1107.
528 See Daniel S. Nagin, Robert M. Solow & Cynthia Lum, Deterrence, Criminal
Opportunities, and Police, 53 CRIMINOLOGY 74, 77 (2015) (noting largely stable clearance
rates for robbery and other crimes for last several decades).
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clearance rate declines in 1966 through 1968 were discussed at the time they
happened. What was the contemporaneous understanding?
The national clearance rate declines were reported by the FBI in its annual
Uniform Crime Reports. The FBI had strong incentive to provide explanations
for apparently declining police performance. During the critical 1966-to-1968
period, the authors of the FBI’s UCR listed the following causes of falling
clearance rates: “court decisions which have resulted in restrictions on police
investigative and enforcement practices, sharply increasing police workloads
not limited to crime increases, an almost static ratio of police to population not
commensurate with the sharp rise in crime, and constant increasing criminal
mobility.”529 Setting aside the first italicized factor (“court decisions”), the
regression equations control for two of the remaining three factors the FBI cited:
the increase in police workloads and the static ratio of police strength. The last
factor cited—increased mobility of those committing crimes—may have some
long-term explanatory power, but seems an unlikely explanation for relatively
sudden shifts in crime clearance rates. Increasing mobility could only affect
clearances over the long haul. That leaves the first factor—“court decisions
which have resulted in restrictions on police investigative and enforcement
practices”—as the logical remaining explanation. Of course, that is the
explanation we have focused on in this Article through our MIRANDA
variable—a factor identified by the FBI at the time.
Confirming the FBI’s contemporaneous explanation were the assessments
from those who knew firsthand the effects of those court decisions: law
enforcement officers who questioned suspects both before and after the Supreme
Court imposed Miranda’s constraints. Otis Stephens and his colleagues
interviewed officers on the streets in Knoxville, Tennessee, and Macon, Georgia
in 1969 and 1970.530 Virtually all of the officers surveyed believed that Supreme
Court decisions had harmed their work, and most attributed this negative
influence first and foremost to Miranda.531 Similarly, in New Haven,
Connecticut, Yale students interviewed most of the detectives involved in the
529 UCR-1967, supra note 79, at 30 (emphasis added); see also Malnic, supra note 345, at
27 (“FBI director J. Edgar Hoover said increased . . . restrictions on police investigative and
enforcement practices are contributing to the reduced rates of solving serious crimes.”).
530 See Otis H. Stephens, Robert L. Flanders & J. Lewis Cannon, Law Enforcement and
the Supreme Court: Police Perceptions of the Miranda Requirements, 39 TENN. L. REV. 407,
411 (1972).
531 See id. at 420 tbl.IV (finding “over 90%” believed the Court decisions created negative
effects, with “58% attribut[ing] this negative influence primarily to Miranda”). The
percentage identifying Miranda as responsible might have been higher but for a memorandum
on legal restrictions governing search and seizure that circulated shortly before some of the
interviews. See id. at 421. Seventy-four percent said that advice of defendants’ rights had an
adverse effect on investigations. See id. at 424 tbl.VIII. In individual interviews, the officers
surveyed generally gave negative assessments of Miranda. See id. at 426-29. In light of these
findings, Stephens’s conclusion that his survey showed little impact from Miranda, see id. at
430-31, is hard to understand.
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interrogations they observed during the summer of 1966 as well as an additional
twenty-five detectives.532 They reported that “the detectives unanimously
believe [Miranda] will unjustifiably [help the suspect].”533 They also reported
that “[t]he detectives continually told us that the decision would hurt their
clearance rate and they would therefore look inefficient.”534 Also, law student
Gary Wolfstone sent letters in 1970 to police chiefs and prosecutors in each state
and the District of Columbia. Most agreed that Miranda at least raised obstacles
to law enforcement.535 And, in Seaside City, James Witt interviewed forty-three
police detectives before 1973.536 Witt reported that the detectives “were in
almost complete agreement over the effect that the Miranda warnings were
having on the outputs of formal interrogation. Most believed that they were
getting many fewer confessions, admissions and statements.”537 Witt also found
the detectives to be “quick to refer to a decline in their clearance rate when
discussing problems emanating from the Miranda decision.”538
Concerns about Miranda continue to be expressed by law enforcement.539 For
example, when the Supreme Court heard arguments in Dickerson v. United
States540 (involving the congressional statute designed to supersede Miranda541)
a number of law enforcement organizations filed briefs in support of the Fourth
Circuit’s decision restricting circumstances in which confessions would be
suppressed for Miranda violations.542 But the more telling evidence is what the
532

See Wald et al., supra note 51, at 1528.
Id. at 1611.
534 Id. at 1612 n.265.
535 See Gary L. Wolfstone, Miranda—A Survey of Its Impact, 7 PROSECUTOR 26, 27 (1971).
536 Witt’s article was published in 1973. See Witt, supra note 87, at 320. He appears to
have begun collecting his data sometime after 1968.
537 Id. at 325.
538 Id. at 330.
539 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1108-10. But cf. Victoria M. Time & Brian K.
Payne, Police Chiefs’ Perceptions About Miranda: An Analysis of Survey Data, 30 J. CRIM.
JUST. 77, 84 (2002) (reporting that 52.6% of chiefs surveyed believed that Miranda warnings
hindered voluntary confessions, but 64.2% did not believe that Miranda made it more difficult
for police to do their jobs); Marvin Zalman & Brad W. Smith, Attitudes of Police Executives
Toward Miranda and Interrogation Policies, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 873, 893 (2007)
(finding police administrators did not generally believe Miranda made it more difficult for
police to do their jobs).
540 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
541 Paul G. Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the Overhauling
of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175, 177 (1999) (discussing § 3501’s replacement of Miranda);
see also Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s Failures in Dickerson,
99 MICH. L. REV. 898, 898 (2001) (criticizing Dickerson’s failure to uphold § 3501).
542 See, e.g., Brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Affirmance, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 95-5525); Brief for
Fraternal Order of Police as Amicus Curiae Urging Affirmance, Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525); Brief for National Association of Police Organizations
533
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police thought at the time Miranda was handed down, when they had experience
both with and without the new rules. Those firsthand, contemporaneous
reports—including the FBI statements of concern about recent “court
decisions”—are strong evidence that Miranda was the cause of the clearance
rate drop.
B. Alternate Explanations Proposed by Feeney
In continuing our search for possible alternative causalities besides Miranda,
we now have the benefit of Feeney’s labors. Having argued at length (for reasons
discussed in previous Sections) that clearance rates did not fall sharply after
Miranda, Feeney then somewhat paradoxically engaged in an aggressive search
to find explanations for why clearance rates would have fallen sharply. Having
canvassed the relevant literature, he offered two alternative explanations—race
riots, and a heroin “epidemic” breaking out at exactly the same time as
Miranda.543 We consider both of these possibilities at some length here because,
given the time and effort Feeney has invested in searching for alternate
causalities, if his identified alternatives fail then we have increased confidence
that Miranda is to blame.
1. Race Riots and Related Disturbances
Feeney’s top choice for an alternative cause for the post-Miranda clearance
rate decline is “race riots and disturbances.”544 Feeney begins his argument by
prominently quoting a 1975 book by Jerry Wilson, Chief of the D.C. Police
Department, who said that urban riots (and shortly thereafter, the antiwar and
campus disorders) were the principal issue in police “administration” in the
middle and later 1960s.545 But Feeney neglects to mention that Wilson
specifically discusses not only issues of “administration,” but also—more
directly relevant to our discussion—rising crime rates due to restrictive court
rules. Wilson identifies riots as fourth on a list of five specific factors that
explained crime rate increases in the 1960s, just ahead of increased use of

et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirming the Decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals,
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525); Brief for National District
Attorneys Association, Various State Prosecuting Associations & the Police Executive
Research Forum in Support of the Judgment Below, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428
(2000) (No. 99-5525). Thomas and Leo argue that these briefs from major national
organizations appear “to be the result of Paul Cassell’s impressive lobbying and advocacy
efforts, not the natural inclination of law enforcement, on its own, to abandon Miranda.”
Thomas & Leo, supra note 23, at 253. But collecting these briefs required little more than a
single short phone call advising the organizations of the amicus briefing schedule, not a major
professorial effort to indoctrinate them on a particular theory about Miranda’s effects.
543 Feeney, supra note 8, at 76-83.
544 Id. at 77.
545 Id. (quoting JERRY WILSON, POLICE REPORT: A VIEW OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, at viii
(1975)).
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heroin.546 Wilson’s top three explanatory factors are all included in our
regression equations. Wilson wrote that rising crime in the 1960s is attributable
to: urbanization, the maturation of baby boomers into their crime prone years,
and, of importance here, “increasingly restrictive court rules which impinged on
both the police and the courts”—including specifically “Miranda.”547 Wilson
also discussed at length the harmful impact on the District of Columbia of
Mallory v. United States,548 a decision regarding the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure that restricted the ability of police officers to question suspects in D.C.
ten years before Miranda.549 If anything, Wilson’s views regarding the
harmfulness of court restrictions on police interrogation support our view that
Miranda is a potential candidate for the post-1965 clearance rate declines.
With regard to riots, Feeney acknowledges that in our earlier article we briefly
considered this possibility.550 In our view, however, events like the race riots
Feeney refers to—and more broadly, declining police-citizen relations—are
poor candidates for explaining the 1966-to-1968 decline in clearance rates that
we are interested in. To be sure, citizen cooperation is essential for clearing
many crimes, as witnesses (and victims) must both report crimes to police and
give information about those crimes for police to clear them.551 But although
worsening relations could conceivably have played a role in declining clearance
rates during the 1960s, we think it an unlikely candidate for an alternative
causality for the nationwide clearance rate declines in 1966 to 1968. It is
improbable that police-citizen relations would have deteriorated substantially
across the country over such a short period of time. Indeed, the Gallup Poll
suggests increased respect for the police around the time of Miranda. In April
1965, 70% of respondents across the country had a great deal of respect for the

546 WILSON, supra note 545, at 31, 33 (mentioning riots and heroin, respectively, as a
contributing factors). Wilson also discusses, as a background factor for rising crime, the fact
that government officials, at least in the early 1960s, were willing to “live with” rising crime
rates. Id. at 35-36.
547 Id. at 29. The Court decisions that Wilson cited in addition to Miranda were Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and the lineup/identification cases (United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263 (1967), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)). WILSON, supra note 545,
at 29. We discuss Escobedo at infra notes 756-65 and discuss the line-up cases at infra notes
643-53 and accompanying text.
548 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
549 WILSON, supra note 545, at 47-50 (calling Mallory an “ill-advised” decision that should
have been overturned, but also noting that D.C. police might have been better to use the
decision as a basis for trying to obtain more manpower to help function under the decision).
550 Feeney, supra note 8, at 77 (citing Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1114-15).
551 See Desmond, Papachristos & Kirk, supra note 138, at 858; W. S. Wilson Huang &
Michael S. Vaughn, Support and Confidence: Public Attitudes Toward the Police, in
AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND JUSTICE: A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 31, 31 (Timothy
J. Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire eds., 1996).
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police, a percentage that rose to 77% two years later in August 1967.552 Although
we have been unable to locate consistent polling data on public confidence in
the police throughout the decade, the polls we have found reported generally
high public confidence in the police, although then (as now) minority
communities were more skeptical than were their white counterparts.553
In our earlier article, we also explained that any decline in trust for the police
would have been a more long-run phenomenon, extending from the late 1950s
through (at least) the mid-1970s, from the earliest days of the civil rights protests
to the waning days of Vietnam War protests and Watergate disillusionment.
Such an extended decline would therefore not explain the sharp decline in
clearance rates of the late 1960s. Also, the late 1960s, like the years before and
after, were a time of rising public concern about crime,554 which might have
produced more, rather than less, willingness to help the police.555 We also noted
in our earlier article that it is quite possible that declining confidence in the
police was more concentrated in some parts of the country than others, and in
some kinds of geographical areas than in others (e.g., large cities). Yet the
sudden drops in clearance rates in 1966 and 1967 were reported by all population
groups and all geographic divisions.556
In response to these points, Feeney argues that we needed to pay more
attention to “the turbulent race riots and disturbances that shook the nation in
1965-68”557—and then he goes on to quantify (in the next sentence of his article)
that the riots “affected 570 different cities during 1967-69.”558 The fact that
Feeney himself gives—in consecutive sentences in his article—two different
time frames for the riots (1965-68 vs. 1967-69)—illustrates a problem for his
552

See 3 GEORGE H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, at 1935,
2077 (1972).
553 See NAT’L CTR. ON POLICE & CMTY. RELATIONS, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF POLICE AND
COMMUNITY RELATIONS, preface, 10 (1967) (reprinting a national Harris Poll finding a “goodexcellent” rating of 76% for federal law enforcement, 70% for state law enforcement, and
65% for local law enforcement around 1966). The same polls also suggest lower confidence
in the police in minority communities. See id. at 11-13. However, this low confidence existed
well before 1966. See id. at 16 (citing CALIFORNIA ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM’N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON CALIFORNIA: POLICE-MINORITY GROUP RELATIONS 8 (1963)).
554 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS—1994, at 166 tbl.2.31 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1994)
(reporting that 49% of Harris Poll respondents felt more uneasy on the streets in 1966 than in
the previous year; this number increased to 53% in 1968 and to 55% in 1969).
555 Public attitudes towards the police “have changed little since the 1970s.” See Emily
Ekins, Policing in America: Understanding Public Attitudes Toward the Police. Results from
a National Survey., 1 (CATO Inst., Working Paper, Dec. 7, 2016),
https://www.cato.org/publications/working-paper/policing-america-understanding-publicattitudes-toward-police-results [https://perma.cc/YN7V-34WR].
556 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
557 Feeney, supra note 8, at 77 (emphasis added).
558 Id. (emphasis added).
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argument. The timing of the riots is quite important, because we are seeking to
explain nationwide declines in clearance rates during 1966 to 1968. If the riots
started earlier (1965) or ended later (1969), the timing would not quite fit the
clearance rate changes we are seeking to explain. The best available quantitative
evidence suggests that the riots began in 1964 and extended through 1971,
peaking in 1968.559 Not only does that time frame not fit the 1966-to-1968 drop,
but it also fails to fit the fact that clearance rates failed to rebound after 1971.
Feeney also overstates the scope of the riots, at least when compared to the
vast size of the American criminal justice system. Feeney presents what might
be described as the gee-whiz statistic that the riots around the country involved
37,000 arrests—not mentioning that, during 1967 to 1969, American police
made more than 2,700,000 arrests for index crimes in cities and millions more
arrests for other crimes.560 Riot arrests were a proverbial drop in the bucket of
American law enforcement efforts and, as Barry Latzer has pointed out, “the
overwhelming majority of American cities had no disorders.”561
Feeney concludes his alternate causality argument by despairing of any
possibility of analyzing his conclusion. He contends that “[i]t is difficult to
estimate how long the [riots’] effects on the police lasted.”562 And he maintains
that “[a]bsent a massive, and possibly now impossible, study, it would be
difficult to prove that the 1966-68 race riots and disturbances had a greater
impact on police work in this period than the Miranda decision.”563 Feeney goes
on to argue:
[B]efore any study could realistically claim that the Miranda decision was
a decisive factor in any major police change in the 1966-68 period it would
have to compare the Miranda effects with the massive amount of attention
that the 1960s riots and disturbances demanded from police managers at all
levels, the huge workload demands, and the impact on citizen cooperation
and the environment in which the ordinary work of fighting crime took
place during this period.564
Because Feeney is claiming that it is essentially impossible to disprove his
argument, one can wonder if it qualifies as a serious social science effort.565 But
559

See LATZER, supra note 159, at 126 tbl.3.7 (citing William J. Collins & Robert A.
Margo, The Economic Aftermath of the 1960s Riots in American Cities: Evidence from
Property Values, 67 J. ECON. HIST. 849, 853 tbl.1 (2007)).
560 See UCR-1969, supra note 79, at 108-09, 116-17 (data for total city arrests); UCR1968, supra note 79, at 108-09, 116-17 (same); UCR-1967, supra note 79, at 108-09, 116-17
(same).
561 LATZER, supra note 159, at 125.
562 Feeney, supra note 8, at 81.
563 Id.
564 Id.
565 See KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE 39 (1962) (identifying the possibility of falsification as the hallmark of a serious
scientific hypothesis). Note also that Feeney described four different time periods in which
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we are not so skeptical about the possibility of investigating, at least at a general
level, how much effect the race riots had on American policing. Indeed,
Feeney’s article itself points to one possible approach. Feeney identifies as the
first race riot the August 1965 Watts Riot.566 Feeney explains that “Watts
exploded in August 1965, shocking the nation and making [racial] tension
manifest for the first time in a major way. Hundreds were injured, 34 killed, and
over 4,000 arrested.”567 The Watts Riot was generally considered to be “the
worst in the United States since the Detroit riot of 1943.”568 So what effect did
the Watts Riot have on Los Angeles clearance rates in 1965?
Inconveniently for Feeney’s riots-reduce-clearances thesis, after falling for
three straight years (1962-1964), Los Angles robbery clearance rates rose in the
year of the Watts Riot (1965)—from 32.0% to 32.8%, as shown in Figure 12
earlier.569 One would think that if riots were to have the decisive effect on
ordinary policing across the country that Feeney ascribes to them, the Watts Riot
would have at least had a noticeable effect on clearance rates in the specific city
where it occurred in 1965.
It is possible to drill down more deeply into the Los Angeles data to see what
sort of effect the Watts Riot had on day-to-day policing in Lose Angeles in 1965.
As Feeney mentions, the LAPD made several thousand arrests during the
riots.570 Not surprisingly, these arrests show up as a spike in the LAPD statistics
for 1965, which are reported on a monthly basis.571 The Watts Riot took place

the race riots occurred—“1965-68,” “1967-69,” “1966-68,” and “the 1960s.”
566 Feeney, supra note 8, at 78 (calling the Watts Riot “just a prelude . . . to 1966”).
567 Id.
568 See NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 20 (1968).
569 Compare L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1965, supra note 349, at 10 (stating that 32.0% of
robberies were cleared in 1964), with L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1966, supra note 349, at 11
(stating that 32.8% of robberies were cleared in 1965). We focus on robbery clearance rates,
see supra Figure 12 (depicting clearance rates for the 1960s), because those are the rates cited
and discussed by Feeney, see Feeney, supra note 8, at 35-38.
570 Feeney, supra note 8, at 78. A few arrests were also made by the Los Angeles Sheriff’s
Office, the Compton Police Department, the Long Beach Police Department, and the
California Highway Patrol. See BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE
OF CAL., WATTS RIOT ARRESTS: LOS ANGELES AUGUST 1965, at 10 tbl.1 (1966) [hereinafter
WATTS ARRESTS ACCOUNTING].
571 Clearance rates in Los Angeles are not reported on a monthly basis, and thus we focus
our discussion on arrests as a partial substitute for these purposes. We look at total number of
arrests, rather than arrest rates, because our interest here is whether police were able to
continue making burglary arrests after the riots, not their overall “batting average” in solving
burglaries. Because the number of burglaries was increasing during this time period, if we did
look at arrest rates, we would likely see a long-term downward trend. But our interest here
(on this particular subject) is not in longer-term trends but rather on any noticeable immediate
effect from the riots. If the riots had no immediate effect on law enforcement, it is hard to
understand how they could have had an effect at even more remote times.
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from August 11 to 17, 1965.572 Most of the arrests were for burglary or for
theft.573 The increase in arrests during the riots is reflected in the LAPD
Statistical Digest for burglary arrests,574 which reports that burglary arrests by
LAPD spiked up dramatically in August—from 579 in July, to 2543 in August—
before returning to 546 in September, 555 in October, and 587 in November.575
The number of arrests the LAPD made each month for burglary from one year
before the riots to one year after can be seen in Figure 15.

As is readily apparent, burglary dramatically spiked in August 1965—the
month of the Watts Riot. But, as is equally apparent, at least as far as burglary
arrests in Los Angeles are concerned, things quickly return to normal. There
does not appear to have been any long-term effect on burglary arrests from the
Watts Riot. Indeed, researchers interested in LAPD work reported that, as of
January 1966, investigations had clearly returned to normal.576
572 See GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON THE LOS ANGELES RIOT, REPORT: VIOLENCE IN THE
CITY—AN END OR A BEGINNING? 1 (1965) [hereinafter the “MCCONE COMM’N REPORT”].
573 See id. at 24 (noting 3438 adult arrests, 71% for burglary and theft; 514 juvenile arrests,
81% for burglary and theft).
574 We saw no apparent increase in arrests in August 1965 for any of the other major crime
categories, not even for larceny, which was identified as an area of increased arrests during
the riots. Accordingly, we focus our discussion on burglary here.
575 L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1965, supra note 349, at 30-31 (showing number of “adult
arrests” in each month of 1965).
576 Isaacs, supra note 392, at 88 (stating that “[t]he month of January 1966 was chosen” in
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To confirm this visual conclusion more rigorously, we ran the monthly
burglary arrest data through the strucchange algorithm used earlier in this
Article.577 We found no structural break in the burglary arrest series between
1964 and 1966.578 In short, based on arrest data, it seems difficult to argue that
the Watts Riot was the dominant event for Los Angeles policing in 1965, let
alone for other years and other locations.
This lack of an obvious effect makes intuitive sense. Riots invariably take
place in a limited space over a limited time. For example, the Watts Riot spanned
“144 hours in August 1965.”579 The riot was also confined to a relatively small
part of the city, South Central Los Angeles.580 While such a terrible event would
be quite significant for the affected community, as an explanation for widespread
changes in clearance rates detectable throughout California and beyond,581 it is
hard to understand the logic of the argument. Moreover, if this was the
explanation for declining clearance rates in 1966 and 1967, that fact escaped the
notice of the authors of the FBI’s UCR for those years, who attributed the
declines to restrictive court decisions and other factors apart from riots.582
In an effort to explain how a riot could have exerted a long-term downward
tug at crime clearance rates, Feeney offers as the explanation that “[d]uring the
riot periods themselves, the police could do little else but attend to the riots.”583
But in Los Angeles, for example, the riot period (144 hours) was a tiny fraction
of the entire year. Feeney also explains that “[a]ttempting to prosecute the
[rioters] imposed significant ongoing ‘clean-up’ costs.”584 But those costs would
have been largely borne by the prosecuting authorities, not the police; and, in
any event, even those costs would seem to be relatively short-lived. In Los
part because “sufficient time would have elapsed after the August 1965 riots so that the data
would reflect a return to normalcy”).
577 See supra note 306 and accompanying text (explaining the strucchange algorithm).
578 We also collected monthly burglary arrest data through 1969. Running the series from
1964 through 1969, we saw no structural breaks.
579 MCCONE COMM’N REPORT, supra note 572, at 10.
580 One measure of the geographic limitation comes from the statistic that a curfew was
imposed over a 46.5-square-mile area. James Queally, Watts Riots: Traffic Stop Was the Spark
That Ignited Day of Destruction in L.A., L.A. TIMES (July 29, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-watts-riots-explainer-20150715htmlstory.html. Presumably, this area significantly exceeded the area of actual rioting, but
this large area is still only a small percentage of the total area of Los Angeles.
581 See supra Section II.B.1.
582 See UCR-1967, supra note 79, at 30 (listing the same factors as well as “an almost
static ratio of police to population not commensurate with the sharp rise in crime”); UCR1966, supra note 79, at 29 (“There are a number of factors influencing the decline in the police
solution rate. These include court decisions which have resulted in restrictions on police
investigative and enforcement practices, sharply increasing police workloads not limited to
crime increases, and constantly increasing criminal mobility.”).
583 Feeney, supra note 8, at 80.
584 Id.
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Angeles, for example, prosecution of the rioters had largely been accomplished
just three months later.585 Most of those arrested either had the charges dropped
or received probation or minor jail sentences.586
Feeney also speculates that a riot might have exacerbated preexisting distrust
between the black community and police. But as Feeney’s speculation inherently
acknowledges, distrust long predated the Watts Riot587 (and, indeed, may have
been one of the central causes of the riot588) and certainly continued after. This
point was emphasized in 1992, for example, when a six-day riot followed the
acquittal of four police officers accused of beating Rodney King.589 The
exacerbated-lack-of-trust hypothesis also seems unlikely to work for some
crimes. For example, vehicle theft is a crime that is generally and consistently
reported to the police because of insurance requirements.590 Our MIRANDA
effect on vehicle clearance accordingly seems unlikely to have been caused by
declining citizen cooperation in black communities (or elsewhere).
For all these reasons, we do not think that riots in Watts and other areas
explain the pattern of clearance rate declines that we see. But what would be
ideal for comparing our views with Feeney’s would be to conduct a crosssectional analysis, comparing jurisdictions affected by riots with those which
were not to see if there were declines in clearance rates. While it is not possible
to do such cross-sectional analysis on the nationally imposed Miranda rules,591
585

For example, the McCone Commission Report indicated that, as of November 1965,
just three months after the arrests, most of the riot-related criminal cases had already been
disposed of. MCCONE COMM’N REPORT, supra note 572, at 25. Virtually all cases had been
resolved by the following year. See WATTS ARRESTS ACCOUNTING, supra note 570, at 6-7
(stating that as of June 1966, of an initial total of about 4000 arrests, only 106 adult cases
“were still pending” and that “[f]or the most part” these were simply cases in which the
defendant had “absconded” and a bench warrant was pending).
586 See WATTS ARRESTS ACCOUNTING, supra note 570, at 11-12, 15 tbl.2.
587 See ERROL WAYNE STEVENS, RADICAL L.A.: FROM COXEY’S ARMY TO THE WATTS
RIOTS, 1894-1965, at 315 (2009) (discussing minority-community concerns about police
brutality in 1961).
588 See MCCONE COMM’N REPORT, supra note 572, at 12-13.
589 See INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT, at vii (1991).
590 See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: MOTOR VEHICLE
THEFT 4 tbl.10 (1988) (stating that 87% of completed vehicle thefts were reported to the
police, as were 36% of attempted thefts and 68% of completed and attempted thefts
combined); Dale O. Cloninger & Lester C. Sartorius, Crime Rates, Clearance Rates and
Enforcement Effort: The Case of Houston, Texas, 38 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 389, 392 (1979)
(“[A]uto theft . . . showed no appreciable reporting errors in national surveys.”); Samuel
Nunn, Computers in the Cop Car: Impact of the Mobile Digital Terminal Technology on
Motor Vehicle Theft Clearance and Recovery Rates in a Texas City, 17 EVALUATION REV.
182, 187 (1993) (“[U]nlike burglary, robbery, and assaults, for example, that are subject to
both the uncertainty of reporting and nonreporting by victims and changes in the definition of
the crimes, motor vehicle thefts are generally reported and are not particularly subject to
changes in definition.”).
591 See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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the riots are a different story. As Feeney himself appears to acknowledge,592 the
late 1960s riots affected America’s largest cities, “including all but one of the
50 largest cities and all but nine of the 100 largest cities.”593 But the late 1960s
riots were an urban phenomenon that did not occur in, for example, rural
areas.594 So if Feeney’s theory is correct, the MIRANDA effect should appear in
urban areas but not rural areas. And yet, as discussed earlier, our MIRANDA
effect appears not only in the clearance rates of large cities but also in, for
example, the nation’s small cities (populations between 10,000 and 20,000),
very small cities (populations below 10,000), suburban areas, and even rural
areas.595 Feeney’s riot theory is, obviously, an extremely poor candidate for
explaining simultaneous clearance rate declines in 1966 to 1968 among
hundreds of rural law enforcement agencies.
2. Increasing Heroin Use
Apart from the riots, the other factor that Feeney cites as a potential
confounding alternate causality is increasing use of heroin, which he
characterizes as the “late 1960s heroin epidemic.”596 Feeney argues that heroin
users often finance their drug habits, in part, through various crimes and that a
surge in heroin-induced crimes could have caused the declining clearance rates
that we observed.597
In our earlier article, we considered the possibility that Feeney raises. We
explained that if drug use increased dramatically uniquely around the time of
Miranda, and if this led to a significant increase in crimes, and if drug-related
crimes are harder to clear, then perhaps drug usage could have caused the
clearance rate drops.598 But we thought each of these links was questionable.
The timing of increased illegal drug usage does not quite fit the 1966-to-1968
drop, because the use of illegal drugs appears to have increased from the early

592

See Feeney, supra note 8, at 77.
Id. (citing JANE A. BASKIN ET AL., LEMBERG CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF VIOLENCE, RACE
RELATED CIVIL DISORDERS: 1967-1969, at 3, 9, 20 (1971)).
594 See NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 568, at 1 (reporting on
“racial disorders” in “American cities”); id. at 66 (quantifying city size where disorders
occurred).
595 See supra notes 318-28 and accompanying text.
596 Feeney, supra note 8, at 81.
597 See id. at 81-82 (“There is . . . wide acceptance of the idea that heroin users often
finance their own habits through the sale of drugs to others and by thefts, including robberies
and burglaries.”).
598 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1114.
593
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1960s599 (if not earlier600) through at least the 1970s and 1980s.601 The available
Department of Justice data show sharply increasing arrests from 1965 (the first
year for which comparable data are available) to 1974, then a leveling off, then
another sharp rise from 1980 to 1989.602 The data thus do not suggest a unique,
sharp 1966-to-1968 change in drug usage that would explain the clearance rate
change during the same time.
In response to these points, Feeney quibbles that our national data “focus on
drugs in general rather than on heroin—the drug with the closest connection to,”
he argues, the crimes in question (such as larceny and burglary).603 This might
be an effective argument if Feeney had data showing a different pattern in heroin
arrests than from overall drug arrests, from which one might ascribe a different
pattern to the heroin epidemic. But Feeney presents no such data. Data about the
extent to which a particular drug is used is notoriously hard to obtain, and “even
from an historical perspective it is difficult to identify with precision when the
sharp upward trend [in hard narcotics] began.”604 Some scholars have even
claimed that there was no heroin “epidemic” around that time.605 And, of course,
increases in illegal drug usage were hardly confined to the late 1960s, as the
crack cocaine “epidemic” of the late 1980s attests.606

599

See RICHARD ASHLEY, HEROIN: THE MYTHS AND THE FACTS 43 (1972) (quoting Myles
J. Ambrose of Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement as saying that heroin/drug use
exploded beginning “around 1962-63”).
600 See GEOFFREY PEARSON, THE NEW HEROIN USERS 1 (1987) (“North American cities
such as Chicago and New York experienced their initial heroin epidemics . . . in the late 1940s
and early 1950s . . . .”).
601 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1114 (citing STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS,
AMERICA’S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS 100-02
(1993)) (“Use of illegal drugs appears to have increased from the early 1960s through the
1970s and 1980s.”); see also Robert L. DuPont, Profile of a Heroin-Addiction Epidemic, 285
NEW ENG. J. MED. 320, 320 (1971) (observing that the heroin-addiction epidemic in
Washington, D.C. appeared to be accelerating in 1970); Janet Reno, Attorney Gen., Keynote
Address at the Drug Enforcement Administration National Heroin Conference 6-7 (Feb. 5,
1997),
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/1997/0205_ag.dea.html
[https://perma.cc/C7CF-9M4P] (discussing increased heroin addiction in 1997).
602 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1114 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra
note 554, at 413 tbl.4.33 (reprinting an FBI compilation of 1993 UCR data)).
603 Feeney, supra note 8, at 82-83.
604 WILSON, supra note 545, at 33-34.
605 See CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 175-76 (1978)
(“[T]he ‘alarming trend’ of increased addiction . . . was the product of a politically induced
change in the statistical procedures used by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs (BNDD) to estimate the number of addicts, not of any sudden jump in heroin use.”).
See generally EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, AGENCY OF FEAR: OPIATES AND POLITICAL POWER IN
AMERICA (1977) (discussing “the inner workings of the ‘war on heroin’”).
606 LATZER, supra note 159, at 175-82.
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In an effort to provide some statistical support for his argument, Feeney drops
a footnote asserting that “[t]here was a tremendous surge in California in 196668 in opiate arrests.”607 Feeney then asserts that “opiate arrests” in California
increased 5% (1965 to 1966), 31% (1966 to 1967), and 33% (1967 to 1968)—
but he fails to provide any source supporting his asserted figures.608 In
attempting to verify his assertion, we could find no such reported California data
for those years. We did find that the annual crime reports for California during
that time do not report a separate category of offense for “opiate arrests” but
rather only aggregate data for “[d]rug law violations”609—the much broader
category of arrests that Feeney criticized us for using. Perhaps more important,
the California data for all drug law violations confirms our argument that there
was no unique surge in drug arrests during the 1966-to-1968 period that would
match the timing of our clearance rate decline.610
The only specific California data about heroin arrests during that time that we
have been able to locate appear in California’s 1972 and 1973 annual crime
reports. But contrary to Feeney’s suggestion that California heroin usage surged
in 1966 to 1968, the surge seems to have occurred later. California’s 1972 Crime
and Delinquency report says that “[o]ne of the more sobering changes seen in
drug arrests is the nearly two-thirds increase in arrests for heroin offenses over
the five years” 1968 to 1972.611 A line graph accompanying that assertion shows
an approximate annual percentage increase from 1968 to 1969 of 3%, from 1969
to 1970 of 12%, from 1970 to 1971 of 13%, and from 1971 to 1972 of 26%.612
The fact that heroin arrests continued rising well after the 1966-to-1968
clearance rate declines, even in the one state Feeney has hand-selected for
special analysis, undercuts his argument substantially.
In addition, even if there had been a sharp surge in drug usage during this
limited period, the connection between drug use and crime is unclear.613
607

Feeney, supra note 8, at 83 n.265.
Id.
609 BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE OF CAL., CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA: 1968, at 71 tbl.III-1 (1969). The table for misdemeanors
likewise does not break out separate drug categories. Id. at 82 tbl.III-8.
610 According to the annual reports from Crime and Delinquency in California, adult
felony drug arrests rose sharply from (at least) 1964 to 1972. Specifically, from 1960 to 1965
adult drug arrests fell slightly from 14,152 to 12,874, BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, supra
note 335, at 221; in 1966 and 1967 the number of arrests spiked to 19,403 and then 33,360,
BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, supra note 609, at 71 tbl.III-1; and from 1968 to 1973 the
number of arrests rose further from 49,274 to 96,733.
611 BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE OF CAL., CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 30 (1972).
612 Id. at 30; see also id. at 33 tbl.6.
613 See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN, THE HARDEST DRUG: HEROIN AND PUBLIC POLICY 57 (1983)
(stating that experts cannot “relate the contribution of heroin addiction to the total volume of
property crime in the United States—except to say that it is far less than the popular literature
has portrayed”); cf. Trevor Bennett, Katy Holloway & David Farrington, The Statistical
608
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Feeney’s argument rests on the assumption that heroin-induced crimes increased
at exactly the same time as the Court decided Miranda. But even if we assume
that such crimes grew, Feeney’s argument still needs to develop a unique heroin
link to the particular clearance rate changes we are trying to explain. Our
equations find MIRANDA-induced declines in clearance rates for, in particular,
the crimes of robbery, larceny, vehicle theft, and perhaps burglary.614 But the
conventional argument that we have seen in the literature suggests a connection
between heroin use and the specific crimes of drug dealing or larceny.615 One of
our property crime categories where Miranda has a particularly strong effect is
vehicle theft. We have not seen any special connection suggested between heroin
use and vehicle theft.
Turning to the declining clearance rates for robbery that are of special interest
to us and Feeney—and on which Miranda may have had a particularly strong
impact—there is considerable reason for doubting a strong connection between
heroin addiction and robbery in the 1960s.616 One observational study from
around that time found that only a tiny fraction of heroin users’ income came
from robberies or other violent encounters with others.617 Even adjusting for the
fact that certain criminal heroin users were less likely to be detected in an
observational study, violent crimes were a relatively small percentage of the way
in which heroin users financed their habit.618 Another study found that violent
felonies were only a tiny fraction of heroin addicts’ criminal histories, both preaddiction and post-addiction; only two percent of the criminal charges faced by
addicts in the year before entering methadone treatment were violent crimes.619
Feeney’s blame-it-on-heroin argument suffers still further difficulties. As we
noted in our earlier article, our regression equations already control for the
Association Between Drug Misuse and Crime: A Meta-Analysis, 13 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT
BEHAV. 107, 117 (2008) (collecting available empirical evidence on linkage between all forms
of drug misuse and various forms of crime and finding “that the odds of offending were
between 2.8 and 3.8 times greater for drug users than non-drug users”).
614 See supra Section II.D (describing effects of the MIRANDA variable).
615 See, e.g., Michael Alexander & Catherine McCaslin, Criminality in Heroin Addicts
Before, During, and After Methadone Treatment, 64 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 51, 52 (1974)
(finding heroin addicts most often had criminal records of minor crimes, property felonies,
drug felonies, and thefts); cf. Max Singer, The Vitality of Mythical Numbers, 23 PUB. INT. 3,
6 (1971) (discussing inflated estimates of alleged property crimes committed by heroin users).
616 See Robert Nash Parker & Kathleen Auerhahn, Alcohol, Drugs, and Violence, 24 ANN.
REV. SOC. 291, 295 (1998) (“Evidence to support a link between heroin and violence is
virtually nonexistent.”).
617 MARK HARRISON MOORE, BUY AND BUST: THE EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF AN ILLICIT
MARKET IN HEROIN 88 tbl.2-9 (1977) (finding that 1.1% of heroin users’ income came from
“[t]hefts [i]nvolving [e]ncounters with [i]ndividuals,” including “robbery, mugging, and
preying on dealers”).
618 Id. at 89 tbl.2-10 (finding that seven percent of heroin users’ income came from
“[t]hefts [i]nvolving [v]iolent [e]ncounters with [o]thers”).
619 Alexander & McCaslin, supra note 615, at 53 fig.1.
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number of crimes committed.620 Thus, for drug usage to be the confounding
omitted variable, drug-related crimes would need not only to have increased
around the time of Miranda, but also to have been uniquely hard to clear. Yet
Feeney offers no reason to suspect that, for example, a heroin-induced robbery
would be harder to solve than other robberies. Instead, Feeney attempts to flip
the burden of proof around, arguing that we are the ones who claim “without the
benefit of any facts, that heroin-induced robberies are as easy to clear as all other
kinds of robberies.”621 As we explained above, during the pivotal 1966-to-1968
period, the contemporaneous law enforcement assessment of reasons for
declining clearance rates included restrictive court decisions and other factors
accounted for by our equations—not any rise in heroin consumption. Given that
contemporaneous assessment, the burden of persuasion can properly be assigned
to someone who, like Feeney, is now proposing—decades later—a heretofore
unrecognized explanation for the declining clearance rates in 1966 to 1968.
In any event, looking at the available empirical evidence, good reason exists
for thinking that heroin-induced crimes are no more difficult to solve than other
crimes. Contrary to Feeney’s underlying premise that heroin use causes crime,
in fact causality may well run the other way.622 This point has been most
carefully articulated by John Kaplan—a source cited by Feeney for the argument
that there is “wide acceptance of the idea that heroin users often finance their
own habits through the sale of drugs to others and by thefts, including robberies
and burglaries.”623 But as Kaplan makes clear in his book, things are not so
simple:
On the other hand, . . . one can make a strong argument that heroin use is
not a major factor in turning addicts into criminals. The alternative
explanation is that criminality causes heroin addiction instead of the other
way around, or, more precisely, that both heroin addiction and criminality
are caused by the same thing.624
Kaplan goes on to explain that “[v]irtually every study of the onset of
addiction shows that, on the average, the addict’s first arrest precedes his first
use of heroin by about one-and-a-half years.”625 In other words, heroin use is

620

Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1114.
Feeney, supra note 8, at 83.
622 See, e.g., Bruce L. Benson et al., Is Property Crime Caused by Drug Use or by Drug
Enforcement Policy?, 24 APPLIED ECON. 679, 690 (1992) (concluding after empirical study
that “even for those drug users who do commit property crimes, causation could easily be
running from crime to drugs”).
623 Feeney, supra note 8, at 81-82 (first citing KAPLAN, supra note 613, at 51-58; then
citing MOORE, supra note 617, at 67-115).
624 KAPLAN, supra note 613, at 54.
625 Id. at 54-55 (citing C. Jack Friedman & Alfred S. Friedman, Drug Abuse and
Delinquency, in 1 DRUG USE IN AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE, app., 398, 409 (1973)).
621
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often something of a status symbol for criminals—not something that drives
them to criminality.626
Many studies support Kaplan’s argument that criminality often precedes
heroin use.627 After beginning drug use, an addict is likely to commit fewer
violent crimes and more property crimes.628 The most common type of crime
committed by heroin addicts is theft, with the second most common crime being
the selling of drugs.629
[A] clear majority of the crimes by male heroin users [are] crimes without
victims: Almost 60 percent of the criminal behavior reported . . . [are] drug
sales, prostitution, gambling, and alcohol offenses, with an additional 8.1
percent of criminal activity involving the buying, selling, or receiving of
stolen goods—a secondary level of criminality resulting, in most instances,
from the users’ initial involvement in property crimes.630
The finding that criminal activity rapidly increases when drug users become
dependent can be explained other than by the drugs-cause-crime model.631

626 See Theodore Dalrymple, Myths and Realities of Drug Addiction, Consumption, and
Crime, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (July 31, 2015), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/07/31/mythsand-realities-of-drug-addiction-consumption-and-crime/
[https://perma.cc/XB8V-BT5H]
(“Whatever the connection between crime and addiction, it is not that addiction causes
crime.”).
627 See John C. Ball et al., The Criminality of Heroin Addicts: When Addicted and When
Off Opiates, in THE DRUGS-CRIME CONNECTION 39, 40 (James A. Inciardi ed., 1981)
(analyzing the sequence of crime and heroin use, and discussing a study finding that “71
percent of heroin users . . . had a delinquency record prior to onset of their opiate use”); James
A. Inciardi, Heroin Use and Street Crime, 25 CRIME & DELINQ. 335, 335-36 (1979) (“Some
researchers have found that the criminal histories of their sample cases considerably preceded
any evidence of drug use . . . .”); William H. McGlothlin, M. Douglas Anglin & Bruce D.
Wilson, Narcotic Addiction and Crime, 16 CRIMINOLOGY 293, 294 (1978) (“[N]umerous
studies have found that the majority of addicts are involved in crime prior to addiction . . . .”);
Scott Menard, Sharon Mihalic & David Huizinga, Drugs and Crime Revisited, 18 JUST. Q.
269, 269, 274 (2001) (“[R]esearch results indicate that initiation of crime typically precedes
initiation of drug use . . . .”).
628 See Duane C. McBride, Drugs and Violence, in THE DRUGS-CRIME CONNECTION, supra
note 627, at 105, 119-20 (“[T]he relationship between drug use and property crime occurs
because of the monetary cost of drug use and the need to commit property crimes that produce
the funds necessary to obtain drugs.”).
629 Ball et al., supra note 627, at 51 (studying the criminal actions of Baltimore opiate
addicts).
630 Inciardi, supra note 627, at 341; see also James A. Inciardi & Carl D. Chambers,
Unreported Criminal Involvement of Narcotic Addicts, J. DRUG ISSUES, Spring 1972, at 57,
59, 60 tbl.1 (describing the “predominance of direct acquisitive property crime as
characteristic of [addicts’] criminal behavior” and self-reports reflecting that ninety-three
percent of crimes were property crimes).
631 See Toby Seddon, Explaining the Drug-Crime Link: Theoretical, Policy and Research
Issues, 29 J. SOC. POL’Y 95, 97 (2000).
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“[L]evels of drug use are often . . . determined week-to-week by success in
crime (and the resulting money available) rather than [the addict’s] physical
need.”632 That is to say, “periods of criminal success are accompanied by a more
extravagant lifestyle in which increased drug consumption is one part.”633 As a
result, “day-to-day, crime [may be] a better explanation of drug use than drug
use [is] of crime.”634 If all this is true, it offers little reason for thinking that
heroin-induced crimes are uniquely hard to solve.
One last and fatal problem with Feeney’s blame-it-on-heroin thesis is the fact
that clearance rate declines in 1966 to 1968 were experienced not only in major
urban areas, but also suburban and rural areas.635 Yet heroin abuse in the 1960s
was commonly understood to be a predominantly urban problem, particularly in
the largest cities such as New York.636 For example, Barry Latzer recently
looked back at crime trends in the 1960s and reported that “[w]hile the
authorities were unsuccessful in controlling heroin, sale and use was localized
in a few big cities within poor black and Hispanic neighborhoods.”637 We have
not seen any evidence of a suddenly developing heroin “epidemic” in, for
example, suburban and rural America in 1966 to 1968. And yet we find evidence
of MIRANDA effects in these very areas638—something for which Feeney’s
argument cannot account.
For all these reasons, Feeney’s argument about heroin as an alternative
causality is unpersuasive. And a larger point should be made about that
unpersuasiveness. Feeney has obviously labored long and hard to canvas all of
the criminal justice literature to find an explanation for the late 1960s clearance
rate declines. Because his leading suspects (riots and heroin) so clearly fail, the
correlative case for our suspect (Miranda) strengthens considerably.
C. Other Supreme Court Decisions Apart from Miranda
Because we are looking for something that caused a nationwide decline in
crime clearance rates, it is also worth considering the possibility that other
Supreme Court decisions apart from Miranda are responsible. Although police

632

Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
634 Id. (quoting Richard Hammersley et al., The Relationship Between Crime and Opioid
Use, 84 BRITISH J. ADDICTION 1029, 1040 (1989)).
635 See supra Table 11 (showing effect of the MIRANDA variable on suburban and rural
areas).
636 See ASHLEY, supra note 599, at 47-48 (noting that it was “commonly asserted that onehalf of the heroin users in America live in New York City,” although questioning the factual
grounding for this assertion); MOORE, supra note 617, at 67 (“New York City accounts for a
reasonably large fraction of the total volume of heroin distributed in the United States.”).
637 LATZER, supra note 159, at 91.
638 See supra Table 11 (showing the MIRANDA variable’s effect on suburban and rural
areas).
633
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contemporaneously identified Miranda as a major obstacle,639 defenders of
Miranda might argue that it is impossible to single out Miranda as the most
harmful decision among the Warren Court’s various rulings.640 This argument
suggests that the MIRANDA variable is more properly denominated a “Warren
Court” variable, given the various Warren Court restrictions on the police.641
Even if this assertion were true, our findings would still be of some importance,
as legal academics have generally denied that the Warren Court decisions
impeded law enforcement.642 Nonetheless, there are strong reasons for believing
that Miranda was the Warren Court decision primarily—although perhaps not
exclusively—responsible for declining clearance rates in 1966 to 1968.
Other Court decisions from the same time seem unlikely to have had as much
effect on clearance rates.643 Isaac Ehrlich and George Brower have cataloged the
“significant” Warren Court decisions that possibly affected law enforcement.644
In the critical 1966-to-1968 period, they identify, in addition to Miranda, two
other Court decisions. The first, United States v. Wade,645 is one of several
“lineup” cases decided by the Court in 1967 that suggested that the right to
counsel extended to such proceedings.646 But lineups are probably implicated in
a small percentage of cases overall, certainly a much smaller percentage than
interrogation. Police also had fairly simple ways of circumventing the lineup
rulings.647 Moreover, the Court cut back on the applicability of the doctrine in
1972,648 with the result that it is now “largely ineffectual.”649 Therefore, if the
639 See supra Section VI.A (describing law enforcement’s response to the Miranda
decision).
640 See Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda, supra note 125, at 369-70 (suggesting that other
Warren Court rulings should be taken into account).
641 See generally Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST.
L.J. 723 (2011).
642 See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 164, at 245-57 (denying that the Warren Court decisions
were responsible for sinking clearance rates in the 1960s).
643 Cf. Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century
Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 1 (1995) (questioning whether the Warren Court generally
shifted rules in favor of the defense); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So
Defense-Minded?), the Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police
Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T
62, 63 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) (same).
644 See Ehrlich & Brower, supra note 97, at 103 tbl.2.
645 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
646 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263,
272 (1967); Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37.
647 See Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 39 (2001).
648 See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690-91 (1972) (refusing to extend counsel
requirements to lineup cases where “a person has not been formally charged with a criminal
offense”).
649 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
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lineup decisions were responsible for the drop in clearance rates, those rates
should have later rebounded. Such a rebound does not exist.650 The other
significant case identified by Ehrlich and Brower is Katz v. United States,651
which involved the unusual investigative technique of placing an electronic
listening device on a telephone booth used frequently by a suspect.652 Although
the decision is doctrinally important because of its famous suggestion that “the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,”653 its effect on day-to-day
police operations was probably relatively small; the Court specifically
concluded that the law enforcement agents could have done exactly the same
thing, provided they obtained a warrant first.654 Other potentially important
cases during the 1966-to-1968 time period did not restrict police investigations,
but rather court adjudicatory processes—which begin only after a crime has been
cleared.655 None of these others decisions (far less famous and presumably less
impactful than Miranda, in any event) could have had much effect on police
clearance rates.
Nor do earlier decisions seem likely to have affected clearance rates during
the 1966-to-1968 period.656 Stephen Schulhofer has cited the Court’s decisions
in Mapp v. Ohio657 and Gideon v. Wainwright658 as possible competing
impediments to law enforcement.659 But the timing of these rulings makes them
implausible candidates to explain the immediate post-Miranda clearance rate
drop. Mapp was decided in 1961 and Gideon in 1963. It seems improbable that
they could explain, for example, the sudden changes in robbery clearance rates
that appeared in 1966 to 1968, but not earlier.660 Mapp’s main effects, if any,661
§ 26.02[B][2] (6th ed. 2013).
650 See supra Figures 2-7 (displaying no noticeable rise in clearance rates in 1973 and
1974).
651 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
652 Id. at 348.
653 Id. at 351.
654 See id. at 354.
655 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12, 59 (1967) (applying due process requirements to
determine “the constitutional validity of” juvenile delinquency proceeding); Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1967) (finding a constitutional violation when the prosecutor
commented on the defendant’s assertion of right to silence).
656 But cf. Kamisar, supra note 164, at 242 n.5 (concluding that the Warren Court decisions
“caused relatively little furor until applied to the ‘police practice’ phases of the criminal
process in the late 1960’s”).
657 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961) (excluding evidence in a state criminal trial that was the
result of an illegal search).
658 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963) (establishing a right to counsel for indigent defendants).
659 See Schulhofer, supra note 21, at 512-13.
660 Note that robbery clearance rates changed little from 1962 to 1965, even rising slightly
from 1964 to 1965. See supra Figure 5.
661 See Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 585, 592-617 (2011) (raising questions about whether the exclusionary rule affects
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were probably felt in the early 1960s.662 It is hard to understand why Mapp
would cause clearance rates to begin falling at an accelerated pace some five to
seven years after the decision. Also, Gideon is a particularly poor candidate to
influence clearance rates because it dealt not with police investigations but with
later court adjudications.
Nor are the Court’s decisions on vagrancy and related issues plausible
candidates for explaining 1966-to-1968 changes in clearance rates. William
Stuntz has explained how police once had rather substantial authority to stop and
arrest persons on loitering, vagrancy, and related grounds663 —authority that is
now restricted.664 Although this declining authority to arrest might result in
declining opportunities for interrogation and hence confessions, the timing does
not fit the drop we are interested in explaining. The leading case striking down
vagrancy laws is Papachristou v. Jacksonville,665 decided in 1972. Also, arrest
rates for vagrancy, “suspicion,” disorderly conduct, and drunkenness declined
over a much longer time period, from well before Miranda to well after,666
without sharp changes in the late 1960s.667 Finally, restrictions on police arrests
police behavior); Oaks, supra note 127, at 755 (arguing that “the exclusionary rule is a failure”
in terms of “deterring illegal searches and seizures by the police”); cf. Paul G. Cassell, The
Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under State Constitutions:
The Utah Example, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 751, 842-46 (collecting evidence that state
exclusionary rules are unlikely to have an incremental deterrent effect beyond the federal
rules). The Court’s later decision in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-25 (1984), may
also have had a minimal effect on police practices, see CRAIG D. UCHIDA ET AL., THE EFFECTS
OF UNITED STATES V. LEON ON POLICE SEARCH WARRANT PRACTICES, 1984-1985 (1987).
662 See Atkins & Rubin, supra note 134, at 166 (finding Mapp had an effect on crime rates
starting in 1961); Stuart S. Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence,
1965 WIS. L. REV. 283, 285-88 (finding changes in police search and seizure practices due to
the exclusionary rule from 1960 to 1963); cf. Bradley C. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in
Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J.
681, 711-16 (1974) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s refinement of the exclusionary rule in
its 1969 decision Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), produced an increase in use of
search warrants from 1968 to 1973).
663 See William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 559 (1992) (stating that, prior to the late 1960s, “the police
could, and did, keep public areas ‘clean’ by stopping or arresting whomever they wished”).
664 See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1209-14 (1996)
(detailing court decisions in the 1960s and 1970s that struck down regulations permitting
arrest for minor forms of public disobedience).
665 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972).
666 RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND
THE MAKING OF THE 1960S, 186-88 (2016) (noting vagrancy laws actually continued past the
1960s).
667 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1113 & n.273. For example, arrest rates for
vagrancy per 100,000 inhabitants went from 140.8 in 1960, to 89.8 in 1965, to 66.7 in 1970,
and to 33.1 in 1975. See id.
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for vagrancy would only indirectly affect clearance for index crimes, such as
robbery.
In sum, Miranda appears to be the Supreme Court decision most likely to
have caused declining clearance rates in 1966 to 1968.
D. The Implausibility of Declining Coercion as an Explanation
Readers who agree with us that Miranda caused clearance rate declines might
be tempted at this point to respond along the lines of: “Of course—Miranda
stopped the police from beating suspects up to get confession, so naturally
clearance rates declined.” On this view, declining clearance rates measure not
the social cost of criminals unfairly escaping, but rather the social benefit of
police abandoning impermissible questioning techniques. Note that this
argument would implicitly concede that clearance rates did fall because of
Miranda. However, this explanation of why Miranda produced the drop is farfetched for several reasons.
First, genuinely coerced confessions were statistically rare at the time of
Miranda.668 Of course, one cannot consult an FBI tally of the number of coerced
confessions each year. Yet it appears to be common ground that, as the result of
increasing judicial oversight and police professionalization, coercive
questioning methods began to decline in the 1930s and 1940s.669 By the 1950s,
coercive questioning had “diminished considerably,”670 because police viewed
such techniques as unnecessary and harmful to their image.671 By the time of
Miranda, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice reported that “today the third degree is almost
nonexistent” and referred to “its virtual abandonment by the police.”672 Thus,
the Supreme Court’s decision curtailing police interrogation techniques
addressed a problem “that was already fading into the past.”673 Chief Justice
Warren’s majority opinion in Miranda, though noting historical police abuses,
acknowledged that such abuses are “undoubtedly the exception now” and that
“the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than

668

To be clear, we strongly condemn even isolated instances of coerced confessions.
Cassell, supra note 16, at 473-75; Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The
Changing Nature of Police Interrogation in America, 18 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 35, 47-53
(1992).
670 Leo, supra note 669, at 51.
671 GEORGE C. THOMAS III & RICHARD A. LEO, CONFESSIONS OF GUILT: FROM TORTURE TO
MIRANDA AND BEYOND 139 (2012).
672 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME
IN
A
FREE
SOCIETY
93
(1967),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nIj/42.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J6JE-77EH] (discussing pre-Miranda data).
673 FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 22 (1969).
669
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physically oriented.”674 Furthermore, empirical surveys675 provide good support
for Gerald Rosenberg’s assessment: “Evidence is hard to come by but what
evidence there is suggests that any reductions that have been achieved in police
brutality are independent of the Court and started before Miranda.”676
Unfairly coercive police questioning is not only limited to physical brutality,
but also includes other techniques. It seems unlikely, however, that such forms
of coercion were so widespread that their elimination would have greatly
changed clearance rates.677 In addition, statistics on motions to suppress
confessions confirm that coercive techniques were infrequently used at the time
of Miranda. We should find frequent challenges to the voluntariness of
confessions before Miranda if coerced confessions were in fact frequent.678 Such
motions, however, appear to have been rare around the time of Miranda.679
Besides the relative scarcity of coercion, there is another reason for believing
that clearance rate reductions were not caused by fewer coerced confessions: the
nature of the Miranda rules themselves. Miranda was not particularly well
designed as a shield against coercion. As Justice Harlan pointed out in his
Miranda dissent, “Those who use third-degree tactics and deny them in court
are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers.”680
In other words, police who used coercive tactics to obtain involuntary
confessions would not necessarily have felt compelled after Miranda to change
their already-improper methods.681 And even if they did so, it was unlikely to
have been so rapid a change as to produce a quick decrease in confession rates.
674

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1965); see also id. at 499-500 (Clark, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he examples of police brutality mentioned by the Court are rare exceptions
to the thousands of cases that appear every year in the law reports.” (footnotes omitted)).
However, the majority continued on to state that police abuses “are [still] sufficiently
widespread to be the object of concern.” Id. at 447-48.
675 For a discussion of this empirical evidence, see Cassell, supra note 16, at 474-75.
676 ROSENBERG, supra note 80, at 326.
677 Wayne LaFave reported the year before the Miranda decision that “[i]n the great
majority of in-custody interrogations observed, the possibility of coercion appeared slight.”
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 386 (1965);
see also Barrett, supra note 49, at 42 (reporting California data in 1960 that most
interrogations lasted under two hours). Similarly, the student observers in New Haven in
1966, assessing all forms of police “tactics,” found a “low level of coerciveness in most
questioning.” Wald et al., supra note 51, at 1558.
678 Cassell, supra note 16, at 476. Such challenges are rarely made today and even more
rarely granted. See id. at 392-93 (collecting the studies on this point).
679 See id. at 476 (citing studies showing few rejections of defendants’ statements by
prosecutors or by judges at preliminary hearings).
680 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
681 See Evelle J. Younger, Prosecution Problems, 53 A.B.A. J. 695, 698 (1967) (“Miranda
will not affect the brutal or perjurious policeman—he will continue to extract confessions
without reference to the intonations of the Supreme Court; and when he testifies, he will
simply conform his perjury to the latest ground rules.”).
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Considering the low coerciveness of questioning even before Miranda and the
ineffectiveness of the Miranda requirements in preventing coercion after,682 it is
unlikely that the 1966-to-1968 clearance rate drop is a manifestation of a change
from a coercive to a noncoercive system.683
E. The Logic of Miranda as a Cause
Having carefully reviewed possible causes for the confession rate decline, we
believe Miranda’s unprecedented restriction on police questioning is the most
likely cause. But because we have been focusing on a host of specific and narrow
issues, it might be useful to step back for a moment to look at the big picture: Is
it logical to view Miranda as an important causal factor?
The conclusion that Miranda caused a significant part of the 1966-to-1968
decline in clearance rates is supported by a wide range of information. To begin
with, there is an obvious, sharp drop in clearance rates between 1966 and 1968,
at exactly the time when the drop should have occurred if Miranda harmed law
enforcement.684 Next, the regression equations indicate that the drop for violent
crimes and property crimes, as well as the individual crimes of robbery, vehicle
theft, and larceny, cannot be explained by major criminal justice or
socioeconomic variables.685 In addition, both the FBI and the police on the street
contemporaneously identified Miranda as a hindrance to clearing crimes.686
These law enforcement reports are corroborated by declining confession rates
reported in the before-and-after studies of Miranda’s impact687 and lower
confession rates reported in this country in the years after Miranda.688
And what do Miranda’s defenders have to say about, in particular, the
declining clearance rates as evidence of Miranda’s harm? Recall that exploring
clearance rates to measure Miranda’s effect was not our idea—but that of
Miranda’s defenders. The initial position (adopted by such prominent defenders
of Miranda as Schulhofer, Kamisar, and others) was that clearance rates were a
valid measure of whether Miranda harmed law enforcement and that the rates
did not show a permanent decline after Miranda.689 This position collapsed, of

682 Isolated cases of police brutality continued, of course, well after Miranda. See Susan
Bandes, Tracing the Pattern of No Pattern: Stories of Police Brutality, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
665, 666 (2001).
683 Note that we are only arguing that the clearance rate decline found from 1966 to 1968
is not explained by a sudden, contemporaneous reduction in coerciveness. “One could believe
that police interrogation has generally become less coercive over the last several decades and
still accept this claim.” Cassell, supra note 16, at 478 n.533.
684 See supra notes 100-24 and accompanying text.
685 See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
686 See supra notes 533-42.
687 See supra notes 16-47 and accompanying text.
688 See supra Section I.B.1.
689 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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course, in the face of FBI data to the contrary.690 Rather than concede (consistent
with their earlier position) that these declining rates showed Miranda’s harmful
effects, Miranda’s defenders instead shifted their position and told us that one
“need only turn to trends in levels of crime and police resources during the [post1965] period” to understand the clearance rate decline.691 However, empirical
evidence demonstrated that the 1966-to-1968 drop in clearance rates did not
follow the pattern of rising crime rates throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.692
Subsequently, Miranda’s defenders took the view that, while “[m]any forces
contributed to clearance rate trends . . . there is no reason to think that one
particular factor—Miranda—was among the factors playing a causal role.”693 In
addition to rising crime rates and reduced law enforcement resources,
Schulhofer (for example) pointed to the limited “capacity” of the criminal justice
system, urbanization, the proportion of crimes in small cities, and other less
easily quantifiable factors.694 To the extent that such claims are empirically
testable, they have been disproven: our regression analysis suggests that, even
controlling for all the quantifiable factors, Miranda had a significant depressing
effect on clearance rates, an effect found more consistently than for these
suggested competing causes.695
Following publication of our regression results in 1998, John Donohue
offered a competing specification of the equations, which diminished (but did
not eliminate) our findings.696 This Article shows that, even using his
specifications, with newly available data (through 2012) our MIRANDA effect
is substantially confirmed.697
And yet another scholar, Floyd Feeney, thought that California clearance rate
data undercut our conclusions.698 Instead, properly understood, the California
data fully confirms our theory.699 And Feeney thought that the inclusion of
690

See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 280 (“[S]oaring rates of violent crime and stagnant levels
of police resources easily explain the observed clearance-rate trends.”); Schulhofer, supra
note 29, at 24 (“[T]here is no reason—none—to blame Miranda, rather than precipitously
shrinking resources, for the decline in clearance rates during the late 1960s.”).
692 See Cassell, supra note 16, at 307, 308 fig.2 (“[C]rime rates were increasing well before
Miranda was handed down and continued to climb afterwards.”).
693 See Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda, supra note 125, at 357-58.
694 See id. at 365-67; Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 291-93.
695 See, e.g., supra Tables 2-4 (finding a statistically significant MIRANDA effect on
violent and property crimes, but no statistically significant effect from crime rate, police
variables, capacity variables, or crime in small cities—urbanization was significant only for
violent crimes).
696 See Donahue, supra note 7, at 1159-69 (discussing the specifications used in Donahue’s
1998 model).
697 See supra notes 224-74 and accompanying text.
698 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 18-41 (arguing that the California clearance data do not
support a conclusion of a sharp fall in the clearance rate from 1966 to 1968).
699 See supra notes 329-65 and accompanying text.
691
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arguably flawed data from New York City and few other big cities could explain
away the confession rate drop we are concerned about.700 But our MIRANDA
effect shows up in the FBI data for suburban and rural areas, as well as smalland mid-sized cities.701
We believe that the fact that we have been able to use quantitative methods to
disprove so many of the counterarguments advanced against our position should
itself be evidence in favor of our handcuffing-the-cops theory. But additional
empirical evidence has recently developed that strongly supports our hypothesis.
In an important empirical study, Stephen Rushin and Griffin Edwards
considered the issue of whether legal regulation of police behavior could
inadvertently reduce officer aggressiveness, thereby increasing crime. To test
this issue, they compared all police departments that have been subject to
federally mandated reform under consent decrees with those who have not. They
found that the introduction of such external reforms “was associated with a
statistically significant uptick in some crime rates, relative to unaffected
municipalities.”702 They concluded that this effect was due to “de-policing”—
i.e., police becoming less aggressive, and thereby less effective in fighting
crime.703 Rushin and Edwards thought it was “likely that external regulation of
law enforcement comes with growing pains. Frontline officers may find the
imposition of external mandates to be procedurally unjust.”704 While Rushin and
Edwards researched the impact of consent decrees, the same logic about the
harmful effects of “external regulation” can be easily applied to the Miranda
decision.
Finally, one last important fact remains to be considered: common sense. Our
conclusion is simply that when the Supreme Court imposed unprecedented
restrictions on an important police investigative technique,705 the police became
less effective. This was exactly what the dissenters predicted in Miranda,706 a
700

See Feeney, supra note 8, at 63.
See supra notes 318-28 and accompanying text.
702 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 127 (manuscript at 1).
703 Id. (manuscript at 5).
704 Id. (manuscript at 55).
705 See id. (manuscript at 6 n.15) (observing that Miranda was a “transformational
regulation[] of American law enforcement” agencies); Schulhofer, supra note 21, at 552 n.214
(noting Miranda was a “radical departure” from the assumption of the times); cf. FRYDL &
SKOGAN, supra note 41, at 255 (“Miranda is no doubt the best-known criminal procedure
decision in the United States.”); Amos N. Guiora, Relearning Lessons of History: Miranda
and Counterterrorism, 71 LA. L. REV. 1147, 1152 (2011) (identifying Miranda as “the
cornerstone of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution”); Frederick Schauer, The
Miranda Warning, 88 WASH. L. REV. 155, 155 (2013) (describing Miranda as “the most
famous appellate case in the world”). See generally THOMAS & LEO, supra note 671, at 141
(discussing the Miranda “volcano”); AMOS N. GUIORA, EARL WARREN, ERNESTO MIRANDA
AND TERRORISM (forthcoming 2017) (describing the importance of the Miranda decision).
706 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 516 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“There can
be little doubt that the Court’s new code would markedly decrease the number of
701
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claim that the majority did not bother to refute.707 In short, we are not asserting
anything unusual; instead, we are merely suggesting the obvious. The
proposition that Miranda harmed law enforcement should be uncontroversial.
Instead, it is the contrary academic wisdom that should receive our skepticism.
VII. REFORMING MIRANDA
So far we have argued that strong evidence (the combination of confession
rate and clearance rate data) supports the view that Miranda has made it
noticeably more difficult for police officers to obtain confessions. Assuming that
Miranda has harmed law enforcement, the question would remain what to do
with that information. Of course, one possible conclusion is that Miranda should
simply be overruled, as some commentators have suggested.708 In wrapping up
this Article, we make a more limiting argument and suggest the Court might take
a somewhat different course. The empirical evidence concerning Miranda’s
harm reveals ways Miranda could be reformed to reduce those harms while
securing the goals that Miranda hopes to achieve.
In discussing reforming Miranda, it is important to emphasize one difference
between the decision and other seemingly similar Supreme Court decisions. In
arguing that Miranda has “handcuffed” the cops, we are not complaining about
the fact that constitutional rights pose obstacles for law enforcement.
Commenting on the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, for example, Dallin
Oaks concluded that “[t]he whole argument about the exclusionary rule
‘handcuffing’ the police should be abandoned. If this is a negative effect, then it
is an effect of the constitutional rules, not an effect of the exclusionary rule as
the means chosen for their enforcement.”709
Miranda stands on different footing. Despite what some commentators have
argued (including Donald Dripps in this Symposium710), the Miranda decision
is clearly unlike other constitutional decisions in explicitly inviting alternative
approaches to regulating police interrogation. The decision itself stated it had no
confessions.”); id. at 541 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing clearance rates and concluding
that “[t]he rule announced today will measurably weaken the ability of the criminal law to
perform these tasks”).
707 See id. at 481 (claiming that the decision “should not constitute an undue interference
with a proper system of law enforcement”).
708
See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH AND THE LAW 199-222 (1993); U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF
PRETRIAL INTERROGATION (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 437 (1989). But cf.
Alschuler, supra note 40, at 890 (predicting that the chance the Supreme Court will overrule
its Miranda decision is “nonexistent”); William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Taking
Miranda’s Pulse, 58 VAND. L. REV. 813, 849 (2005) (predicting that, in the long term, the
Court will eventually either overrule Miranda or recast it substantially).
709 Oaks, supra note 127, at 754.
710 See Dripps, supra note 521, at 894-95 (arguing that formal critiques of Miranda are
inconsistent with conventional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, among other bodies of
law).
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intention of “creat[ing] a constitutional straitjacket,”711 and specifically
“encourage[d] Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for
increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while
promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.”712 While the Court’s
later decision in Dickerson gave a narrow reading of this language, it certainly
did not retreat from the proposition that Miranda could be replaced with an
alternative.713
In this Section, we briefly sketch what a reasonable and constitutional
alternative to Miranda could look like.714 In crafting this alternative, we use the
quantitative information about Miranda’s harms we have gathered to propose
removing the decision’s most harmful features. The alternative we propose only
serves to highlight the fact that Miranda has, indeed, handcuffed the cops,
because Miranda’s harmful effects are incurred unnecessarily. Specifically, the
alternative we propose continues delivering warnings to suspects but adjusts
them so they do not promise suspects that they can immediately stop
questioning. We would also require police to record police interrogation. And
we would encourage more careful scrutiny of voluntariness issues. These
modifications would remove Miranda’s handcuffs from the cops while
protecting suspects’ legitimate interests against being coerced into giving
involuntary confessions.
A. Eliminating Miranda’s Waiver Requirement and Questioning Cut-Off
Rules
In this Article’s previous Sections, we reviewed the available empirical
evidence in an attempt to establish that Miranda had harmful effects on crime
clearance rates and, ultimately, on confession and conviction rates as well.
Assuming Miranda created such harms, what features of Miranda are
responsible?
One argument might be that the famous Miranda warnings inhibited suspects
from talking. For reasons we articulate in the next subsection, we think that
711

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
Id. For the origins of this language in the opinion, see Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving
Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 123-25 (1998).
713 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435-40 (2000) (holding that Miranda
was a constitutionally based decision and, consequently, cannot be modified by Congress, but
observing that Congress retained the power to create alternative, effective approaches); see
also Smith v. State, 974 A.2d 991, 999 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) (“While the Dickerson
Court put an end to this campaign to dismantle Miranda via the federal statute from 1968, the
Court reiterated that the specific Miranda warnings themselves are not mandated by the
Constitution, and implied that new laws, passed by either Congress or state legislatures, which
more adequately safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege, might be acceptable.” (quoting
ANDREW JEZIC, FRANK MOLONY & WILLIAM NOLAN, MARYLAND LAW OF CONFESSIONS 19293 (2005))), aff’d, 995 A.2d 685 (Md. 2010).
714 Cf. Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1129-32 (discussing possible alternatives to
Miranda).
712
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unlikely. Instead, the features of Miranda that cause harm are the rules that block
police questioning of suspects, specifically the requirements that police obtain a
“waiver” from a suspect before proceeding with questioning and that police must
stop questioning when a suspect invokes his rights.715 These rules harm law
enforcement almost by definition. As Joseph Grano has explained, “By giving
the suspect power to prevent questioning even before it begins, . . . Miranda
gave the law of confessions a ‘single focus—protection of the suspect.’”716
While the Miranda rules seem to envision suspects consulting with counsel and
then answering questions, as a practical matter that does not occur. As Alschuler
has nicely put it in this Symposium, Miranda’s promise of a right to counsel
during questioning is not really a right to counsel; rather “[i]t is an incantation
that suspects can use to shut down questioning.”717
Generally, academic commentators have been unperturbed about Miranda’s
questioning cut-off features. The standard argument is that most suspects waive
their rights and so Miranda has little effect. Indeed, the argument is typically
accompanied by a citation to empirical research conducted by Cassell suggesting
that only 20% of suspects invoke their Miranda rights.718 But if the glass is 80%
715

See David Garthe, The Investigation of Robbery, in IV THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL

OF ROBBERY 93, 112 (Floyd Feeney & Adrianne Weir eds., 1973) (noting views of one officer

that “since Miranda robbery suspects have ‘clammed up’” and placing emphasis on the fourth
warning).
716 GRANO, supra note 708, at 219 (quoting Gerald M. Caplan, Miranda Revisited, 93 YALE
L.J. 1375, 1469 (1984)).
717 See Alschuler, supra note 40, at 874.
718 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 859 (reporting that 83.7% of suspects given their
Miranda rights waived them and concluding that “[t]he evidence, although generally quite
dated, suggests that about 20% of all suspects invoke their Miranda rights”); see also Cassell,
supra note 16, at 495-96 & n.623 (collecting other information on waiver rates); Saul M.
Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices
and Beliefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 389 (2007) (estimating that 81% of adult suspects
waive); Richard A. Leo, Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 259, 260 (reporting that 78% of custodial suspects waived their Miranda
rights); George C. Thomas III, Stories About Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1972 (2004)
(finding a 68% waiver rate in reported and litigated cases). An even higher waiver rate of 93%
was reported in one study. Anthony J. Domanico, Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrenece T. White,
Overcoming Miranda: A Content Analysis of the Miranda Portion of Police Interrogations,
49 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 13 (2012). But the study rested on an unrepresentative sample of cases
in which a videotape was made of the interrogation, the suspect was charged, and the public
defender’s office agreed to provide the tape for further analysis, id. at 11-13, rendering the
findings of little use in estimating an overall waiver rate.
Research on juveniles also finds high waiver rates. See Feld, supra note 11, at 429
(reporting a 92.8% juvenile waiver rate); Feld, supra note 65, at 255 (reporting 80% waiver
rate by juveniles); Viljoen, Klaver & Roesch, supra note 64, at 261 (reporting that in a
retrospective study of delinquents held in detention, only 13.15% “reported that they asserted
the right to silence”). It seems unlikely that this juvenile data are directly applicable to adult
interrogations. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting that juveniles are more likely
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full, it is likewise 20% empty. Twenty percent is a very large number in this
context, since it suggests that 20% of all criminal suspects in this country—one
out of every five—are essentially immune from police questioning.719
What makes these numbers even more troubling is that it turns out that there
is good evidence that the suspects who are most likely to invoke their rights are
disproportionately the suspects whom police would most like to question.
Suspects with criminal records are generally more likely to invoke their Miranda
rights than those without one.720 There is also experimental evidence suggesting
that innocent persons are more likely to waive their Miranda rights than guilty
persons.721 All this suggests that Miranda may be backwards public policy
because it confers protection disproportionately on those who are least entitled
to it. As Stephanos Bibas has cogently argued, Miranda’s rules have “shielded
some savvy, guilty recidivists while doing little to protect juveniles, the mentally
retarded, and other innocent defendants most likely to confess.”722
Miranda’s waiver and questioning cut-off rules likely have additional harms
beyond blocking questioning of suspects who refuse to waive. Police may decide
not to even attempt to interrogate a suspect because of the need to obtain a
waiver, something the statistics regarding invocations of rights will fail to

to confess compared to adults).
719 In theory, if a suspect invokes his Miranda rights, the police could simply ignore that
invocation and continue to question the suspect for investigative purposes. There is little
research on the extent to which police follow such practices, but the research that exists
suggest that police do not generally employ this practice. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note
58, at 861 (“[I]n none of our cases did the police continue questioning a suspect after an
invocation of Miranda rights.”); cf. Thomas, supra note 718, at 1978 (finding conflicting
evidence in a sample of mostly appellate cases about whether police stop questioning after
invocations); Weisselberg, supra note 45, at 1552-54 (discussing California training materials
discouraging “two step” questioning approaches).
720 See Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 57, at 286 (finding suspects with
felony records four times more likely to invoke Miranda rights than those without records);
William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 993 (2001) (describing affluent
suspects and recidivists as those most likely “to know that talking to the police is a tactical
error”); see also Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 895-96 & tbl.9 (finding suspects with
prior records more likely to invoke rights, but result was not statistically significant); Feld,
supra note 65, at 255-56 (juveniles with one or more prior felony arrests waived their Miranda
rights 68% of the time, compared to 89% for juveniles with fewer or less serious police
contacts); Feld, Questioning Gender, supra note 68, at 1095-96 (finding both boys and girls
with prior criminals records are significantly more likely to invoke their rights). But cf. Leo,
Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 57, at 291 (noting that “class” had no effect on the
success rate of police interrogation).
721 Saul M. Kassin & Rebecca J. Norwick, Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: The
Power of Innocence, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 213 (2004). The extent to which laboratory
studies can be applied to real world police questioning remains uncertain. See Slobogin, supra
note 47, at 1183.
722 Weisselberg & Bibas, supra note 43, at 77.
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capture.723 In addition, to avoid the need to obtain Miranda waivers, police may
decide to proceed with noncustodial questioning rather than custodial
questioning, as Alschuler and Dripps both point out in their contributions to this
Symposium.724 While police appear to have received some training on this
noncustodial maneuver,725 the extent to which it is available is uncertain. And,
in fact, police generally question suspects in custody rather than outside of it.
The one study to investigate this issue quantitatively (the Cassell/Hayman study)
found that 69.9% of 173 police interviews were custodial while 30.1% were
noncustodial.726 The concern is that the same study also found that noncustodial
questioning was substantially less effective in obtaining incriminating
statements (56.9% success for custodial questioning vs. 30.0% success for
noncustodial questioning), a difference that was statistically significant.727 This
lower success rate is consistent with reports from the leading police interrogation
manual that custodial interrogation is often needed to obtain a confession.728
It is also possible for police to avoid Miranda’s requirements by engaging in
“public safety” questioning.729 But while some commentators have suggested
that this recognized exception “carv[ed] a gaping hole” in Miranda’s
requirements,730 its impact on day-to-day law enforcement appears to be almost
nonexistent.731
The bottom line from the available empirical evidence is that in many cases,
Miranda’s waiver requirement will prevent police officers from questioning
suspects at all732 (or, lead officers to questioning them in less-likely-to-beproductive noncustodial settings). To be sure, even if officers had been able to
723

See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 855-58.
See Alschuler, supra note 40, at 869-72; Dripps, supra note 521, at 918.
725 See Weisselberg, supra note 45, at 1546-47.
726 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 882-83; cf. Brian C. Jayne, Empirical Experiences
of Required Electronic Recordings of Interviews and Interrogations on Investigator’s
Practices and Case Outcomes, 4 LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVE F. 103, 106 tbl.2 (2004)
(finding that, of police investigators surveyed following the imposition of mandatory
recording during custodial interrogation, 8% significantly increased noncustodial
interrogations and 26% somewhat increased such interrogations).
727 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 883 (discussing the effect of custodial status on
acquiring incriminating statements).
728 See INBAU ET AL., supra note 82, at xiii (“Criminal offenders, except those caught in the
commission of their crimes, ordinarily will not admit their guilt unless questioned under
conditions of privacy and for a period of perhaps several hours.”).
729 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984).
730 Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of
Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 82 (1989).
731 See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 885 (finding only one case out of 173 suspects
that even arguably fell within the public safety exception); Thomas, supra note 718, at 197072 (reporting that in a sample of 211 litigated cases, only 2.8% (6/211) involved public safety
questioning).
732 See Stuntz, supra note 720, at 984-85.
724
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question all these suspects, not all of them would have confessed or even given
incriminating statements. But “guilty suspects need not confess for interrogation
to be useful; in general, if the suspect says much of anything the police benefit,
and benefit substantially.”733
Miranda’s waiver requirement does not rest on firm constitutional
foundations.734 It is something of an odd duck, because the waiver requirement
“is plainly at odds with the rest of the opinion.”735 After explaining that custodial
police interrogation was an inherently compelling environment, the Miranda
Court allowed suspects to waive their Miranda rights in that same
environment.736 And what that waiver means is not immediately clear, because
“no sane person would knowingly relinquish a right to be free of compulsion.”737
In any event, like other features of the Miranda regime, the waiver
requirement is simply a prophylactic rule that can be replaced by a reasonable
alternative. And it should be. Police do nothing wrong when they simply ask a
suspect, in custody, whether he has anything to say about an alleged crime. In
suggesting otherwise, Miranda “runs counter to our ordinary standards of
morality.”738
An otherwise-excellent recent article by Tonya Jacobi glosses over this point.
Jacobi proposes steps to “discourage waiver”739 on the grounds that Miranda, as
currently structured, “is not doing its job in properly informing suspects and
girding them in facing the inherently coercive atmosphere of the
stationhouse.”740 But “girding” suspects to face police questioning is exactly
what causes social harm—the trade-off is unavoidable. And why we would want
to “gird” suspects to resist police efforts to have them confess to their crimes is
unexplained.
Rather than strengthening the waiver requirement, we propose abolishing it.
In our view, police officers should be free to give suspects their warnings and,
after ascertaining that suspects understand those warnings, proceed to
questioning them. Recent decisions suggest that the Court might be receptive to
steps in that direction. While the Miranda decision suggested the prosecution
733

Id. at 995.
See Susan R. Klein, Transparency and Truth During Custodial Interrogations and
Beyond, 97 B.U. L. REV. 993, 994 (2017).
735 Tracey Maclin, A Comprehensive Analysis of the History of Interrogation Law, with
Some Shots Directed at Miranda v. Arizona, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1387, 1411 (2015) (quoting
THOMAS & LEO, supra note 23, at 172).
736 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1965) (“The defendant may waive effectuation
of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”).
737 Alschuler, supra note 40, at 853.
738 Id. at 63-64 (quoting WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 59 (1967)); see
also Charles T. McCormick, Law and the Future: Evidence, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 218, 222
(1956) (“[O]rdinary morality . . . sees nothing wrong in asking a man, for adequate reason,
about particular misdeeds of which he has been suspected and charged.”).
739 Jacobi, supra note 44, at 78.
740 Id.
734
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would face a “heavy burden” in establishing waiver,741 more recent Court
decisions have undercut that holding. In an important decision handed down in
June 2010, Berghuis v. Thompkins,742 the Supreme Court held that a suspect
could implicitly waive his Miranda rights by talking to police and that
affirmative waiver of rights from a suspect is not required.743 The constitutional
permissibility of abolishing the waiver requirement follows straightforwardly
from the Berghuis holding.
Because Berghuis allows the police to dispense with a waiver, some
commentators have criticized it in apocalyptic terms. Some have suggested that
it almost marks the end of the Miranda regime.744 Others have argued that it has
“enormous practical implications” for policing.745 Their contention is that
Berghuis offers law enforcement agencies the opportunity to eliminate from
their standard Miranda warning procedure the explicit request for a waiver of
rights746—precisely the step we propose here. But the extent to which American
law enforcement agencies have generally taken up that invitation is unclear.
Barry Feld’s study of interrogations of juveniles in Minnesota found no
examples of implied waivers, but it rested on interrogations conducted between
2003 and 2006, before Berghuis was handed down.747 Since Berghuis was
decided, some law enforcement officers have apparently been trained to avoid
asking for explicit waivers, particularly in California, where training materials
appear to be particularly aggressive in how to avoid Miranda’s costs.748 But

741 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (“If the interrogation continues without the presence of an
attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and
his right to retained or appointed counsel.”).
742 560 U.S. 370 (2010).
743 Id. at 384. For an insightful debate about the merits of Berghuis, see Weisselberg &
Bibas, supra note 43.
744 See, e.g., Richard L. Budden, Comment, All in All, Miranda Loses Another Brick from
Its Wall: The U.S. Supreme Court Swings Its Hammer in Berghuis v. Thompkins, Dealing A
Crushing Blow to the Right to Remain Silent, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 483, 496-509 (2011); Illan
M. Romano, Note, Is Miranda on the Verge of Extinction? The Supreme Court Loosens
Miranda's Grip in Favor of Law Enforcement, 35 NOVA L. REV. 525, 526 (2011); cf. Maclin,
supra note 735, at 1406 n.107 (agreeing that “Thompkins ‘is perhaps the most significant
Miranda case yet decided’” (quoting THOMAS & LEO, supra note 671, at 192)).
745 Weisselberg & Bibas, supra note 43, at 75; see also THOMAS & LEO, supra note 671,
at 192 (“[I]n removing the last residue of the ‘heavy burden’ waiver language from Miranda
doctrine, Thompkins is perhaps the most significant Miranda case yet decided.”).
746 See, e.g., Kinports, supra note 45, at 406 (arguing that Berghuis and related decisions
“allow law enforcement officials to do a complete end run around Miranda, reducing the
Warren Court’s decision to a formalistic requirement that warnings be read and otherwise
reinstating the voluntariness due process test”).
747 See Feld, supra note 11, at 419 n.125, 428.
748 See TRACEY MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 308 n.54 (2013) (discussing the practice of “questioning suspects
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recent California appellate decisions on Miranda issues do not show a clear
pattern of California police officers dispensing with the formal waiver
requirement.749
Based on our empirical evidence of harm to law enforcement from Miranda,
officers should take steps to move in the direction Berghuis allows. Asking
suspects directly for a waiver obviously creates the chance suspects will
refuse—preventing any questioning whatsoever. Moving away from explicit
waivers will likely lead to additional confessions (and crime clearances) and is
consistent with current Miranda doctrine as explicated in Berghuis.
Closely related to the concept of waiver are the questioning cutoff rules,
which prevent police from moving forward with questioning if a suspect
“lawyers up.”750 Here, too, we believe that these rules create social costs by
preventing legitimate police questioning. And here too, we believe reasonable
alternatives exist, as the Department of Justice (for example) outlined in its
report on Miranda.751 Along with the formal waiver requirement, the
questioning cutoff rules should be abolished and replaced with a videotaping
regime—a regime we explain below.
B. Modifying Miranda’s Warnings
If jettisoning Miranda’s waiver and questioning cut-off requirements reduces
social harm, should the famous warnings also be jettisoned? Here the available
empirical evidence suggests that we can have our cake and eat it too—i.e., we
can give warnings to suspects without having them interfere with police efforts.
It is possible to wonder whether Miranda warnings do any good. The
available evidence suggests that the warnings are not generally understood by
suspects.752 And in this Symposium, there did not seem to be much enthusiasm
that the warnings are doing any real good.753 But perhaps requiring police to
‘outside of Miranda’”); Weisselberg, supra note 712, at 132-39 (discussing earlier California
training practices); Weisselberg, supra note 45, at 1577 (same).
749 Compare People v. Mejia, No. E064637, 2016 WL 4655781, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App.
Sept. 7, 2016) (“The officer first read defendant his Miranda rights from a card, concluding
with two questions: ‘Do you understand the rights I read to you? Having these rights in mind,
do you want to talk to me about the rifle?’”), with In re Art T., 234 Cal. App. 4th 335, 340
(2015) (describing how an officer “made no attempt to secure an express waiver of rights”
from a suspect but simply continued to talk to him after reading of rights).
750 See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S.
675, 687-88 (1988); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 487 (1981).
751 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 708, at 39-40 (“[W]e
see no reason why a reasonable effort should not be made to persuade an uncooperative
suspect to make a statement or answer questions.”).
752 Richard Rodgers et al., General Knowledge and Misknowledge of Miranda Rights: Are
Effective Miranda Advisements Still Necessary?, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 432, 432
(2013).
753 See Alschuler, supra note 40, at 890 (“Fifty years’ experience has confirmed the
fourfold failure of the fourfold warnings.”); Dripps, supra note 521, at 932-33 (arguing for a
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deliver warnings to suspects in custody can be justified on the grounds that it
signals our society’s commitment to the rule of law, even during police
interrogation.754
In any event, given that the Miranda decision required warnings, the simplest
path for reform would be to leave them largely in place. Fortunately, from a
social harm perspective, the available literature suggests the warnings
themselves are not the cause of lost confessions and clearances.755 The best
evidence of this fact comes from the experience of law enforcement agencies
following the Supreme Court’s 1964 Escobedo decision, after which many
police agencies began giving various warnings without substantial effects on
confessions.756 At the annual meeting of the National Association of Attorneys
General, held in May 1966 (after Escobedo but shortly before Miranda), the
“clear consensus” was that Escobedo had had little effect on the rate of
confessions and that confession rates remained constant even in those states
where courts had extended Escobedo to require the police to warn suspects of
their rights.757 A related indication that warnings per se were not responsible for
the change in the rates comes from the practice of the FBI, which gave warnings
on the right to remain silent without apparent adverse effect.758
The available empirical evidence also confirms that warnings have
comparatively little effect on confession rates. In Detroit, there was, at most, a
2.8% drop in the confession rate after police began warning suspects of a right
to remain silent after Escobedo—from 60.8% of all cases in 1961 to 58% of all

consistent approach to both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson &
Richard A. Leo, The Miranda App: Metaphor and Machine, 97 B.U. L. REV. 935, 937 (2017)
(“Strikingly, the core problem that gave rise to Miranda—namely, the coercive pressure of
custodial interrogation—has remained largely unchanged.”); Eve Brensike Primus,
Disentangling Miranda and Massiah: How to Revive the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
as a Tool for Regulating Confession Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1085, 1087 (2017) (“Many scholars
have mourned this dilution of suspects’ Miranda rights.”); Slobogin, supra note 47, at 115859. But see Thomas, supra note 6, at 1215.
754 See Schulhofer, supra note 101, at 451.
755 See Cassell, supra note 16, at 493-94 (arguing that the simple recitation of the rights
does not appear to be the cause of the decline in the confession rates).
756 See Cyril D. Robinson, Police and Prosecutor Practices and Attitudes Relating to
Interrogation as Revealed by Pre- and Post-Miranda Questionnaires: A Construct of Police
Capacity to Comply, 1968 DUKE L.J. 425, 482 (reporting that after Escobedo but before
Miranda ninety percent of police and prosecutors said they advised suspects of their right to
silence).
757 Sidney E. Zion, Prosecutors Say Confession Rule Has Not Harmed Enforcement, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 1966, at 27.
758 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 483 (1966). The Miranda majority went on to equate
the limited FBI practice of warning of rights with the Miranda requirements—an equation
that was clearly wrong. See GRAHAM, supra note 673, at 181-82 (noting that “important
differences” made Miranda “far more generous”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL
POLICY, supra note 708, at 39-40 (calling FBI practice “basically different”).
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cases in 1965.759 In Pittsburgh, a substantial decline occurred in the confession
rate after Miranda, even though it was the pre-Miranda practice of the detectives
to warn suspects of their right to remain silent and to, at some point, advise
suspects that they would receive counsel.760 In New Haven, the Yale Law
Journal reported no support in its data for the claim that warnings of rights
caused a decline in police success at obtaining confessions.761 Finally, in
Philadelphia, an estimated 90% of arrested suspects made statements before
Escobedo, 80% (estimated) after Escobedo when police gave limited warnings,
68.3% when police gave more extended warnings as required by the Third
Circuit, and 40.7% when police followed Miranda.762 Thus, the biggest drop
followed not the imposition of warning requirement itself, but rather the
imposition of the Miranda warnings-and-waiver regime.
While warnings themselves do not substantially interfere with law
enforcement efforts to obtain convictions, if Miranda’s waiver requirement and
cut-off rules are abolished, that will necessitate some corollary modification of
the Miranda warnings. As currently structured, the warnings promise a suspect
a lawyer before questioning occurs—implicitly creating the questioning cut-off
rule discussed in the previous Section. A modification to limit Miranda’s harms
would need to change that promise. One way of redrafting the Miranda rules
along these lines would be as follows:
(1) You have the right to remain silent.
(2) Anything you say may be used as evidence.
(3) You have a right to an attorney when we bring you before a judge.
(4) If you cannot afford an attorney, the judge will appoint one for you
without charge.
(5) We are required to bring you before a judge without unnecessary
delay.763
These warnings modify the third and fourth Miranda warnings, which
promise suspects an attorney during questioning as part of Miranda’s
prophylactic protections.764 As a practical matter, police never provide suspects
759

See Souris, supra note 50, at 255; see also Cassell, supra note 16, at 428 (discussing
the study at greater length).
760 See Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 87, at 8.
761 Wald et al., supra note 51, at 1569.
762 See Controlling Crime Hearings, supra note 292, at 200-01; Cassell, supra note 16, at
402-04.
763 See Cassell, supra note 16, at 496.
764 The Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel does not generally apply during custodial
interrogation following an arrest. It is possible to craft an argument for expanding the right to
counsel during questioning, as Eve Primus does capably in this Symposium. See Primus,
supra note 753, at 1089 (arguing for a more “robust” protection for criminal suspects under
the Sixth Amendment during questioning). However, Primus one-sidedly assesses the
concerns of suspects, and her proposals would clearly increase the harms to law enforcement
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with an attorney if they ask for one.765 Moreover, the Court has already approved
a warning that contains similar language to these.766 As Tonja Jacobi has pointed
out, “Both prior to and subsequent to Dickerson, the Court has displayed a
willingness to tolerate legislative tinkering with Miranda, by varying the
Miranda warnings, rather than substituting them altogether.”767 The proposal
also adds a fifth warning, advising suspects of the constitutional requirement of
prompt appearance before a judge. This kind of warning has been suggested by
other commentators,768 and it does not seem likely to interfere with confessions.
It is also possible to wonder about broader changes to the Miranda warnings.
For example, some commentators have suggested that police officers might be
required to have a “dialogue” with suspects to ensure that they understand their
rights.769 Still others have discussed ways in which the Miranda warnings might
be delivered in order to make them more “effective.”770 The concerns about
these types of modifications is that they would likely increase the number of
suspects who refused to waive their rights, thereby exacerbating the harms we
have tried to explicate in this Article. Perhaps such broader changes can be
justified through a cost-benefit analysis. But without more careful consideration
of the serious costs that follow from lost confessions, it is hard to say.
One modification of the warnings that would not harm law enforcement—and
could significantly increase the number of confessions—would be to modify the
warnings so that they track the warning police currently deliver in England and
Wales.771 Suspects there are advised it “may harm your defense if you do not
mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court.”772 Craig
Bradley has made the case for changing Miranda warnings along these lines at
length.773 And Chris Slobogin has pointed out that this language was added to
discussed in this Article by preventing police from questioning an even larger percentage of
suspects than Miranda prevents.
765 See Alschuler, supra note 40, at 873 (discussing the “right to counsel that wasn’t”).
766 Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 198 (1989).
767 Jacobi, supra note 44, at 22 (first citing Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 202-03; then citing
Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 62 (2010)).
768 See, e.g., id at 28-30.
769 See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Dialogue Approach to Miranda Warnings and
Waiver, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1437 (2012).
770 See, e.g., Ferguson & Leo, supra note 753, at 948-49.
771 See generally Chris Blair, Miranda and the Right to Silence in England, 11 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 1 (2003); Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial
Evidence: A Comparison of the English and American Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1
(1986).
772 Craig M. Bradley, Interrogation and Silence: A Comparative Study, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J.
271, 285 (2009).
773 Id. at 297 (“[T]he ‘English warning’ as to the use of silence is a sensible rule that would
advance the search for truth.”); see also Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93
MINN. L. REV. 1327, 1329 (2009). But cf. Geoffrey S. Corn, The Missing Miranda Warning:
Why What You Don’t Know Really Can Hurt You, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 761, 762 (urging an
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the English/Welsh warnings to respond to lower confession rates produced by
Miranda-style changes in interrogation law—with the apparent effect of
increasing confession rates.774 Such a change runs up against current precedent,
not only in Miranda but arguably also the decision from a year earlier, Griffin v.
California.775 But as Alschuler has argued in this Symposium, it might be
possible to convince the Court to reconsider Griffin and Miranda and allow
adverse inferences because it might permit other approaches to questioning
suspects.776 Our research suggests that changes in this direction might help to
undo some of Miranda’s harmful effects on confession and clearance rates.
C. Recording of Custodial Interrogations
So far we have discussed ways in which Miranda’s rules should be curtailed
to avoid harming law enforcement. But we are obviously aware that there are
competing concerns during police interrogation. At the top of the list of concerns
is avoiding physical coercion or threats to obtain a confession. But Miranda is
poorly constructed to block physical coercion, a point first made by the Miranda
dissenters.777 Recording of interrogations promises to be far more effective in
preventing mistreatment than the requirement that an officer read some warnings
off of a card.778 As part of any Miranda reform, adding videotaping seems like
it could be an important step.
Although not required by Miranda or any federal constitutional provision,779
videotaping appears to be increasingly common around the country. According
to a recent survey, “[s]ince 2003, the number of states requiring law enforcement
officers to electronically record some or all interviews conducted with suspects
additional warning that advises suspects that no adverse inference would will result from
invoking the right to silence).
774 Christopher Slobogin, Comparative Empiricism and Police Investigative Practices, 37
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 321, 337 (2011).
775 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that the Fifth Amendment “forbids either comment
by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is
evidence of guilt”).
776 Alschuler, supra note 40, at 860 (“With a forthright, moderate incentive for cooperation
in place, perhaps the deceptive stratagems could be abandoned.”); see also Donald Dripps,
Foreword: Against Police Interrogation—And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699 (1988).
777 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Those who use
third-degree tactics and deny them in court are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully
about warnings and waiver.”).
778 See Cassell, supra note 22, at 1120-22; cf. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d
540, 558-63 (S.D.N.Y.) (requiring a trial program of body cameras as a response to concerns
about stop and frisk polices of the NYPD), on appeal, 736 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013) (requiring
reassignment), and vacated in part, remanded in part, 743 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2014) (vacated
in part and remanded for purpose of exploring settlement).
779 See Slobogin, supra note 47, at 1188-93 (noting that a recording is not required by
Miranda but making arguments for how it could be).
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in their custody has grown from two to at least twenty-two.”780 In addition to
specific requirements that police record interviews, a growing number of police
departments are requiring their officers to wear uniform-mounted bodycameras.781 “Recent surveys suggest that about 25% of the nation’s 17,000
police agencies [are using video recording devices], with fully 80% of agencies
evaluating the technology.”782 As of August 2016, of the sixty-eight “major city”
police departments in the United States, about forty-three have some type of
body worn-camera programs in place.783 The Department of Justice recently
awarded $23 million in funding for a body-worn camera pilot program that will
provide seventy-three police agencies in thirty-two states funding for purchase
of body cameras and technical assistance.784
While the trend at the state level is very much in the direction of recording
policing questioning at the federal level, the Department of Justice for many
years resisted this trend and rarely recorded custodial interviews.785 Then, on
May 12, 2014, the Department of Justice announced a change to its interview
policy.786 The new policy establishes a presumption that statements made by
780

Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Dep’t of Justice, New Department Policy Concerning
Electronic Recording of Statements, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1552, 1552 (2015); see also Jim
Dwyer, Unmet Pledge: Interrogations Are Not Filmed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2016, at A24
(noting twenty-two states and the District of Columbia record some interrogations, but New
York City has not yet met its pledge to do so). A convenient resource for tracking
developments in this area is a website maintained by the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers. See Recording Interrogations, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW.,
https://www.nacdl.org/recordinginterrogations [https://perma.cc/J46B-2UUU] (last visited
Feb. 14, 2017).
781 See generally Kami Chavis Simmons, Body-Mounted Police Cameras: A Primer on
Police Accountability vs. Privacy, 58 HOWARD L.J. 881 (2015).
782 Jay Stanley, Police Body-Mounted Cameras: With Right Policies in Place, A Win for
All,
Version
2.0,
ACLU
(Mar.
2015),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/police_body-mounted_cameras-v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ADU2-HP4V]; see also Research on Body-Worn Cameras and Law
Enforcement, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www.nij.gov/topics/lawenforcement/technology/pages/body-worn-cameras.aspx
[https://perma.cc/NYK6-Z6LV]
(noting that the number of police departments not using body cameras is around seventy-five
percent).
783 Police Body Worn Cameras: A Policy Scorecard, LEADERSHIP CONF. (Aug. 2016),
https://www.bwcscorecard.org/ [https://perma.cc/L89W-JHMV].
784 Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Awards over $23 Million in Funding for
Body Worn Camera Pilot Program to Support Law Enforcement Agencies in 32 States, DEP’T
JUST. (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-awards-over-23million-funding-body-worn-camera-pilot-program-support-law
[https://perma.cc/2ST5X2SB].
785 See Thomas P. Sullivan, The Department of Justice’s Misguided Resistance to
Electronic Recording of Custodial Interviews, 59 FED. LAW. 62, 63 (2012).
786 See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to
Assoc.
Att’y
Gen.
et
al.
(May
12,
2014),
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individuals during custodial interviews will be electronically recorded.787 The
policy also encourages agents and prosecutors to consider electronic recording
in investigative or other circumstances where the presumption does not apply.788
Although the policy contains exceptions,789 this new Department of Justice
policy means that recording is coming to the federal level as well.790
One reason why the Department of Justice was concerned about recording
interrogations may have been the possibility that doing so might reduce
confession rates. Just as there is little data in this country on confession rates,
we have surprisingly little data on the effect of recording on confession rates.
One of the present authors (Cassell) collected the available data on this point in
a 1996 article, concluding that it did not generally appear to harm law
enforcement efforts.791 Since then, there has been some, largely anecdotal,
empirical evidence collected on the issue.792 One question that arises from this
evidence is whether the recording equipment should be made visible to the
suspect. A study of officer’s experiences with recording found that visible
recording equipment reduced the confession rate,793 and the most widely used
interrogation manual accordingly recommends against making the recording
device visible.794 Nonetheless, given the fact that law enforcement agencies and
supporters seem to have acquiesced in (at least hidden) recording, it seems
reasonable to conclude that practice will not significantly harm interrogation
efforts.795
Video recording also offers one undoubted advantage over Miranda: It helps
prevent wrongful convictions due to false confessions. While the extent of the
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1165406/recording-policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RW48-WWYW].
787 Id. at 1, 2 (clarifying that “electronic recording” encourages the use of video recording
to satisfy the presumption, but allowing the use of audio recording when video is unavailable).
788 Id.
789 See Harvard Law Review Ass’n, supra note 780, at 1552 (noting that the new policy
fails to provide enforcement and accountability measures).
790 Id.
791 Cassell, supra note 16, at 489.
792 See, e.g., THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, NW. U. SCH. OF L. CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS,
POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS 24 (2004) (reporting that
officers who recorded interrogations were generally pleased with the results).
793 See Jayne, supra note 726, at 105-08 (finding that of investigators surveyed following
the imposition of mandatory recording requirements during custodial interrogation, 74%
believed it had not affected the number of confessions, while 22% thought it had reduced the
number of confessions, and 4% thought it had increased the number of confessions).
Interestingly, Jayne reported that confession rates declined when the recording equipment was
visible—from 82% when recording equipment was never visible to 43% when it was always
visible. Id.
794 INBAU ET AL., supra note 82, at 51.
795 See Jacobi, supra note 44, at 44-45; Kassin et al., supra note 718, at 393 (reporting that
81% of police officers surveyed favored recording interrogations).
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false confession problem has sometimes been overblown,796 there is no doubt
that police on rare occasions obtain a false confession.797 We have not discussed
the problem elsewhere in this Article because, in terms of aggregate national
crime statistics, the false confession problem is almost certainly so small as to
be completely undetectable.798 But the important point for present purposes is
that Miranda does nothing to prevent false confessions and, indeed, may place
the innocent at greater risk by blocking voluntary confessions that could help
exonerate them.799 A system of recording interrogations would certainly do far
more than Miranda to protect the innocent.800 We add videotaping as part of our
Miranda reform because it appears to offer a true “win-win”—more protection
for suspects against involuntary confessions while not reducing law
enforcement’s ability to obtain voluntary confessions.
D. Renewed Focus on the Voluntariness Test
Our tentative proposal necessarily places greater emphasis on voluntariness
issues. By eliminating the waiver requirement and questioning cut-off rules (and
making associated changes in the warnings), courts will necessarily have to pay
more attention to whether a defendant gave not merely a “Mirandized”
confession but also a “voluntary” confession.
796

See Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An Examination of Alleged Cases
of Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523 (1999).
797 See generally Julia Carrano & Marvin Zalman, An Introduction to Innocence Reform,
in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 11 (Marvin
Zalman & Julia Carrano eds., 2014).
798 One back-of-the-envelope calculation to support this assertion is that the National
Registry of Exonerations reports that from 1989 to 2012 it has identified about 130 cases of
wrongful conviction due to false confessions. REPORT BY THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN THE U.S., 1989-2012, at 40 (2012). During that same
twenty-three-year period, police arrested about 46 million people (assuming 2 million
arrests/year for index crimes, see, e.g., UCR-2010 tbl.29 (reporting 2,195,000 arrests in
2010)). Assuming the exonerations all involved truly innocent persons (a debatable
assumption), wrongful convictions due to false confession occur about once for every 35,000
arrests. To be sure, reported wrongful convictions are only a fraction of actual wrongful
convictions. But our limited point is that it seems unlikely that false convictions leading to
wrongful convictions is a regular phenomenon in day-to-day law enforcement. Of course, for
those who disagree with this assertion, the point remains that those false confessions occur
under the Miranda regime—and, indeed may be occurring more frequently because of the
Miranda regime. See generally Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False
Confessions and Lost Confessions—and from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497
(1998). We also agree that every wrongful conviction is itself a substantial cost that society
should attempt to avoid.
799 Id. at 538-52.
800 See Paul G. Cassell, Can We Protect the Innocent Without Freeing the Guilty?
Thoughts on Innocence Reforms that Avoid Harmful Tradeoffs, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF INNOCENCE EXONERATIONS 16-19
(forthcoming 2017); Cassell, supra note 16, at 488-89.
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And that is good thing. One of the clear problems with Miranda is that it has,
in essence “become a substitute for serious voluntariness scrutiny,”801 as others
in this Symposium have pointed out.802 Under the current regime, as a practical
matter, courts simply adjudicate whether police have complied with Miranda’s
warnings-and-waiver regime. If so, they readily admit the confession without
much serious additional scrutiny. In this sense, Miranda has “practically
displaced voluntariness determinations”803 because once a suspect has waived
his Miranda rights, “the routinized Miranda ritual lulls judges into admitting
confessions with little inquiry into voluntariness.”804
Our reform proposal would effectively revitalize the voluntariness test,
simply by forcing courts to pay more attention to such issues. Because police
questioning would not be covered by explicit waiver and questioning cut-off
rules, courts would be forced to make a more searching inquiry into police
conduct during interrogations whether that ultimately produced an involuntary
confession.
Sometimes it is argued that courts lack the capacity to make such
voluntariness determinations.805 But the simple fact of the matter is that courts
routinely have to make voluntariness determinations even under the existing
Miranda regime. Whether or not a statement was “voluntary” dictates, for
example, whether a non-Mirandized statement can be used for impeachment
purposes806 or whether the fruits of such a statement can be admitted into
evidence.807
Focusing admissibility hearings on voluntariness issues would lead defense
attorneys and courts to focus on substantive issues surrounding confessions
rather than on procedural ones. As Bill Stuntz has powerfully written, Miranda
was part of a Warren Court trend that “proceduralized criminal litigation,
siphoning the time of attorneys and judges away from the question of the
defendant’s guilt or innocence and toward the process by which the defendant
was arrested, tried, and convicted.”808 Focusing more on voluntariness

801

Weisselberg & Bibas, supra note 43, at 80.
See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 40, at 856.
803 Weisselberg, supra note 45, at 1595; see also Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About Miranda:
Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV.
601 (2006). See generally GRANO, supra note 708, at 135-38 (discussing the historical
meaning of the voluntariness test).
804 George C. Thomas III, The End of the Road for Miranda v. Arizona?: On the History
and the Future of the Rules for Police Interrogation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 18 (2000).
805 It is also sometimes argued that the very concept of “voluntariness” is essentially
incoherent, as a powerful article by Ron Allen contends. See Ronald J. Allen, Miranda’s
Hollow Core, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 71, 72 (2006).
806 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
807 United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004).
808 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 228 (2011).
802
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questions—and less on Miranda’s daunting number of procedural issues—is a
step that should be applauded, not criticized.
Greater focus on voluntariness would allow more consideration of what sorts
of psychological techniques police officers can use during questioning.809 One
of the great mysteries of the Miranda decision is how it could so strongly
condemn psychological tactics and, at the same time, do so little about them.
The point was perhaps most nicely made by Liva Baker, who wrote:
The last laugh in the Miranda episode was not had by its author, Earl
Warren . . . , but by Fred E. Inbau and John E. Reid, the authors of the
interrogation manual that he quoted frequently and with
disapproval . . . . Warren exposed the techniques taught in that manual and
others, which enable the police to bring psychological pressures to bear on
the suspect to “persuade, trick, or cajole him out of exercising his
constitutional rights.” With this to recommend it, the manual became a best
seller among police and a second edition had to be printed. “All but a few
of the interrogation tactics and techniques presented in our earlier
publication are still valid,” the authors purred in their post-Miranda edition,
adding that all that is required to is give the warnings, get a waiver, and
proceed.810
Greater scrutiny of the tactics used during interrogations would be a good
thing—and would not harm law enforcement efforts. The police seem likely to
win the vast majority of those court challenges,811 because “[i]n the great
majority of in-custody interrogations observed, the possibility of coercion
appear[s] slight.”812 One quantifiable measure of this fact is that police
questioning is generally very limited. Leo’s Bay Area study in 1993 found that
most interrogations lasted less than an hour.813 Cassell and Hayman’s study
found that, of 86 interrogations, only 11 extended beyond 30 minutes and only
1 extended beyond an hour.814 To the extent that courts give greater scrutiny of
very long interrogations, as some have advocated,815 that scrutiny will fall on a
tiny percentage of cases—and precisely the tiny percentage of cases where most
judicial time and energy should be devoted.
At the same time, however, we have concerns about broad interpretations of
voluntariness rules that would dramatically change existing practices. For
809

See Slobogin, supra note 47, at 1164-67.
GRAHAM, supra note 673, at 315-16.
811 THOMAS & LEO, supra note 671, at 210 (citing WELSH WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING
PROTECTIONS 122 n.40 (2001) (noting only nine cases of involuntary postwaiver interrogation
out of 2000 cases)); Thomas, supra note 731, at 1977 (noting that the state wins ninety-six
percent of voluntariness issues).
812 LAFAVE, supra note 677, at 386.
813 Leo, supra note 57, at 279 tbl.6.
814 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 892.
815 See Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for the
Voluntariness Test, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1, 46-48 (2015).
810
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example, some observers have suggested that police officers should be forbidden
from engaging in deceptive practices.816 A firm basis for such proposals is
lacking because, while such practices may (like any other technique) produce
false confessions, they also produce vastly larger numbers of truthful
confessions.817 Moreover, the fundamental problem with such suggestions is that
they would require restricting hundreds of thousands of police interrogations
every year in ways that seem likely to harm police efforts.818
Similarly problematic are proposals that would forbid admissibility of
confessions that do not “fit” the crime.819 The problem with this approach is that,
as Thomas has explained, “even ‘true’ confessions are often riddled with halftruths because suspects want to paint the most favorable picture possible.”820
The false confessions literature demonstrates numerous reasons why suspects
might give otherwise truthful confessions that deviate (or apparently deviate)
from the crime scene’s facts.821 To be sure, research on false confessions has
established that in most cases where a suspect gives a false confession, that
confession will often be contradicted by crime scene or other evidence.822 But
the same can be said of a vastly larger number of cases where a suspect gives a
true confession. Without taking into account the relative frequency or
infrequency of false confessions to truthful confessions, it is impossible to
deduce that an inconsistency in a confession is evidence of a truth or falsity.
Indeed, if anything, the available evidence suggests that it is far more likely
that any confession containing inconsistencies will turn out to be a true
confession rather than a false confession. To establish this point, it is only
necessary to have some rough measure of the relative proportion of false
confessions to true confessions. While precise quantification is impossible, the
empirical literature suggests (unsurprisingly) that the great majority of
confessions and incriminating statements are true.823 And, as discussed above, a

816 For good overviews of this issue, see generally Jacobi, supra note 661; Slobogin, supra
note 47, at 1167-68.
817 See Lawrence Rosenthal, Against Orthodoxy: Miranda Is Not Prophylactic and the
Constitution Is Not Perfect, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 579, 616 (2007).
818 See Christopher Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1275, 1289-90
(2007); Slobogin, supra note 47, at 1161.
819 See, e.g., Primus, supra note 815, at 50-51; Julie Tanaka Siegel, Note, Confessions in
an International Age: Re-Examining Admissibility Through the Lens of Foreign
Interrogations, 115 MICH. L. REV. 277, 302-05 (2016).
820 George C. Thomas III, Telling Half-Truths, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996, at 20.
821 Cassell, supra note 796, at 594-95.
822 See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1051, 1087 (2010).
823 See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 798, at 507-13; Marvin Zalman, Qualitatively Estimating
the Incidence of Wrongful Convictions, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 221 (2012) (surveying available
empirical literature on wrongful convictions and estimating an overall trial error rate for all
causes at between 0.5% and 1.0% for felony offenses).
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majority of these confessions and false statements will have inconsistencies in
them.
E. Fewer Costs, More Benefits Than Miranda
These tentative ideas we have sketched out suggest it would be possible to
craft a superior alternative to Miranda, one that minimizes the costs to society
from restrictions on law enforcement while properly protecting suspects’
legitimate interests. In engaging in such cost-benefit analysis, we are doing
nothing more than Miranda’s defenders have urged. As Kamisar wrote in 1987,
striking a balance “is the way Miranda’s defenders—not its critics—have talked
about the case for the past twenty years.”824 Indeed, that is still the way Miranda
is defended.825
The reforms that we suggest here, particularly eliminating Miranda’s waiver
and questioning cut-off rules (and perhaps, in addition, adding an adverse
inference warning) would likely increase law enforcement’s ability to clear
crimes and convict criminals through voluntary confessions. In considering how
much of a benefit this is, the starting point must be that voluntary confessions
remain an important part of law enforcement in America today. The Supreme
Court has emphasized that “[a]dmissions of guilt are more than merely
‘desirable’; they are essential to society’s compelling interest in finding,
convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.”826 Thus, the “‘ready
ability to obtain uncoerced confessions is not an evil but an unmitigated good.’
Without these confessions, crimes go unsolved and criminals unpunished. These
are not negligible costs . . . .”827
The data we review here suggest Miranda resulted in a loss of a substantial
number of voluntary confessions, both as measured by the confession rate
studies and by (as an understated second-best approach) FBI clearance rate data.
While we have not attempted to fully map out the ultimate consequences of these
lost confessions, there can be little doubt that they operated to produce the
unsolved crimes and unpunished offenders that the Court has warned about, with
significant harm to society.
824

Yale Kamisar, The “Police Practice” Phases of the Criminal Process Revolution and
the Three Phases of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER YEARS 143, 150 (Herman Schwartz
ed., 1987).
825
See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The Miranda Case Fifty Years Later, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1293,
1300 (suggesting that the balance of power with respect to Miranda has been “worked out”).
826 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) (quoting United States v. Washington, 431
U.S. 181, 186 (1977)).
827 Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 796 (2009) (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501
U.S. 171, 181 (1991)); see also Ronald J. Allen, The Misguided Defenses of Miranda v.
Arizona, 5 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 205, 214 (2007) (“We should not treat the serious matter
of trying to limit criminality as a high school civics lesson in which the predominate issue is
to see how we can get more and more people to obstruct legitimate police investigations.
Rights are wonderful things, but so, too, is the ability—dare I say “right”?—to live one’s life
free from the predations of individuals who have no respect for your rights.”).

846

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:685

Turning first to clearance rates, a decline in clearance rates “signals a decline
in punishment certainty and threatens to undermine deterrence principles, a key
foundation of our criminal justice system.”828 If a crime goes uncleared, the
responsible criminal is never held accountable and, to the contrary, remains free
to commit further crimes. Lower clearance rates thus indicate that “the state is
ineffective at insulating citizens from violent offenders, which may contribute
to negative social reactions such as loss of faith in public officials, an increased
sense of fear and insecurity.”829
Our interest in lower clearance rates, however, is only as a telltale of the
resultant problem of lower confession rates. Lower clearance rates suggest lower
confession rates. And confessions, in turn, are frequently needed to secure a
conviction,830 even in this age of DNA testing and other advanced forensic
science.831 When Miranda blocks the police from obtaining a voluntary
confession, in many cases the result will be a criminal who goes free—free, it
should be noted to continue his depredations against other crime victims. And
sadly, we know who those victims will be. They will disproportionately be racial
minorities, residents of inner cities, the poor, and others in society who are in
the weakest position to defend against crimes.832
While the focus of this Article is a quantitative one, it important to emphasize
the limitations in the kind of data we explore. As Gerald Caplan has nicely
explained, criminological studies “reduce crime to something remote and
abstract, a string of numbers, an event that one reads about in the newspapers,
something that happens in another part of town. There is no hint of rape as a
nightmare come alive or robbery as a ruinous matter.”833 Too often the costs of
these crimes are unduly minimized, even though efforts at quantification suggest
crime victims (and their families) bear enormous burdens.834
To be sure, in some of its post-Miranda decisions, the Supreme Court appears
to have been cognizant of such costs. But there is little in the data reviewed here
to support the Court’s claim that “[i]f anything, our subsequent cases have
reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement.”835 The
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832 See JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA 8 (2015)
(discussing “failure of the law to stand up for black people when they are hurt or killed by
others”); JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & RACHEL E. MORGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2015, at 9 tbl.7 (2016).
833 Caplan, supra note 716, at 1384-85.
834 See Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and
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TED R. MILLER, MARC A. COHEN & BRIAN WIERSEMA, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, VICTIM COSTS
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Court’s decisions have generally nibbled around the edges of the doctrine (with
the possible exception of the 2010 decision in Berghuis,836 which was decided
so recently as to be largely outside of the trends our regression equations
measured). The most harmful features of Miranda have not been modified—and
the harms reflected in, for example, the FBI’s clearance rate data do not appear
to have been mitigated.837
And what, then, are Miranda’s offsetting benefits? If many of the articles in
this Symposium are to be believed, Miranda’s benefits are few and far
between.838 Alschuler writes that “Miranda is a doctrinal failure, an ethical
failure, a jurisprudential failure, and an empirical failure.”839 Dripps adds that
“whatever rules were right fifty years ago are unlikely—extremely unlikely—to
be ideal rules today or for the future.”840 Klein agrees that “[t]he Miranda
warnings have perverse results and ought to be retired and replaced.”841 David
Rossman concludes that “[a]t this point in its history, . . . Miranda is bankrupt
both intellectually and in terms of practical effect.”842 Slobogin explains that
while “Miranda was an attempt at giving police clear guidelines about
interrogation[,] . . . [o]ther than its warnings requirement, . . . it has not done
so.”843 And Charles Weisselberg agrees that “Miranda does not provide
meaningful protection for the Fifth Amendment privilege.”844
But the ultimate question is not whether Miranda confers benefits in the
abstract, but whether it is, on balance, more beneficial than other alternatives
that the Court could reasonably implement. The ideas we have sketched here
suggest it would be possible to craft a replacement for Miranda that would be a
true win-win—a system in which fewer guilty criminals go free while suspects’
legitimate interests during police questioning are protected. Our reform proposal
would deliver warnings to suspects of their right to remain silent, much as the
current system does, and would provide even stronger protections against
coercion by a system of videotaping. It would also focus the attention of defense
attorneys and courts on the most troubling confessions—those in which there is
a genuine issue of voluntariness. Such a system would not only better protect
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society from dangerous criminals but also better protect suspects from abusive
law enforcement.
CONCLUSION
We began this Article by recalling that the dissenters in Miranda had warned
that the decision would have social costs and that only time could tell how
serious the costs would be. Has Miranda handcuffed the cops over the last fifty
years? In this Article we have tried to assay all of the available empirical
evidence on Miranda’s effects on law enforcement. Based on that evidence, we
believe the best answer is ‘yes.’
This finding should not be particularly surprising. We have shown little more
than that a landmark Supreme Court decision imposing unprecedented restraints
on law enforcement made law enforcement less effective. But our conclusion is
an important one because it runs contrary to conventional academic opinion.
And whether Miranda handcuffed the cops continues to be important as courts
and policy makers must consider how to interpret and respond to Miranda’s
rules.
Our conclusion rests on multiple bases, including showing substantial
confession rate declines in Miranda’s wake as well as the FBI’s clearance rate
data which we analyze at length. Throughout our Article, we have tried to make
clear the caveats and limitations of our findings. We do not purport to have
irrefutably proven that Miranda handcuffed the cops. But we believe we have
demonstrated that the preponderance of empirical evidence points strongly in
that direction. Our findings certainly call into question the general academic
belief that Miranda has not hampered law enforcement. We hope that this
Article will lead to more research on Miranda’s effects on law enforcement.
Given the importance of the decision, we should not have to live in an empirical
desert with little information about its real-world effects.
But more broadly, if (as we suggest) Miranda has harmed law enforcement,
extremely difficult questions arise for Miranda’s defenders. Miranda extends
beyond the boundaries of the Fifth Amendment on the basis of cost-benefit
prophylaxis. But how can one measure a victim’s pain when a criminal escapes
justice against the benefit of giving that criminal the power to stop questioning?
Miranda’s defenders have worked long and hard to maintain the conventional
wisdom that Miranda did not handcuff the cops, presumably so that they would
not have to confront explicitly the costly tradeoffs that inhere in the decision. As
we now observe Miranda’s fiftieth birthday, it is time to have a full and fair
debate about the decision—about its costs, its benefits, and its alternatives.
Strong empirical evidence supports the conclusion that Miranda’s
unprecedented restrictions on law enforcement has allowed numerous criminals
to escape justice. No less than many other controversial social policies, Miranda
is not cost free. Nor is Miranda the only way to regulate police questioning. It
is time for Miranda’s defenders to acknowledge these facts and begin a frank
discussion about how we can do better.

